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This thesis develops and implements a framework for investigating 
retail change which is both theoretically and historically informed. 
The framework is applied to an investigation of teleshopping as a 
retail innovation. The investigation took the form of fieldwork 
interviews with decison-makers in companies with an interest in 
teleshopping in Britain and the United States. It is shown how the 
response which these sectors are making to the challenges of 
teleshopping can be understood within a marxist framework, by 
introducing the notion of modes of competition. These are specific 
configurations of the labour relations which have canalised the 
accumulation process in sectors of retail capital during each major 
period of capitalist accumulation. The failure of grocery retailers 
to take up teleshopping is attributed to the fact that it does not 
offer them further scope for accumulation, and it is inconsistent 
with their current mode of competition. Mail order houses are 
adopting teleshopping because it is consistent with their emerging 
mode of competition. The potential and actual restructuring which 
teleshopping enforces on the distribution chain is interpreted 
considering the way that surplus-value is shared out between the 
different capitals in the distribution chaih. This is described as 
vertical competition. It is argued that in Britain, the effect of 
British Telecom's hegemony over the telecommunications networks is 
prejudicial to the establishment of capitalistic teleshopping. The 
development of teleshopping in the United States is used to provide 
an example of a country in which the telecommunications agency has 
been prevented from taking a dominant role. Even there it is found 
that the restructuring of established sectoral boundaries, and the 
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As a research project, the investigation of teleshopping is a hard 
nut to crack. Teleshopping is a new form of retailing. There . 1.S 
little empirical evidence to support arguments which might be put 
forward concerning its significance. As a result much of the 
published literature which deals with teleshopping has a 
disreputable a1.r of speculation to it. Yet, teleshopping 1.S 
important. As an example of an ever growing range of consumer 
serv1.ces based on computer and telecommunications technologies it is 
l.n the thick of the processes which are reshaping society. 
Teleshopping challenges the conventional wisdoms of retailing, and 
so runs against the vested interests of established retail 
compan1.es. 
A consc1.OUS decison was made in this thesis is to avoid the wilder 
excesses of speculation about teleshopping and its future prospects, 
which are so common l.n the information revolution literature. 
Rather, the main thrust of the work has been to try to develop an 
appreciation of teleshopping based upon its relation to the retail 
structure. In this regard, the present work can be seen as taking 
teleshopping as a case study in the theorisation of retail change. 
The first maJor problem 1n developing this theme was that whilst 
retailing is an essential and highly visible part of modern society, 
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retail research 1S a marginal activity. Retailing is abstracted out 
of existence by orthodox economists and marxists alike. By the same 
token, conventional retail research assumes an artificial separation 
between retailing and its overall function within society. Small 
wonder then that such research fails to adequately account for 
teleshopping as an example of retail change. Unfortunately, the 
absence of any integrated theory of retailing meant that it was 
necessary to go right back to the most basic abstractions, in order 
to construct a framework for understanding retail change, which in 
turn could be used to develop a theoretically informed perspective 
on teleshopping. 
A maJor part of this thesis is the integration of retail capital 
into marxist theory. Marxist theory 1S the only theoretical 
perspective which allows retailing to be understood in both a 
rigorous and comprehensive manner. Marxist theory does not make 
distinctions solely on the basis of surface phenomena, but in terms 
of causal links. The distinctions made between sectors of capital 
~l~ 
are therefore analytical, so~ when the empirical boundaries of 
retailing alter, as happens with teleshopping, analysis is not 
constrained by out-moded categorisations. Within marx1sm retail 
capital 1S clearly definable in an analytical manner which shows 
both its peculiar logic and its role in the reproduction of society. 
\~ 
The maxist paradigm was particularly adept at showing how the 
technological nature of teleshopping creates a new set of linkages, 
and a new set of problems, for retail capital. 
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1.1 Outline of the thesis 
The first part of the thesis introduces the conventional retail 
literature. Chapter Two provides a general overview of the different 
types of retail research, dealing first with geographical and 
planning perspectives and second with the marketing and business 
literatures. Attention then turns to the literature dealing with 
retail change through an examination of the various alternative 
theories which have been proposed to explain alterations Ln retail 
institutional form. Rather than duplicate the general critique of 
retail research made in Chapter Two, the teleshopping literature 19 
decomposed into the series of for and against arguments which 
provide its only real substance. This discussion in Chapter Three 
1S meant to introduce the reader to the main issues which surround 
the introduction of teleshopping. 
Chapter Four begins the process of reconstructing teleshopping from 
an avowedly marxist viewpoint. A framework for analysis 1S 
constructed by first locating retail capital within the overall 
circuitry of capitalism, then defining its specific logic. The way 
that retail capital is implicated in the reproduction of the social 
relations of production is pointed out, with special reference to 
its position at the interface between economic life and the realm of 
consumption activities. The concepts of competition and innovation 
within capitalism are introduced and examined with respect to retail 
capital. A particular distinction is made between competition 
, 
between retailers horizontal markets, and the vertical 
competition between retail and other forms of capital. The last 
section of Chapter Four describes the fieldwork which was undertaken 
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l.I1 support of the thesis. The investigation took the form of 
interviews with senior executives representing companies with known 
interests, or potential interests l.I1 the development of 
teleshopp~. To gain a cross-national perspective interviews were 
carried out in the United States as well as the United Kingdom. 
The nature of horizontal competition between retailers in the mail 
order and grocery trades 1S the subj ect of Chapter Five. The 
development of capitalistic retailing in these trades 1S examined 
and interpreted to give the context within which teleshopping has 
emerged. This provides an historical context within which to 
interpret the results of 
marxist understanding of 
competition. 
fieldwork interviews, and to derive a 
teleshopping as a mode of retail 
The significance of teleshopping as a force to restructure the 
supply of consumer goods is the subject of Chapter Six. The nature 
of vertical competition l.I1 the grocery and mail order businesses is 
explained. Then the restructuring of the lines of battle in this 
vertical competition by teleshopping is discussed. 
Chapter Seven widens the analysis by looking at teleshopping's 
development in different national context of the United States. The 
similarities between the two countries in many ways outweigh the 
differences, and it 1S argued that this can be explained by 
appea .ling to marxist analysis. 
Chapter Eight provides an overv1ew of 
teleshopping as an example of retail change, 
the changing nature of capitalist society. 
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the significance of 
and as a component of 
I t is argued that the 
depth of insight provided by developing the thesis within a marxist 
framework 1S greater than would be possible if a more conventional 
approach had been adopted. Finally, the overall conditions which 
are transforming the dominant labour processes 1n capitalist 
society are are considered to see what part teleshopping might play 
in the restructuring of society. 
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CHAPrER TWO 
THEORY IN RETAIL RESEARCH 
In this chapter academic retail research 1S examined and found 
wanting. Retailing is very weakly theorised. Primarily, there 1S 
little attempt to provide a critical judgement of the role of 
retailing either ill the economy or in society. For the task ill 
hand, this is a serious flaw; one cannot hope to understand changes 
ill the mode of retail provision without first theorising the forces 
of social change. Most of the work reviewed here fetishizes 
retailing, or consumer behaviour, or both. It ascribes them an 
independent existence by taking them at face value. 
The retail literature contains two main sources of retail research. 
Research from the geographical and planning disciplines and research 
from business schools. Within both of these traditions there are 
two main perspectives, demand-side (behavioural) studies and supply-
side (institutional) studies. 
The maill distinction between the two traditions m demand-side 
studies is that geography has an explicitly spatial orientation; the 
business school studies do not. The similarity is a central focus 
upon consumer decision making in which the status quo 1S legittmated 
by default. The one-sided analysis of consumer choice between 
obscures the powerful dynamic of (retail firms~ self-interest ill 
determining what the alternatives will be. 
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Retail institutional studies differ between the two traditions in so 
far as the business schools exhibit a wider diversity of modes of 
study. Econometric studies are similar in outlook to the normative 
modelling studies m geography. Both are concerned with efficiency 
1n the spatial configuration of retail stores. Both theoretical 
offerings are rigid and static. 
The first part of the chapter reVlews the mam currents 1n 
geographical and planning thought on retailing. This is followed by 
a similar synOPS1S of themes 1n the marketing and business 
~ 
literatures. The third section is devoted to a discussion of 
theories of retail change. Finally, the implications, for the 
present work, of the issues raised in the chapter are examined. 
2.1 Geographical and planning perspectives on retailing 
Geographical and planning studies of retailing are considered 
together because they are cognate disciplines; they share a spatial 
tradition. Good reviews of the literature in these fields can be 
found in Davies (1976) and Dawson (1980). Reviews with an explicit 
p lann ing interest are in Guy (1980), and Davies ( 1984) . In this 
section, the essential characteristics of each maJor style of 
spatial retail research are discussed to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of conventional approaches to retailing. 
2.1.1 Normatiye spatial models 
If there 1S a natural starting point for this section it is the 
resuscitation, during the 1950s and 1960s, of earlier models of the 
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spatial pattern of settlements (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 Roots of the Fifties and Sixties 'Theories' 
Recent Author Year Inspiration Original Author Year 
Berry and Garrison 1958 
Huff 1963 
Garner 1966 
Central Place Theory Christaller 
Gravity Model Reilly 




These publications, all concerned with retail phenomena, were 
seedcorn to human geography throughout the 1960s, and on into the 
1970s. The strong spatial component of these models provided 
geographers with a seductively powerful set of new tools. Between 
1960 and 1974 there were approximately 500 studies of tertiary 
activity location most of which used Central Place Theory (White and 
Case, 1974). 
The remit of Post-War planning was to control land use patterns, and 
urban form. This was applied through land zoning. Planners 
justified their zoning decisions by invoking the service hierarchy 
in Central Place Theory. The pri.ma.ry criticism of the way planners 
used the hierarchy is that it forces retail provision into a static 
equilibrium (Dawson, 1979). In other words, "the pattern of 
shopping centres which happened to exist shortly after World War Two 
would henceforth become that which planners appeared to regard as 
the most desirable for the town in question" (Guy, 1980 p. 75). 
The general limitations of normative spatial models have been 
discussed elsewhere (Shepherd and Thomas, 1980) . The chie~ 
criticism 1.S the inability, due to excessive simplifying 
assumptions, of such models to account for real human choices. 
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There is a preoccupation with the spatial appearance of society, 
over the explanation of the causes of that form. In the retail 
studies the spatial manifestation of shops and shopping is the chief 
focus of concern. There is the sense of stasis, 1n which central 
place theory was the prime CUlprit. Disquiet over these defects set 
the scene for the shift towards more behavioural approaches, which, 
it was hoped, would allow a greater reflection of individual, or 
subjective, decision making. 
2.1.2 Behavioural approaches 
Although the physical structure of retail prOV1S10n continued to 
preoccupy planning orientated research (e.g. Dawson and Kirby, 
1979), the behavioural approach dominated retail geography from the 
mid-Seventies. Store location theory was canalised by shopper-
choice models, rather than studies of retailer strategy (Dawson, 
1980). 
Behavioural approaches required new styles of data collection and 
interpretation. The collection of data often followed the social 
psychological approaches used in marketing studies. For instance, 
the use of Kelly's Repertory Grid (Hudson, 1974), or of semantic 
differentials (Downs, 1970). Another key development was the 
application of probabilistic modelling techniques, to represent the 
variety of ways in which consumers make decisions (e.g. Burnett, 
1977; Dunn and Wrigley, 1985). 
The achilles heel of behavioural research is the implicit use of 
consumer utility ax10m (Luce, 1959). The status quo appears as the 
outcome of the free choices~individual consumers. Behavioural 
-9-
research tells only half the story. The powerful logic which lies 
behind the actions of retailers and commodity producers is 
concealed. 
The 1970s also saw an outpouring of empirical shopp~ studies. 
These provided the source material for the behavioural models (e.g. 
Wrigley et al., 1985), the input to planning studies or were 
undertaken more or less on their own merits (e.g Thorpe 1975). The 
result of this proliferation has been to immerse researchers ~ a 
wealth of detail from which theorisation is difficult (Shepherd and 
Thomas, 1980). 
2.1.3 Time geography 
One useful outcome of behaviourism was time-geography . Time-
geography has not contributed much to mainstream retail geography in 
itself, but by placing shopping behaviour in the context of everyday 
life, the socially determined nature of such activities are revealed 
(Thrift, 1977). Potentially, time-geography permits the 
consideration of the welfare implications of the shopping provision 
within the overall context of physical accessibilty and time budgets 
(Hillman et al., 1976; Jones et al., 1983). Notwithstanding some 
attempts to address the shopping needs of deprived members of 
society (for example Davies and Champion, 1980), welfare approaches 
have not been a research priority in retail geography. Rather, the 
commercial issues of distribution research have been seen as 
competitive with the social relevance movement (Davies and Kirby, 
1985) . 
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2.1.4 Systems theory 
Meanwhile planning studies concerned with the form of retail 
provision continued to flourish (Guy, 1980). New approaches such as 
Systems Theo~ within planning (McLoughlin, 1969) merely reflected 
the constant desire to legitimate planning as a SC1.ence. Systems 
theory may make for more dynamic planning models, but the systems 
approach 1.S only a framework within which the predispositions of 
planners are given substance. That systems theory is not by itself 
an alternative to normative models or to behavioural models can be 
seen l.n recent attempts to rehabilitate spatial interaction models 
and Central Place Theory into large-scale system models of the urban 
spatial structure (Batty, 1978; Clarke and Wilson, 1985). 
2.1.5 Recent trends lD retail geography 
Recently, l.n geography, there has been turn away from demand-side 
studies towards the supply-side. This has been associated with the 
growing links between geographers and retailers, 
()\-v-~ Cy 
the prestige of/I planned development. The 
and a weakening of 
new practical, or 
pragmatic, slant is most clearly illustrated by the migration of 
several of the leading retail geographers to business schools. 
Certainly, the one-sided analysis of retail patterns remal.nS 
Unabated. There 1.S still a tendency to accept the allocational 
efficiency of retailing, based upon the free-market, free-choice 
argument. Business schools are hardly the prime foci of critical 
thought on the activities of retail capital. From the other side of 
the fence, apart from some concern about the chang~ conditions of 
retail labour (Lewis, 1985), there has been virtually no attempt by 
the radical, or critical geographers to deal with the geography of 
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retailing. One of the maln items on the agenda of the present 
thesis is to construct a critical appreciation of retail capital; 
task which will be taken up in Chapter Four .. 
a 
2.1,6 Summary 
The defects in the present body of retail geographic literature are 
these: there has been an overpowertng concern for either 
methododology over theory or for measurement over concepts; and far 
too much attention has been given to the spatial manifestation of 
retail facilities or shopping behaviour. The consequence 1S that 
most retail geography is superficial and the present structure of 
provision goes unquestioned. The analysis is reduced to the mere 
description of the present physical format of retail supply. One 
reason is that retail geography nearly always starts from the 
assumption that retailing and shopptng can be considered in 
isolation from the rest of society. It implies an acceptance of the 
appropriateness and social efficiency of the status quo In retail 
supply. There 1S scant attention given to the logic of the 
structures of supply which confront shoppers. 
2,2 Retailing and marketing 
Two types of study fall under this heading. The first type derives 
from socio-psychological theory, and has had a maJor impact upon the 
nature of business research, particularly In the United States. 
Second is the economic or business history approach, which runs the 
gamut from orthodox econom1C history to anecdotal studies of 
individual firms. There 1S a split between these two types of 
study, similar to that observed in the previous section. The former 
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tend to focus upon the individual consumer whereas the latter are 
concerned within the institutional form of retailing. The individual 
level will be taken first. 
2.2.1 Socio-psychological models of conSlmer behaviour 
The core assumption of socio-psychological research is always a 
variant of the notion that individual choice behaviour is the 
outcome of: the functional qualities; and the psychological affect 
of the consumption good or service. The approaches differ in the 
way that these two features are integrated and in the postulated 
relationship between the resulting attitude and observed behaviour. 
i) Psychological models 
For example, image research holds that a retail store will be 
perceived in a symbolic manner by a shopper. The image will be made 
up of: the true functional attributes of the store; the emotional 
response that each function invokes (the function's quality); and 
the expected psychological rewards that the consumer will reap as a 
result of that particular choice (Martineau, 1969). 
The causes of these different mentalities are sought at a deeper 
level in Vroom's (1964) motivation theory. Individuals are posited 
as goal orientated. Actions are interpreted as a function of: the 
expected satisfaction which will be gained from achieving a goal; 
the subjective likelihood of achieving that goal through some 
action; and the probability of being able to undertake that action. 
Attitudinal research 1S a strand of cognitive research which has 
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attempted to specify the links between the subjective level and the 
observable act. Attitude can be defined as a uni-dimensional 
measure of the amount of 
object (Thurstone, 1931). 
affect for or against a psychological 
Value Expectancy Theory was developed to 
provide a direct measure of attitude towards an object, in terms of 
an individual's belief set and the evaluation of those beliefs 
Fishbein (1967) . 
In later work (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1973) there was an attempt to 
link the attitude towards the object to actual behaviour. A set of 
constraints, such as social pressures, were postulated. These 
constraints would not change the attitude towards the object, but 
would affect behavioural intent, and therefore actual behaviour. 
However, the distinctions upon which Value Expectancy Theory is 
based are hypothet ical (W i lkie and Pessemier, 1973) , and do not 
improve the predictive capacity of the technique, as there is a 
generally poor correlation between attitude and observed behaviour 
(Michaels and Allaman, 1980). 
ii) ConS1rner utility models 
A direct link between individual preference and choice is theorised 
In the widely used class of models based upon the consumer utility 
axlom (Luce, 1959). The difference between these models and the 
psychological approaches already discussed is one of emphasis and 
not of kind. In the latter, individual personality is investigated 
to uncover the roots of choice, in the former, observed choice lS 
taken to show the personal utility of alternatives. Whilst the 
psychological approaches can be conducted in isolation from actual 
decision making situations, utility modelling requires the direct 
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confrontation of the individual with an object and a number of 
alternative actions which will achieve that object. Both types of 
approach depend upon individuals making choices upon the subjective 
merits of the alternative ways of achieving an objective, that 1S 
some form of utility maximisation. 
The direct measurement of observed behaviour may well account for 
the much greater predictive reliability of consumer utility models 
than, for instance, attitudinal models. Here attitude is only 
measured 1n a simple way. Individuals are allowed to ascribe a 
utility to the attributes of an alternative. But the investigation 
does not deal with the psychological goals which gives the 
alternative a meaning. 
The range of alternatives which are offered to an individual are 
described in terms of attributes which are mutually comparable. 
Thus, the full range of alternatives does not constitute a 
description of the content of the goal, but merely a series of acts 
which have a similar outcome. The outcome is the focus of the 
researcher's attention, rather than the psychological affect upon 
the individual. Researchers using utility models, therefore, are 
mainly concerned with the correct specification of attributes: which 
ones to include; which to leave out; and the manner in which these 
can be analyzed to give the greatest predictive performance. Hence 
the concern with different combination rules, the form of the 
utility function, (for example Anderson, 1970) and the decision 
rules which they imply (Forester, 1979; Williams and Ortuzar, 1982). 
-15-
iii) sociological approaches 
Utility modelling merges with sociological theory through the use of 
socio-demographic variables in order to add explanatory power to the 
analysis. In so doing psychological affect 1S assumed to be 
directly related to, and replaceable by, the objective circumstances 
of individuals. Of course, these circumstances can be decomposed 
into variables that are far easier to measure, than the variables 
which the psychological models requ1re. On a simplistic level the 
researcher can then use a straightforward socio-demographic 
segmentation technique to investigate differences between consumers 
10 their sample, usually with a few impressionistic questionnaire 
responses included for good measure (for example Gillett, 1970). 
Alternatively, a more complex approach can be sought which relates 
consumer behaviour to a more highly specified sociological 
standpoint. The researcher looks for clues to the riddle of 
consumer behaviour by applying batteries of socio-demographic 
variables, constructed into concepts such as role, life-style, life-
cycle, and social class. The latter is much less common in consumer 
research than the former (Foxall, 1980), particularly in retailing 
studies. 
An individual's role compr1ses familial, career and social 
pressures. A lot of activities are undertaken to satisfy this role, 
some of these are routine, but in other cases there is competition 
between social pressures and responsibilities for the individual's 
time and money budgets. Therefore, behavioural change can be seen 
as an adaptive response 10 order to maintain some sort of 
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equilibrium. Of course there are strong similarities between this 
type of work and the time-geographic approaches of Hagerstrand 
(1970) and of the innovation adoption literature (Brown, 1968) to be 
found in geography. 
iy) social class 
IY'-()\~ 
The concept of role, however, can be a lot more powerful than this 
when harnessed with the concept of social class. If individual 
action can be meaningfully constituted in classes, or roles, then 
there must also exist social processes which bind the individuals 
into those roles or classes. This 1S because these roles and 
classes exist through long periods of time, and are reproduced from 
individual to individual. The existence of a socially defined 
activity, such as shopping, requires that groups of people should 
undertake the role of shopper. A prerequisite is the existence of a 
similar ly defined social group called shopkeepers. However, the 
content of the relationship between shoppers and shopkeepers is not 
definable only in respect of these two complementary groups, it 
requ1res the investigation of the social meaning of the act of 
shopping, and of retailing. 
y) Sl1mmary 
Most consumer research does not even begin to tackle these issues. 
Rather, the concentration is upon an individual's comparison between 
available alternatives. The researcher only wants to know how the 
choice decision is made. They are not interested ill the context ill 
which the decision arises. For this reason alone it would be 
possible to reject the present corpus of consumer research for use 
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1n this thesis. In the next sub-section attention turns to supply-
side retail literature; an area of literature which is remote from 
consumer research, but seeks to legitimate itself through the self-
same appeal to freedom of choice, and the allocational efficiency of 
free-competition. 
2.2.2 Retailing as an institutional form 
This section is composed of three ma1n literatures: the econom1CS of 
retailing; the retail management or trade literature; and the 
business history of retailing. Each of these three literatures are 
considered 1n turn. From the wealth of empirical material which 
these literatures have spawned there are few examples of retail 
studies which are placed within their wider historical context. Two 
exceptions to this rule are examined in the fourth part of this 
section. 
i) the econom1CS of retailing 
The study of retailing, or even of physical distribution as a whole, 
has been small beer to ! econonmists. As Tucker and Yamey (1973) 
point out, retailing is asbstracted out of existence in mainstream 
econom1cs. In the theory of the firm it seems as if the producers 
sell directly to the consumers. 
In the theory of retail econom1CS, the ma~ point of discussion has 
been the efficiency of different patterns of retail provision. 
Hotelling (1929) argued that retail markets would tend to be 
imperfect. Retailers would tend to locate together rather than be 
spread out into the most efficient pattern. Lerner and Singer 
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(1937), and Lewis (1945) extended the argument to show that as long 
as there is easy entry into retailing the shops will be smaller, and 
more numerous than the optimum in the suburbs, but will be at an 
approximate optimlm in the central locations. They also concluded 
that if the retailer pays the transport costs the number of shops 
will be ideal. This excess capacity is thought to ensure fierce 
price competition between retailers, which is usually held to be in 
the interests of consumers (Hood and Yamey, 1951). 
Beyond the argument over how many shops are consistent with an 
efficient distribution system, and the related themes of pricing 
(for example Naden and Jackson, 1953) and fair trade or resale price 
maintenance (for example Yamey, 1966), econom1C theory has not 
yielded great riches on the economics of the retail trade. Rather, 
there has been a tendency towards the production of a great wealth 
of empirical matter without much theoretical content (for example 
Hall, et al., 1961). 
ii) retail trade literature 
Retail studies seem doomed to slide into empiricism as it is also 
the hallmark of the retail management literature. In fact, there 
are no great distinguishing features between economic studies of 
retailing and the retail management literature, beyond the degree of 
technicality engaged and the type of journal involved. So that, 
there are many studies (for example Ingene and Lusch, 1981) that 
could be in either category. 
Retail management studies are found in a vast range of sources from 
the trade literature to academic research. The trade literature . 1S 
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profuse but deals only with the ephemeral or topical; current bones 
of contention and changes in ownership, management or strategy are 
the maln content. 
More substantial papers are found in a number of journals which 
address both an academic and an executive audience. These 
from the popular (for example the Harvard Business Review, 
range 
Retail 
and Distribution Management) through the accessible (for example 
Journal), to the quite 
Journal of Physical 
Journal of Retailing, Service Industries 
technical (for example International 
Distribution and Management, Journal of Business, 
Marketing) . 
Journal of 
The common factor in all of these journals and sources is that they 
rarely question the substance of retailing, because retailing is the 
stuff of which they are made. To question the nature of retailing 
would be to cast doubt on the substance of their own existence. The 
papers which are published here are either descriptive of changes 
which are taking place within retailing, or are prescriptive of the 
measures which retailers should take to improve their business 
performance or both (for example Star and Massel, 1981; Davies .et 
al., 1985). Social trends and changing economic circumstances are 
seen as things which "impact the industry" (Sheth, 1983 p. 6 ) that 
1S, are external pressures for change. The internal agents of 
change are almost exclusively seen as consumer tastes, the 
individual decisions of individual firms, and the competitive 
pressures which result. In this situation the poverty of the theory 
of retail change, which is considered in the next section, is hardly 
suprising. 
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iii) Business histories 
The business histories which are available are variable ~ quality 
and content. General reV1ews of the physical distribution sector 
are rare in recent years. Of particular note are reV1ews of the 
development of retailing ~ Britain by Jefferys (1954), and 
W instan ley ( 1983) . Good reV1ews of the deve lopmen t of the 
contemporary physical distribution system can be found in Jeffreys 
and Knee (1962) and Stacey and Wilson (1965). 
The purpose of the historical study is to account in systematic 
detail for the progress of retailing in all its various forms. The 
ma~ theme is that retailing has emerged and altered in response to 
periodic shifts in the nature of society. In particular to the 
demands associated with an industrialised workforce. A sub-theme is 
that there have been repeated shortenings in the links between the 
producer and the consumer by the elimination of the middle-men 
(Stacey and Wilson, 1965). As part of this process there are 
detailed descriptions of the restructuring of the retail trade, with 
the adoption of larger trading units and the growth of multiple 
trading. There is little to argue with ~ these conclusions, 
however, there is scant attention to the causal relations which 
drove this process forward. Rather the 
entered as a set of variables which are 
development of retailLng. 
influential factors are 
circumstantial to the 
Histories of individual sectors of retailing, or styles of trading 
are commonly hagiographic, often because the author is partisan (for 
example Zimmerman, 1955; Lebhar, 1963). This 1S equally true of the 
biographies of individual firms, these tend to be anecdotal and 
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colourful rather than measured or critical (for example Boswell, 
1969; Briggs, 1956; Corina, 1971). Case studies of actual business 
decisions form a sub-stratum of these individual biographies. This 
is a form of research that has had substantial influence in United 
States business schools. The architect of this strand of work was 
William Applebaum; a geographer who also held appointments as head 
of research for two large supermarket groups in the United States. 
iy) Modes of retailing 
There are a number of exceptions to the general run of retail 
research which explore the development of modes of retailing in 
their historical milieu. One mode of retailing which has attracted 
a fair amount of concern 1S the department store, both as an 
institutional form (see Samson, 1981) and in terms of its labour 
relations (Benson, 1981). Bluestone et ~ (1981) is notable 1n 
giving a number of insights into the changing structure and labour 
relations in department stores. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Bluestone et ~ (1981) 
study is the description of the way that this retail sector has been 
transformed from being petit bourgeois to capitalist over the period 
of a few decades. They also explain the effect of changing working 
practices as a logical development of the new structures of 
management and ownership. 
Aside from the irritating references to"mooes of production" 1n 
retailing, the most dissappointing aspect of Bluestone et ale 's 
(1981) report is that the department store form of retailing 1S 
taken in isolation from developments 1n other forms of economic 
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activity. There is no attempt to understand the effects of changing 
structures in the garment manufacture trade upon this form of 
retailing and vice versa. There is no real attempt to explain the 
reasons for the timing of the insurgence of capitalist modes of 
organisation into the department store business, apart from a series 
of asides which illuminate the manner of that .' . lIlvaslon. 
Furthermore, the explanatory power of their work is weakened by the 
way l.Il which they account for change 1Il the department store 
business, putting the factors together as if in some linear additive 
function. For Bluestone .e.t ala (1981) change is due to "competitive 
forces, human ingenuity, and governmen t po 1 icy" .. and ..... the 
tremendous impact of broad demographic and macro-econom1C trends 
upon the development of the industry" (p.36). They leave us to 
decide for ourselves which of these factors finally determines the 
outcome. 
The nature of petit bourgeois retailing has been investigated by one 
group of- researchers. Whilst not strictly business histories the 
publications by Bechhofer and Elliott (1968, 1976, 1981, and 1985) 
and their associates (Bechhofer .e.t ~ 1974; Bland, et al., 1978), 
provide an interesting commentary on the way the small independent 
retailer has managed to find a place amongst the dominant capitalism 
of modern society. Their chief claim is that the petite bourgeoisie 
are a stratum within the class structure rather than a separate 
class, and that they are distinguished from capitalist economic 
activity by the absence of extensive use of wage labour. 
The position of the petite bourgeoisie in the class structure 1S 
contradictory because they are sympathetic to the purposes and 
methods of capitalism, but they are constantly struggling to 
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maintain their position against the expansion of capital. One of 
the key attributes of these small shopkeepers, which sustains them 
in their struggle for survival, is the belief that they are escaping 
the subordination of wage labour. This essential element 1.S found 
in other studies of small shopkeeping (Dawson and Kirby, 1979; 
Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame, 1981). 
Perhaps the most instructive outcome of this strand of research is 
the conclusion that in spite of the seemingly over-powering growth 
of capitalism this economic form is typified by its persistence. 
The continual change and restructuring of capitalism throws up new 
opportunities for the owners of small amounts of capital to set up 
in business, even as the old ones disappear. Bechhofer and Elliott 
(1981) also claim that the petite bourgeosie have been identified by 
politicians of all parties as a potential power bloc, and that the 
growth of interest and support of small businesses by the state may 
be interpreted in this light. 
Y) Summary 
The two paragraphs above summarise virtually all the available 
English language research which attempts to place retailing into the 
overall social structure. Bluntly, there 1.S very little social 
theory in retai I research. The 
change is external to retailing. 
was a record of attempts to 
illusion created is that social 
This might be acceptable if there 
link the changing conditions of 
production to changes in retailing; there 1S none. The evidence for 
the purely reactive position of retailing 1S not built upon any firm 
economic platform. Economists either treat production or 
distribution, rarely both. The influences upon retailing that cause 
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it to change might be enumerated, but causality 1S not investigated. 
There 1S no theory of retailing: no theory of its role in production 
or its role in consumption; no theory of i ts me~ing as a social and 
economic institution. In Chapter Four an attempt is made to 
construct such a theory, by integrating it with marxist theory. For 
the rest of this chapter, however, attention is brought to bear on 
studies of retail change. 
2.3 Theories of retail change 
Institutional change has been recurrent theme 1n retail research, 
but there is still no detailed theory of why and how it comes about. 
Three conceptual approaches have been used to describe such changes: 
environmental, conflict-based, and cyclical. A recent attempt has 
been made to i.ntegrate these approaches in the multi-polarisation 
model (Brown, 1987). 
2.3.1 Environmental causality 
Environmental causality has been mentioned above, where social 
trends and changing econom1C circumstances lead to evolutionary 
change 1n the retail structure. This approach is often implicit 1n 
empirical studies of retailing whether it be referring to demand-led 
or supply-led change (for example Jeffreys, 1954; Dawson, 1983). 
That these factors are instrumental 1n bringing about change 1S 
undeniable. But for retail researchers to take them as external to 
retailing absolves them from the need to relate retail change to 
social change. In effect this also means that the researcher evades 
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the 1ssue. Environmmental causality does not constitute a proper 
theory of retail change. 
2.3,2 Conflict-based models 
The conflict-based approach holds that new institutional forms in 
retailing lead to entrenchment and political opposition by the 
retail establishment. This can be seen in their fight against the 
purportedly unfair trading against chain stores (Zimmerman, 1955), 
subsequently enshrined 1n the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936. 
(Bluestone et al. 1981). This has not been a popular mode of 
explanation for retail change, depite two species of attempt to 
formalise it. 
In the 'dialectical' interpretation (Gist, 1968; Maronick and 
Walker, 1975) change takes place through the conflict of present 
thesis, and future anti-thesis leading to a final synthesis in 
trading styles. This moves the dominant trading style to a new 
equilibrium. 
The alternative rendition of conflict-based change posits a cr1S1S 
response mechanism. Here change occurs as a result of tensions 1n 
the present retail structure which are resolved through a process of 
restructuring (Stern and El-Ansary, 1977) . 
Neither formulation explains the different timing and effectiveness 
of retail innovations; nor why some periods experience retail 
innovation and others do not; 
successful and others are not. 
nor why some innovations are 
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2,3.3 Cyclical models 
Variations upon the cyclical change theme are the most popular of 
all retail change explanations. Several models have been proposed ~ 
The important ones are the retailing wheel (McNair, 1958), the 
retail accordian (Hollander, 1966) and the retail lifecycle 
(Davidson ~ al., 1976). 
i) the retail wheel 
The retail wheel theory has become an article of faith in retail 
research. The wheel of retail change starts to revolve when a 
retail innovation starts up as a low-price, low-margin operation, 
and slowly moves up-market with higher margins and more emphasis on 
customer service as it matures. This increases its vulnerability 
and makes it prone to competition from a new low-cost operation. 
The pattern described 1S well represented by the progress of 
department stores, chain stores, supermarkets and discount 
warehouses (Hollander, 1960; McNair and May, 1978). The theory does 
not have universal application; not all trading styles have started 
as low cost operators (Goldman, 1975), nor have older forms of 
trading been completely obliterated by the upstart. 
-
The retail wheel has even been used to support predictions that 
teleshopping will become the next dominant mode of retailing. 
McNair and May (1978) claim that the next turn of the retailing 
wheel may well lead to a new telecommunications based marketing 
strategy. The reasons for this are underlying social trends, 
mainly: time-scarcity, the growth of a dichotomy m shopping 
behaviour between price-convenience buying and service-fashion-
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prest ige buying, 
general public, 
Three. 
and the increasing acceptance of technology by the 
these issuses will be taken further in the Chapter 
ii) the retail accordian 
The retail accordian (Hollander, 1966) suggests that the retail 
system undergoes periodic shifts in the way goods are merchandised. 
This takes the form of a movement from general to specific to 
general JJl the inventory of retail stores. For example, JJl the 
Un i ted S ta tes , general stores were superseded~ by the- ) ear ly 
Twentieth Century, innovation of the speciality store which is now 
be ing replaced by general stores again. However, this movement 1S 
not uniform across the entire retail system. While one style of 
trading may be extending its range another may be undergoing 
rationalisation. The reason for this dual action 1S that the 
extension of lines JJl one retail institution implies range but not 
depth, leaving a niche for the merchant who can supply a large 
assortment within a narrow range of products. The limitation JJl 
each of these cases is that stock holding strategies requ1re that a 
minimum turnover rate must be set, and the amount of space JJl a 
store for stock holding is limited. 
iii) the retail lifecycle 
The observation that products undergo a lifecycle from their early 
introduction to acceptance and eventual demise is the stimulus for 
Davidson et al.·s (1976) adaption of the retail wheel concept. In 
their model a direct substitution is made of the product life-cycle 
by the life-cycle of a retail institution. The acceptance of new 
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products or forms of trading is the demand-side manifestation of 
these life-cycles. Some researchers stress the demand 
characteristics, such as consumer innovativeness (Ostlund, 1974), 
-but innovations cannot move through the complete lifecycle unless 
adopted by consumers. Innovation itself is still a supply-side 
prerogative. 
Davidison et ala 's (1976) life-cycle has four stages: early growth; 
accelerated development; maturity; and decline. The early growth of 
the innovation depends upon a significant advantage over present 
trading patterns, perhaps a new product or more efficient 
management. Accelerated growth begins when the early operating 
difficulties are passed and the sales volume of the innovation 
starts to yield profits. There is geographic expansion of trade and 
the rate of new entrants to the field increases. There may also be 
retaliation by established retailers as their trade is taken away. 
The early profitability of the innovation is eroded by imitators 
entering the market, leading to intense competition. The successful 
innovatory companl.es grow and become less flexible. As these 
companies approach maturity they must make the transition from 
entrepreneurial to institutional management. There l.S often a 
shake-out of less efficient firms as the market saturates. Decline 
can set In if the management is unable to make this transition 
successfully, or if another new retail form is able to undermine the 
mature retailing style. 
It is a conventional wisdom that retail innovation springs from 
small companies rather than the large established retailers. This 
l.S consistent with early pronouncements on the potential for 
te leshopp ing (Doooy and Davidson, 1967) . Here again it is the 
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upstarts which are seen as the innovators. This 1S based upon 
empirical evidence rather than deep theoretical ins~ht. For 
instance, the early supermarkets were entrepreneurial operations. 
While larger retailers may adopt new operating methods more quickly 
(Star, 1969), the radical innovators tend to come from outside the 
conventional distribution channels (Curham, 1969). 
For Davidson et ale (1976) the 
evolutionary fact, although it 
managemen t . Both Davidson.e.t..al. 
retail life-cycle is a natural 
can be off-set by skillful 
(1976) and McNair and May (1978) 
claim that the rate of cyclical change is accelerating. The life-
cycle model as used here has an implicit assumption that there 1S a 
necessary return period, which as an argument seems to be a-causal 
and functionalist. At best, the causality for retail change 1S 
being sought outside retailing itself, mainly in the spheres of 
consumpt ion and prcxiuction. The increasing pace of change within 
retailing is a response to an external impetus; the general increase 
in the rate of social change. 
The cyclical mcxiels are popular because they are descriptive of many 
of the changes which have t~{en place in retail institutional form. 
Their descriptiveness 1S also their weakness (Hollander, 1980). 
They cannot be used to determine which innovations will be 
successful 1n the future or the rate of change of the cyclical 
variation. 
2.3.4 The multi-polarisation model 
The multi-polarisation model (Brown, 1987) 18 an attempt to 
synthesize the retail wheel, the retail accordian and the conflict-
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based, polarisation principle. The polarisation principle is the 
.empirical observation that as one retail form grows to dominance new 
niches open up. Brown (1987) argues that "retailing polarises 
simultaneously along each of the price, assortment and size 
dimensions" (p .158) . The retail structure comprises a number of 
different trading styles along these axes, in a dynamic equilibrium. 
Over-development at one polar extreme these axes will cause the 
counter-balancing emergence of new forms of retailing at the other 
extreme. The retail structure oscillates. As a new successful 
innovation is imitated by other retailers, balance tips from one 
extreme to another. This then sets off a fresh counter-balancing 
innovation. 
Brown attempts to explain the motion of retail change, but again 
fails to break out of the descriptive mode. The multi-polarisation 
model is steeped in the concept that economic systems tend to an 
equilibr ium. The swings are caused by voids in the spectrum of 
retail trading styles. There 1S no account of the effect of 
external change upon the retail system, or of why the balance should 
be able to tip so far in one direction before the counter-balancing 
innovation occurs. 
2,3,5 Summary 
With the exception of environmental causality, which is really not a 
explanation at all, the models of retail change are a-historical. 
They pay scant regard to a fundamental influence on retailing 
innovation: the opportuni ty to make higher than average profits. 
Nor do they refer to the in~tutional structure and the inherent 
power relations to be found 1n the historical context which 
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innovatory behaviour faces. 
2.4 Retail literature: a summary 
All retailing research disciplines have a history of empirical work, 
which is descriptive of the structure, institutional and spatial, of 
the distributive trades, but has little theoretical content. The 
empirical approach V1ews changes in retailing structure as 
reflective of shifts in demand. Explicit models of retail change in 
the geographical disciplines seem to be non-existent. Business 
school models of retail change are for the most part either of the 
external stimulus type or are cyclical models. Cyclical models are 
descriptive devices, they cannot be used to investigate the timing 
of new innovations, or the reasons why some innovations fail while 
others succeed. The effect of the increasing concentration of the 
retail trades is not considered, nor is its corollary; the rising 
barriers to entry. 
The problems with retail research are: the excessive concern with 
the spatial configuration of retailing in the geographical 
disciplines; the general lack of theoretical insight; the 
superficial descriptive level of analysis which pervades most retail 
research; the direct inferences about the conditions of consumption 
from revealed behaviour, which is confined by the status quo; and 
the implicit severing of the links between changes in production and 
the effect upon retailing and consumption practices. 
// 2,5 Retail research and teleshopping 
This thesis 1S concerned with the way that a new mode of retailing 
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retailing has certain 
link it to certain forms of 
social organisation, and a specific level of technological 
development' in production techniques. The innovation 1S taking 
place in a set of specific cultural and historical settings. Retail 
theory offers little help in interpreting the way in which these 
VBr10US factors influence teleshopping, nor of the significance of 
teleshopping in context. 
The retail literature is similarly unsatisfying in illuminating the 
progress of teleshopping so far. Teleshopping has unusual spatial 
implications, which make it hard to compare directly with 
traditional store retailing. The nearest equivalent trading style 
is mail order, which on the whole has been ignored within geography. 
The novelty of teleshopping makes it difficult to specify adequate 
consumer choice models to measure its market appeal (Ducatel, 1984). 
In any case, the consumer acceptance of teleshopping will postdate 
its introduction as a retail innovation. There is little help here 
either from the re"tail literature. 
The concentration upon trading styles, to the exclusion of the 
economlC priorities of retailers,hamstrings attempts to comprehend 
retail innovation. In the next chapter the in-home shopping and 
teleshopping literature lS dissected. This is to introduce the 




THE TELESHOPPING LITERATURE 
The teleshopping literature has two main motifs: speculation about 
its market characteristics; and the description of the origin and 
development of the teleshopping experiments that have actually taken 
place. The first of these is discussed in this chapter. Empirical 
descriptions of teleshopping services are referred to where 
appropriate in the development of the thesis. 
The market characteristics of teleshopping can be divided into 
demand-side and the supply-side issues. These can be further sub-
divided into factors favourable and unfavourable to teleshopping. 
The rest of this chapter is based around these distinctions. The 
preliminary section of the chapter provides a definition of 
teleshopping. Then the main points of the arguments for and against 
a consumer need for teleshopping are discussed. This is followed by 
a third section dealing with the supply-side issues which have been 
raised in the literature. The deficiencies in the retail literature 
which were critised in the previous chapters are found again 10 
teleshopping research. These are discussed 10 the critical 
commentary at the end of the chapter. 
3.1 A definition of teleshoppiug 
The synonyms of teleshopping have two elements; a supply-side and a 
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demand-side. The first element 1S technological. It appears in 
such terms as: push-button shopping (Guy, 1985); electronic shopping 
(Goldstucker et ale 1986); and, from the point of view of the 
retailer, tele-marketing (Strauss, 1983). The second element makes 
reference to the spatial and infrastructural implications of 
teleshopping 1n: armchair shopping (Bennison, 1984); or, on the 
supply-side, non-store marketing (Quelch and Takeuchi, 1981). 
The technological element indicates a key feature of teleshopping; 
before teleshopping can take place a certain set of technologies 
must be in place and functioning. The way in which teleshopping 
differs from traditional store shopping is stressed in the second 
form, which itself tends to be a little weak on the difference 
between teleshopping and more commonplace activities such as buying 
by post or by ordering things using the telephone. Even cumbersome 
formulations, such as 'non-store interactive retail services 
(Davies and Reynolds, 
telephone. 
1986) could refer_ to selling via the 
A certain ambiguity 1n the definitions of teleshopping may be 
unavoidable, because teleshopping 1S in some senses merely an 
extension of existing home shopping methoos. "By teleshopping 1S 
meant remote shopping using computer and/or telecommunications links 
from consumers to distributors of gooos. These links replace the 
usual shopping trip" (Davies and Howard, 1983 p.1). 
Thus, although teleshopping depends upon a specific set of 
technologies, it isn't, in human behaviour terms, all that different 
from other forms of in-home shopping; it does not represent a 
totally new conception of retailing. 
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Despite this, the technological part of the service, does affect 
~ (manner ill which the retailer and the customer relate. The 
technology itself forces the retailer to develop new skills to 
accommodate the requirements of the technology. Also, technology 
does not come into the public domain in a neutral manner. It is 
always either owned by some economic power or under the control of 
some agency. 
Teleshopping 1S defined here as shopping conducted at a distance on 
the basis of images which are displayed on a television screen. The 
transaction takes place 'at a distance' from a retail outlet, that 
1S the selection and ordering of products must take place without 
going to a store. 
Obviously, any definition of teleshopping emphasises the shopper. 
To consider tele-retailing, the supplier must provide the complete 
range of facilities to enable a consumer to teleshop. A tele-
retailer may offer a traditional alternative at any stage in the 
transactional process. For instance, a shopper may seek 
supplementary information by referring to a printed catalogue, or 
may visit a retail warehouse to pick up an ordered item. Therefore, 
a pre-requisite of teleshopping is a tele-retailer which offers: an 
opportunity for a shopper to have basic product information 
displayed on a television screen in the home; for it to be possible 
to order and to pay for the goods by interacting with information on 
the screen; and, finally, to offer some means of acquiring the goods 
without making a trip to the shop. 
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3.2 Demand-side 1ssues lD teleshoQping 
The literature is ~lmmarised in two sets of five tables for each of 
the pros and the cons as follows: changes in consumer experience; 
changes in life patterns; changes in attitude; changes in demand; 
and the perceptions of the characteristics of teleshopping (Tables 
3.1 to 3.11). These tables provide a synopsis of all of the issues 
which have been identified in the teleshopping literature. The main 
work of the chapter is in these tables, and they should be read 1n 
their own right. 
The discussion 1n this section 1S complementary to, but not a 
replacement for, the tabulated material. Instead a series of themes 
are traced which run through the tables. The section starts with a 
reV1ew of some research into the consumer characteristics of 
presently accepted forms of non-store shopping. Then, the. demand-
side issues from the teleshopping literature are presented. 
3.2.1 Conventional non-store shopping 
There 1S a body of literature which deals with the characteristics 
of the non-store shopper. The traditional forms of non-store 
shopptng are buying from door-to-door salespeople, and mail order 
and telephone ordering techniques. More recently, direct response 
retailing and catalogue showrooms have become significant. Some of 
the literature on this subject 1S quite old and the conditions 
described may have changed, but it is worth looking at this 
literature because it contains the only detailed attempts to 
understand why consumers shop at non-store outlets. It has also 
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Table 3.1 Factors increasing the propensity to non-store shop 
a) PURCHASING TYPE 
Type of shopper Cause 
r large falily ==~ 
heavy ~ 
\ 
Reason for non-store shopping 
need for credit 
need to synchronise shopping with 
other household activities 
L enjoys shopping -- frequent shopper in all forlls 
r need for credit 
I 
I ,100 incole I L- cuts travel costs 
light J 
lfO dislites shopping ---- .ini.ises ti.e spent in stores 
infrequent r 
L-- high value of time --- save on discretionary tile 







Cox & Rich (1964) 
tHNTEL (1978) 
Gillett (1970) 
Berkowitz et al. (1979) 
Berry (1979) 
Kargaonkar (1981) 
Berkowitz et al. (1979) 
Berry (1979) 
Table 3.1 (Cont.) 
b) DISPOSABLE INCOME TYPE 
Type of shopper Cause Reason for non-store shopping 
r- saves on discretionary time 
r-- full-time worker 1 
I purchasing can take place outside 






r- perceived level of risk lower 
I less price concious full-time workers 1 
+ other high H 
disposable income I 
shoppers J L 
able to buy goods not locally 
available 
r- no need to travel 
r not .orking ~ 
I IF only accessible source I for some products 
status 
'L- need for extended credit 
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Author 
Berkowitz et ala (1979) 
Berry (1979) 
Spence et ala (1970) 
Reynolds (1974) 
Billett (1970) 
Peters & Ford (1972) 
I1INTEL (1978) 
Table 3.1 (Cont.) 
c) PERSONALITY TYPE 
Type of shopper Cause Reason for non-store shopping 
r- purchaser of specialist goods 




l minimises time spent on 
household maintainance 
~ better disposed to planned 
shopping behaviour 
r 
able to seek arbitration 
if not satisfied 
educated lJ 
r 
willing to rely on formal 
fL infor.ation sources 





Berkowitz et ale (1979) 
Cox & Rich (1964) 
Gillett (1970) 
Spence et ale (1970) 
Berry (1979) 
Table 3.2 Trends in consumer experience which favour deland for teleshopping 
a changes in goods and services available 
lore different ways to spend leisure tile [23] 
increasingly good experiences with lail order [9] 
free telephone ordering (US) [23],[26] 
availability of delivery services for sOle products [34] 
increasing energy/fuel costs [29],[27],[25] 
people becoling accustomed to 
longer opening hours of shops [22] 
wider range of choice [33] 
b greater contact with cOlputer technology 
c 
children learn to use cOlputers at school [25],[4],[28],[17] 
growing use of computers in workplace [25],[8],[28],[17] 
more use of the technology: public access terminals [28],[30] 
AiMs (17] 
lore people own a personal computer [18] 
trend to~ards networking them [18] 
changes in economic and social conditions 
lore spending power [23],[18],[26] 
~Gre use of credit [23],[26] 
private transport not available for everyone or all the tile [34] 
information overload need for selectivity [29],[27] 
too lany choices [12] 
rising cri~e, need for security [29] 
d ~igher levels of education 
better educated consulers [28] 
experience of consumerism [28] 
NOt2: in all the tables in this chapter the nUlbers are used to indicate the 
references given belo~. 
[ • 1 IJ 
[2] 




















Berkowitz et !l. (1979) 
Davies (1985) 
Davies and Howard (1985) 
Davies and Reynolds (1986) 
Deacon (i986i 
Distrib irades EDe (1982) 
Eason (1984) 
Gardiner Jones (1984) 























HONard and Davies (1985) 
lnst Retail Mgt (1979) 
lewis (1985) 
Marti and Zeilinger (1982) 
May (1979) 
Maynes (1984) 
Moschis et !L. (1985) 
Guelch and Takeuchi (1981) 
Rosenberg and Hirschman (1980) 
Talarzyk (1986) 
Talarzyk et !L. (1984) 
Talarzyk and Young (1985) 
Taylor (1984) 





Table 3.3 Changes in life patterns which favour demand for teleshopping 
a changes in "orking life 
lore women working [27],[5],[4],[28],[26] 
more hOle working (B] 
lore flexible working [8] 
b changes in social structure 
lore single parent households [29] 
more wives working (23] 
more multi-inca~e households [29],[25],[8] 
;ore dual career households [23] 
later larriages [29] 
~ore single person households [29],[8],[26] 
;ore people having children later in life [23] 
decline of nuclear faftily [2B] 
]ore elderly people [25],[26] 
c changes in consumer behaviour 
increasing diversity in habits [8] 
trust built by personal cDnta~t usurped by advertisment-led 
brand loyalty [23J 
shopping trip otten a special journey [3] 
food shopping trip is an infrequent routine event [35],[4],[14] 
implication that it has to be planned [13] 
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Table 3.4 Changes in attitudes which favour deland for teleshopping 
a tile consciousness 
lore households feel short of tile [29],[18],[5],[2],[14],[8],[28] 
higher value of leisure time [29],[4],[14] 
want minilal inconvenience and hassle [29],[32],[34],[23],[5],[4],[33] 
less tile fo~ routine tasKs [25],[33] 
harder to accommodate institutional opening hours (33],[26] 
b personal attitudes 
increased eJphasis on consuler self-identity and 
quality of life [27],[5],[28],[33],[26] 
higher income groups are willing to take risKs [34] 
greater impatience [33] 
c attitude towards shopping 
convenience 
routine shopping seen as a chore [34],[35],[5],[14] 
dislike of checkouts [22] 
resent time spent shopping in crowded stores [27] 
less disposed to travel to increasingly distant stores [27],[25] 
sOle people find shopping difficult [29],[11] 
shopping infringes on leisure tile [34],[27] 
liddle-class prefers other activities [13] 
greater acceptance of direct marketing devices [27],[4J,[13],[26] 
use of catalogues [23] 
self-reliant 
consulers more self assured/discerning (23],[4] 
frustrated with lack of expertise of salespeople [28],[26] 
willing to trust reputable suppliers/brands [34],(35] 
willing to trade off risK of failure for a 
liberal returns policy [5] 
still very price conscious [23] 
but some groups uninterested in comparison shopping [13] 
and sOle willing to trade-off price for convenience [5] 
d greater acceptance of technical complexity [27],[4],[8] 
increasing computer literacy [29],[28],[33] 
young people like the teleshopping technology [13] 
less passivity towards vdus, now seen as interactive [25],[4] 
large appetite for tv based activities [18] 
feeling of inevitability that teleshopping will happen [34] 
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Table 3.5 Changes in deland Nhich favour teleshopping 
a increasing demand for leisure activities 
leisure activities taking the place of shopping [3] 
b demand for goods and services 
~ant to be lore in control (33] 
access to information and transactions 
want lore inforlation [33] 
lower cost lessage services [29] 
continuous education on stream [29] 
information about products [28] 
finance, hobbies [18],[34],(4],[2],(28] 
easy payment facilities [2] 
instant gratification [28] 
wider choice than a store can stock [27],[34] 
demand for speciality goods [27],[34] 
want greater flexibility 
of choice [33] 
longer opening hours [20],[5],[28] 
Table 3.6 C~aracteristics of teleshopping which favour its adoption 
a the retailer delivers 
no need to shop [14] 
saves carrying [11] 
gives access to a wider range of goods [11] 
cheaper than nearby/local shops [11],[19] 
gives greater feeling of independence (11] 
suitable for institutional provisioning [14] 
cost here is negligible for large value orders [14] 
b can give lore say in how products are specified [29] 
gives a return path to directly contact the supplier [30] 
c more product information [32] 
aids in making cOlparisons [33] 
easier price coaparison [29],[32],[25] 
is available on deland [30] 
lay be adequate for non ego-intensive purchases [32] 






novelty interest [22] 
can create neN activities [28] 
can be fun (game shows) [28] 
club atmosphere promoted [4] 
easy to use (4J 
deals on equipment purchase (4J 
no real difficulty in use, even by elderly [11] 
privacy (ilpersonal) [22] 
instantaneous transactions [22J,[2] 
better response times than lail order [13] 
versatile can be used to suppply a package of services (30] 
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Table 3.7 Consumer e~periences which do not favour deland for teleshoppinq 
a economic and social conditions 
lany people do not even have tvs and telephones (34) 
only 50Z of lail order agents have phones [10] 
cash still accounts for vast lajority of transactions [22] 
a lot of people still don't have bank accounts [22],[34] 
tany cannot afford to buy in bulk [34] 
unable to afford neN services [21] 
Table 3.8 Life patterns which do not favour deland for teleshopping 
a shopping trips often are multi-purpose [34],[3] 
b some people have plenty of tile [11],[26] 
high uneiploY8ent [8] 
flexible work patterns [8] 
c present behaviour 
when shopping, seeing products acts as a visual cue [34] 
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Table 3.9 Attitudes which do not favour demand for teleshopping 
a shopping is a social activity [4],[13] 
shopping can be enjoyable [34],[25],[26] 
by walen at least (!) [14] 
buying large/bulky itess is a family occasion [15] 
vi2wdata is impersonal [22],[26] 
b low value attributed to inforlation [12],[2],[17] 
or at least a wide cross-section of people [25] 
unwilling to pay a lot for these services [25] 
c technofear [29],[3],[26] 
fear of the unknown [34] 
shopping mainly female role, females not technically minded [34] 
great ignorance about videotex [B] 
no knowledge of what teleshopping is [8],[2B],[30] 
d fear of loss of privacy [29],[10] 
too much junk mail now anyway [26] 
fears about security [22] 
proble!s remembering PIN [22] 
e other forms of home shopping are seen as low class [34] 
f need to comparison shop [34],[26] 
fear of failing to be satisfied [34] 
danger of being sent the wrong goods [11] 
g shops are convenient [34] 
it is just as easy to go and get the shopping in [35] 
private transport is readily available [34] 
h videotex is tedious 
hard to wade through all the alternatives [25],[141 
lenu based [9] 
too technical [91 
hard to keep track: no hard copy [22] 
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Table 3.10 Trends in demand which do not favour teleshopping 
a requires new consuler habits [25],[26] 
but does not create new deland [9] 
hard to change habits [31],[7],[17] 
routine activities are the lost habitual 
b no deland: unaware of viewdata [4] 
it is invisible [25],[4] 
c adequate alternatives already exist [11] 
no great relative advantages [25],[28] 
no need for national inforlation services [34] 
not enough local info [4] 
d not the same demand for all aspects of viewdata 
will not diffuse at the sale rate [25] 
sase data on the systel is not very useful [25] 




Table 3.11 Characteristics of teleshoppinQ which do not favour its adoption 
a too costly [25],[18],[19] 
high initial costs [25],[21],[18],[4J,[28],[26] 
lack of critical mass [31J,[17] 
high continuing costs [34],[21J,[14] 
confusing price structure [4] 
poor value of offerings to present [24] 
lack of quantity/quality [24],[22],[18],[4],[28],[19] 
no loving pictures good graphics [9],[4] 
badly organised [24],[4] 
poor sales support [4] 
delivery charges are a new category of expense [26] 
high cost of delivery in rural areas [15] 
b can't be used for all shopping or products [25],[11] 
can't see, touch or smell the goods [29],[32],[14],[11],[26] 
not appropriate for 'ego-intensive' goods [32] 
consumers have to be risk takers [14] 
inflexibility [14],[6] 
lonopolises the tv and telephone [34],[22J 
not very easy to try it out before hand [25J 
don't get instant gratification [14J 
inflexiblity of delivery services 
no good for small shopping trips [14] 
c time consuming [25],[4] 
planning, listing and checking the order [34J,[9],[11],[26] 
waiting in for the delivery [34] 
timing of the delivery [11] 
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111~JVERSIlY n 
been the source material for some of the speculation about the 
nature of the demand for teleshopping. 
In the non-store shopper literature most effort has gone into 
finding out what kinds of shoppers use non-store media, and why. On 
the one hand, the users seem to be fairly affluent shoppers who 
might use non-store services to save time or to purchase products 
not readily available locally (Cox and Rich, 1964). Under these 
circumstances the consumer is willing to trade-off the extra risks 
of non-store shopping, and possibly the extra costs and waiting 
time, 1Il order to avoid the chore of travelling to a store and to 
escape the time costs of undertaking a journey. On the other hand, 
Peters and Ford (1972) noticed that shoppers may buy from a non-
store outlet because it is difficult to make the journey to a store 
ID order to buy the goods required. In their study they found that 
the purchase of cosmetics from door-to-door vendors was most common 
amongst households with: pre-school children; no car available for 
shopping trips; or 1Il predominantly suburban locations. They 
described these shoppers as 'locked-in'. 
The dual market for non-store shopping may be explained in terms of 
the perceived levels of risk and the effect of social constraints on 
the choices made by shoppers. The level of risk 1Il purchasing an 
item comprises the likelihood of failing to achieve satisfaction and 
the importance of the purchase. The importance of a given level of 
expenditure for a more affluent consumer is less than that for a 
less affluent shopper, but a shopper who is 'lock~-into' the home 
is not trad~-off the convenience of a non-store outlet against the 
risk of failure in the same way. In the latter case the shopper has 
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the choice of accepting the risk or not obtaining the product. 
That non-store shopping 1S the outcome of a different response to 
risk, is reinforced by Cunningham and Cunningham's (1973) conclusion 
that different types of consumer are likely to buy different types 
of product using different non-store retailing methods. Higher 
status consumers used non-store outlets for a range of purchasing. 
Lower status consumers who used non-store devices were liable to buy 
mainly novelty goods which incorporate a lower level of financial 
risk. 
The different reasons for non-store shopping are examined further in 
Table 3.1. The various categories suggested in this table are not 
mutually exclusive, any type of shopping behaviour usually has 
multiple causes. The ma1n constraints which lead to non-store 
shopping are temporal and financial. Temporal constraints could be 
as much due to the problems of scheduling activities as to an 
overall shortage of time. For instance, the main household shopper 
may have to put off a maJor shopping trip until both a car and a 
driver are available. 
From the discussion above it will be clear that the free selection 
of non-store shopping only takes place if retail stores provide an 
accessible alternative. For more affluent consumers non-store 
retailing does not constitute a replacement for store shopping, 
rather it enriches the consumer's choice set. 
The most recent extension of the literature has been to consider how 
such affluent consumers will non-store shop in the future. Berry 
(1979) has postulated the emergence of the 'time-buying' consumer. 
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The time-buying consumer ~s typified as: being in full-time work; 
having a large d isposab Ie lIlcome; and p lac ing a high value on 
discretionary time. The concept has been reinforced by Berkowitz et 
ale (1979).. They provide details of a telephone order/home 
delivery grocery service based in a large Midwestern town. The 
areas served are upper-middle income suburbs. In a comparison of 
users and non-users of the service they found that users were more 
likely to: be slightly younger; have a college education; have two 
working household heads; live a little further from a supermarket; 
shop much less frequently; be less price concious; use mail order 
more than twice a year; and have more national charge accounts. On 
the other hand, they were just as concerned about the quality of the 
gocx:is purchased. 
3.2.2 A demand for teleshopping? 
i) the time-buying tele~~con~lmer 
That a stratum of consumers should emerge who are willing to pay for 
a delivery service, even of high risk prcx:iucts like groceries, to 
save time is the great hope of those who claim that teleshopping's 
future is a rosy prospect. 
The first point that they make is that there is a demand for the 
reduction of time spent on routine tasks (Table 3.4a p.43) in order 
to make room for the growing diversity of consumption options (Table 
3.2a p .41) , and hab its (Tab Ie 3. 3c p. 42) . The new importance of 
leisure is thought to reflect the emergence of a 'me-generation' 
with a set of values which emphasise self-identity, and which ~s 
composed of confident and demanding consumers (Table 3.4b p .43). 
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The greater self-confidence of consumers, and the greater variety of 
consumption options leads consumers to desire more information about 
goods and services (Table 3. 5b p.44) and stores cannot accommodate 
the full range of goods produced. There l.S also a demand for 
increased flexibility 10 retailing services, to fit consumers' 
lifestyles, such as longer opening hours or straightforward credit 
arrangements (Table 3.5b p.44). 
In teleshopping there l.S an emphasis on convenl.ence. There is no 
need to shop, which should save time and effort. Ordering can be 
done at anytime and non-store modes of purchasing should be capable 
of giving access to a wider range of products (Table 3.6a p.44). 
The demand for a greater say in the specification of services (Table 
3.5b p. 44) may also be accommodated by teleshoppping. It can be 
used to communicate directly with the retailer, there is scope for 
direct price comparisons, and so forth (Table 3.6a&b p.44). 
Consumerism has its basis in higher standards of education (Table 
3.2d p. 41) , and the changing life patterns of women. Women are now 
more likely to work before and after marriage, and to be committed 
to a career path (Table 3.3a p.42). Their experiences in the 
. 
workforce are thought to increase their self-confidence as 
consumers. The fact that women are committed to careers has 
contributed to couples marrying later and to having children later 
(Table 3.3b p .42). People develop high expectations about 
consumption levels whilst still single, which they try to keep after 
marriage. 
These changes 10 the household structure have led to increased time-
-51-
scarcity (Table 3.4a p .43). There is less time for tasks such as 
food shopping. Such duties have to be scheduled ill advance and have 
acquired an increasingly routine complexion (Table 3 3 42) 
. c p. . 
Consumers, especially those in dual-career households, are willing 
to trade-off convenience and time-consuming activities against 
higher prices (Table 3.4c p.43). In any case, the value of shopping 
amongst some consumers as a social activity is waning (Tables 3.4c 
p.43 and 3.5a p.44). 
Despite all these positive factors teleshopping has its detractions. 
ano1 
It occup~es the telephone and television. {may conflict with the 
social functions of these devices (Table 3.11b p.47). Even for the 
time-buyers, teleshopping is not appropriate for all types of 
shopping such as small purchases, or of items which are desired 
straight away (Table 3.11b p.47), because of the inherent 
inflexibility of a delivery service (Table 3.11b p.47). Moreover, 
although the appeal of shopping as a social activity may be 
declining, it 1S still significant (Table 3.9a p.46). Some 
shopping is a family occasion, particular ly when buying products 
which require personal judgement or have a high risk of failure 
(Table 3.11b p.47). 
ii) the locked ill (or the locked-out) ShOPPfJ":..1 
Of course not all members of society can join the time-buying club. 
Many people are not particularly short of time. Especially at times 
like the present with high unemployment, and an increasing number of 
people in' flexible or part-time work (Table 3.8b p.45). Yet, just 
as with traditional modes of non-store shopping, it is amongst the 
less affluent members of society that there is the greatest need for 
-52-
te leshopp ing . 
The locked-in teleshopper may well have difficulty in getting to a 
store, because of high fuel costs (Table 3.2a p.41), or physical 
difficulty. The age structure of the population indicates that this 
will be an increasing problem ~ the future (Table 3.3b p.42). 
Difficulty gaining access to remote facilities is often felt by the 
growing number of single person households (Table 3.3b p.42). Home-
working on the other hand may increase the convenience of taking 
delivery of goods (Table 3.3a p.42). For these people teleshopping 
may well offer lower prices than the only accessible alternative 
(the local store) and the problems of getting to the store and 
getting the shopping back are avoided (Table 3.6a p.44). 
Regrettably, the locked-in shopper is also the least likely to 
benefit from teleshopping. This portion of the population has the 
lowest frequency of bank accounts and credit cards (Table 3. 7a 
p.45). Televisions and telephones are often not within their means. 
Commercial requirements will probably mean that only large 
deliveries will be free of charge. These people will be unable to 
buy in bulk (Table 3.7a p.45). At the moment teleshopping services 
are costly to join and to use (Table 3.1Od p.47). 
iii) the technological imglications 
The high initial outlay on terminals, subscriptions and continuing 
costs in the form of communications charges and premiums on the 
, 
services, will most probably put teleshopping out of the reach of a 
large proportion of the population. Teleshopping becomes even less 
attractive when the poor quality of the present sevices (Table 
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3.11a p.47) is allied to the lowly status of information in the 
average householder*s perception (3.9b p.46). 
The growing acceptance of non-store retail~ is seen as a good sign 
for teleshopp~ in the literature. Consumers seem ready to accept 
catalogues as sources of product information (Table 3.4c p.43). 
Retail salespeople have been largely replaced by advertising as 
sources of information (Table 3. 3c p .42). Leading brands are also 
low risk purchases because consumers have plenty of experience with 
them (Table 3.4c p.43). 
A problem may be the continuing low class image of mail order (Table 
3.ge p.46), but teleshopping, unlike mail order, is instantaneous. 
It is also more private; there is no need to discuss the transaction 
with a telephone salesperson (Table 3.6f p.44). On the negative 
side, fears of invasion of privacy with the proliferation of 
computer databases and the prospect of electronic junk mail may lead 
to consumer resistance (Table 3.9d p.46). 
The willingness of shoppers to use computer technology 1S unknown 
(Table 3.9c p.46), although computers are becoming more familiar, 
especially amongst young people (Table 3.2c p.41). The complete 
acceptance of computers into the home may only be a matter of time 
(Tab Ie 3 .4d p .43) . Te leshopp ing techno logy is known to be easy to 
learn, and may be packaged as a novel and fun alternative to going 
shopping (Table 3. 6d p .44). Not that current teleshopping services 
are easily portrayed as fun; videotex is ted.ious, time consuming, 
and requires considerable pre-planning if it is to be used. for 
shopping (Tables 3.9h p.46 and 3.11c p.47) 
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Probably the most frequent criticism of teleshopping ~s that it 
requires a change in present consumer habits. For instance: many 
shoppers are prompted by actually seeing a product (Table 3.8c 
,,' 
p .45); foed shopping may be a special trip, but much shopp~ is 
also done whilst engaged m other tasks (Tabl 3 8 45) e . a p. . As 
teleshopping is just a new way of go~ about an old task it will be 
harder to change habitual shopping patterns (Table 3.10a p.47). 
Also, the burden of proof lies upon teleshopp~ to show that it has 
significant relative advantages over conventional shopp~ (Tables 
3.9g p.46 and 3.10c p.47) The diffusion of teleshopping is made more 
difficult because it cannot be seen and imitated as can a shopp~ 
trip (Table 3.10b p.47). Finally, the various transactional 
serv~ces of which teleshopping will be a part will not be equally 
appealling to all consumers (Table 3.1Od p.47). 
iy) spmmary 
Clearly, there is strong evidence of a demand for teleshopping. 
Equally, ~. the opposition has a strong case. That neither case 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt reflects the partial nature of 
the applicability and the market appeal of teleshopping. As with 
other forms of home shopping the demand for teleshopping is bi-
polar: having an element with a serious need for home-delivery and 
an element which is willing and capable of paying for the 
convenience of home shopping. Home delivery is not an unequivocal 
;t means that;t 's ;nappropriate for advantage of teleshopping, J.. J.. J.. J..U 
small or emergency purchases, and so makes teleshopping less 
convenient than buying from a convenient store. 
The crux of the debate ~s whether teleshopping will represent a 
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replacement for conventional forms of shopping. At the moment non-
store shopp~ represents only a small portion of total retail 
trade. From the discussion above it would appear that for 
teleshopp~ to develop there must first be a widespread adoption of 
the means by which teleshopping transactions can take place, . 1. . e. 
computer technology. Second, there must be a broadening of the 
social groups amongst whom shopping is a chore, and for whom time is 
scarce. 
In the 'theories' of retail change reviewed in Chapter Two this 
conclusion belongs firmly :m the non-theory category of 
environmental causality (Section 2.3.1). The causality is exogenous. 
It depends upon social changes which will take place in the flow of 
time. The other 'theories' of retail change refer to the 
institutional forms of retailing (Section 2.3). Here a different 
set of arguments obtain, which will be considered in the next 
section. 
3.3 Supply-side 1.ssues 
As :m the preVlOUS section, the supply-side issues raised :m the 
literature are tabulated. 
One set of tables relates to trends :m the marketing environment 
which seem likely to be influential :m the development of 
teleshopping (Tables 3.12 to 3.18). The others set out the features 
of teleshopping which will be benefial or problematic for retailers 
3 19 t 3 25) The trends in each group are sub-divided (Tables. o. . 
into overall trends and then trends in different departments' of 
economic activity: production; distribution; other services. The 
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Table 3.12 OverJll supply trends which favour teleshopping 
a further technological advances 
information control [23] 
telecommunications [23],[4] 
b increasing knowledge and practical experience [28] 
confidence in potential deland being there [13] 
successful applications of viewdata [4] 
business use [28] 
applications/trials in other services [8] 
electronic funds transfer [23] 
public access viewdata terlinals [28],[30] 
c infrastructure 
extension and improvement of cOllunications networks [4],[28],[7],[16] 
falling costs of being an information provider [14] 
Table 3.13 Trends in production which favour teleshopping 
a greater diversity of products [8],[33] 
range of products available too large for any store [27] 
inadequacy of non-store methods for such a wide range [27] 
less opportunities for growth in lass markets [27] 
b computerisation of production 
trickle down effect to retailing [8],[7] 
new types of products more applicable to viewdata [8] 
c lore use of direct larketing 
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Table 3.14 Trends in distribution which favour teleshopping 
a goods handling 
robotisation of warehouses [31],[23],[14] 
standardisation of products [31] 
greater pre-packaging [2] 
b retailing 
rapid rate of change [14],[7] 
loo~ing barriers to growth 
running aut of new sites for superstores [7] 
increasing barriers to entry in retailing 
search for new unprotected areas [2] 
greater interaction between distribution and marketing [27],[23] 
(retailers just another link in the chain) 
growth of non-store retailing [27],[18],[9],[2],[26] 
success of speciality mail order [23],[26] 
success of hOle shopping networks (USA) [28] 
successes of other teleshopping experiments [18] 
growth of efficient 3rd party delivery services [23] 
econolic factors 
decreasing rate of return on developlent capital [20] 
declining terms of trade in US supermarkets [5] 
increasing cost of (trained) sales personnel [28] 
riSing cost of newsprint/catalogues [28] 
c payment systems 
new ordering/payment mechanisms 
growing use of credit cards [2],[33] 
use of free dial '800' telephone ordering [28],[33] 
d ~anagelent practices 
increasing operational sophistication of lanagelent [23] 
larket orientation of management [2] 
use of lanagement information systems [15] 
greater faliliarity through in-house viewdata [18],[15] 
use of databases of consuler information [15] 
Table 3.15 Trends in other services which favour teleshopping 
high paper handling costs, especially in banks [29],[18] 
escalating production costs in print ledia [29] 
us cable operators looking for growth opportunities in UK [18] 
Table 3.16 Governmental activities which favour teleshopping 
a central government support for 
interactive cable [31],[2],[19] 
liberalisation of telecommunications [18],[16] 
centralised PTT in the UK: il.ediate position of standards [lB] 
direct grants [11] 
b local authority support [19] 
positive intervention to aid disadvantaged [31],[14],[11] 
subsidised local information services [3],[11] 
use of local authority property etc [11] 
direct grants [11] 
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Table 3.17 Increases in efficiency arising fro. teieshopping 
a lower fixed capital costs 
no shops to laintain: [31],[3],[1] 
less floorspace [22] 
cheaper forls of outlet [14] . ... 
showrools instead of shops [29],[14] 
cheaper property/sites [15],[26] 
redundant or under-used infrastructure or institutions 
e.g 'ilk depots or lilkroundslen [31] 
b lower labour costs [26] 
lore intensive use of labour (29],[25],[22],[3],[1],[14] 
reducing peakedness in trading floMs [14] 
lower laney handling costs [22] 
replacement of sales staff effort by customer effort [33],[13],[30] 
c aore efficient stockhandling [26] 
potential for reduction of inventory [31],[29],[13] 
potential to increase hit rate [29],[13] 
less need for costly fancy packaging [29] 
less shrinkage (22],[26] 
d ilproved operational methods 
direct contact with the consuler (27],[30] 
(electronic lail is integral to viewdata [30]) 
lore accurate idea of larket (29],[25],[22],[13],[30] 
more responsive to change 
sensitive price, 
and product or service specification [29],[22],[3],[30] 
able to respond quickly to cost changes (28],[30] 
research 
easier to do panel surveys [29],[30] 
advertising 
able to close the sale [30] 
lore control over the conditions under which ad is seen [30] 
can tailor advertising to the consumer: less alienation [30] 
unobtrusiveness of infomercials [30] 
full product descriptions can be offered on deland (29] 
faster handling of transactions 
reduction of delays in expanding trade 
no need to construct a new store [14] 
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Table 3.18 Growth opportunities arising fro. teleshopping 
a encourages structural changes 
able to by-pass Jiddlemen in distribution chain (14],(13],[30] 
direct sales, potential forward integration [29],[32],[14],[33] 
potential to open other new larketing channels [30] 
potential to extend operations into other products/services [30] 
new niches for smaller companies [17] 
or start-up companies [33] 
viewdata accessible to smaller/specialised retailers [14] 
redistribution of market power 
early entrants lay gain hegelony over the new technology [27] 
and so love up learning curve [18],[9],[28],[30] 
fear of lissing the bandwagqpn [32],[27],[18],[4],[19] 
and of eventual exclusion [27] 
b extensions of larket 
an additional made of expansion other than opening stores [15],[26] 
extension of the catchment of existing stores [15],[8],[33] 
lower risk competition strategy than store openings [15] 
sales of neN types of products based on the teleshop technology [27] 
expansion of trade 
for network operators [27] 
localised information services [4J,[3] 
for banks 
charges to retailers for transactional services [22] 
for entertainment and media [27],[33],[18] 
for delivery companies [14] 
c existence of incremental paths to teleshopping 
use of vdus for info. and shops for acquisition [31] 
restriction of trade to well known brands [23] 
use of existing stores 
smaller stores as pick up points [3] 
put in alongside present superstore [15],[8] 
only minor organisational changes needed [14] 
extension of present lail order business [19] 
mare efficient than present forms [7] 
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Table 3.19 Overall supply trends which do not favour teleshopping 
a lack of experience [30] 
inability ot larket to value infor.ation adequately [12J 
lack ot research on infor.ation needs 
lanagelent 
no operating experielce [26J 
ignorance of the neN technologies [10] 
fear of the new [22J 
b inertia in present systel due to 
energy shortages [23] 
environmental pressures [23] 
c poor performance of other trials [28] 
vicious circle effect (18],[4],(30] 
lack of critical mass-too expensive-lack of critical mass 
Prestel's difficulties 
poor division of labour in Prestel [24],[16] 
lack of pre-test trials [24] 
technical bias in present trials [18] 
so far indifferent quality of marketing [15] 
no integrated service yet been offered [8] 
Table 3.20 Production trends which do not favour teleshoppinq 
sceptis; by terminal suppliers [4] 
slowness of manufacturers to respond to new ideas 
eg bar coding [10] 
direct involvelent unpromising 
fear of being de-listed by store retailers [26] 
feN manufacturers deal in a sufficiently wide range 
of merchandise, would need third party help [26] 
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Table 3.21 Distribution trends which do not favour teleshopping 
a goods handling 
decline in slall drops to stores and hale delivery [14] 
b retailing 
cOlpetition for investment funds 
investments which preclude teleshopping 
EPo5, EFTPo5, ATMs, etc [22] 
investlent in alternatives 
teletext ok for one-way communication services [31] 
trend towards fewer, larger and lore centralised stores [14] 
use of EPOS aand EFTPOS reinforces this [31] 
runs in reverse to small stare pick-up posts idea [31] 
retailers' overall lack of interest [31],[18],[3],(14],[11],[15],[7] 
opportunities for growth in present trading patterns [8],[7] 
main push coming upstream from retailers [14],[15],[7] 
has not trickled down yet [8] 
fear of only being able to make average profits 
due to greater consumer information [25],[26] 
and retaliation by supermarkets [20],[26] 
sceptical of it being able to create new demand [25] 
fear of alienating customers [22] 
;ost retailers not experienced with home shopping [9] 
slow take up of IT in retailing [15] 
little expertise in cOIPuters or telecommunications [IB] 
present attempts to enhance the shopping experience [27],[23] 
Table 3.22 Trends in other services which do not favour teleshopping 
a cable 
declining fortunes of the cable industry [18] 
costly, long pay-back period [9] 
traditional source of income is subscriber [26] 
b viewdata 
uninterested IPs [4] 
not enough advertising interest to bring the price down [28],[30] 
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Table 3.23 Government actions which do not favour teleshopping 
a cable systems 
concentration upon entertainment led cable (UK) [31] 
inaction in developlent of two way cable [31] :. 
low rate of adoption [31] 
b network operators 
legislation to limit AT&T 
reduces activity of a lajor actor in this field [25],[28] 
would be big enough to ilpose a standard [18] 
franchisor opposition to advertising on cable (US) [26] 
BT: rebalancing of tarriffs in favour of business [22] 
c regulation 
anti-trust laws do not reflect the dual nature of information: 
information can be shared without being diminished [12] 
hard to control access to information [12] 
basis of laws in ownership/property [12] 
intellectual property rights [16] 
d SlON rate of governmental progress [23],[10] 
institutional change not taken place yet [30] 
planners sIaN response rate and inflexibility [14] 
e political power of vested interest 
established firms [23] 
local small traders [11] 
f social welfare schemes 
lack of capital [7] 
Table 3.24 New costs which arise with teleshopping 
a fixed capital 
requires different locations of warehouses and superstores [31],[15] 
slaller stores 
unable to get the economies of scale [31] 
large initial capital requirelent [31],[2],[3],[14],[15],[4],[28],[26] 
too large for private companies [4] 
b labour costs 
possible increase in labour costs [31] 
relatively lore expensive labour [31] 
runs against present trend for polarisation [31],[8] 
c operating costs 
cost of delivery too high [31],[20],[14] 
need large order sizes to lake it work [3] 
trade-off of cost with service quality [3],[13] 
high production costs of videodiscs or videotapes [26] 
printed catalog becomes an extra cost with viewdata [26] 
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Table 3.25 Other difficulties which arise with teieshopping 
a lanagelent 
systels not approriate to needs [22] 
union resistance [23],[6] 
costs of compensation [10] 
failures due to inexperience [20] 
only relevant to a slall nUlber of retail types [14] 
b it is an uncertain larketing device [15] 
so far not an alternative to present shopping patterns [8],[28] 
difference between stated preferences and actual behaviour [25],[13] 
inadequate market for large retailers [25],[15],[8],[28] 
need a lass market before start of trading [18J,[6J,[7],[16] 
lost users quite young [22] 
low geographic density of subscibers [3] 
c structural change 
requires restructuring of distribution channels [33],[13] 
new patterns of ownership [13] 
resistance of superstore retailers 
directly competitive to their business [14] 
needs to be cOlpatible with present stores [14] 
fear of losing the core business [31] 
unwilling to form federations with small store operators [31] 
requires much coordination between agencies [25],[22],[18] 
particularly over who pays [9] 
d new operating problems 
transactions 
with cash, no risk of non-paYlent [22] 
new transaction charges fro; the banks [22] 
users have to be subscribers first [3],[16] 
high rate of returns pressure on margins [27] 
equipment not always compatible [22],[10] 
inadequate agreed standards [22],[18] 
difficult to set-up a good delivery service [25],[11] 
e neN marketing issues 
have to differentiate service frol product [32] 
hard to know what information to put in [22] 
need high quality packages of services [18] 
not all products can be sold in this way [32],[20],[14] 
no good for personal services [14] 
inflexibility 
unable to adjust prices if using a catalogue [20] 
f consumer protection issues: it becoles harder to 
distinguish advertising frol information [12] 
bias in information [12] 
attribute liability for bad trading practices [12],[22] 
protect privacy [12] 
9 inadequate infrastructure [18] 
few two-way cable systems (18],[26] 
technology not sophisticated enough yet [26] 
poor grahics capability [18] 
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benefits of teleshopping are categorised according to whether they 
aid efficiency or offer new growth opportunities. The problems 
associated with teleshopping are the new costs which might be 
involved, and a set of unresolved difficulties which will arise when 
teleshopping services are set up. 
Again, the tables are self-standing and should be treated as such. 
The discussion pulls out themes which run through the tables. The 
key supply-side themes in this section are: the technological 
problems associated with teleshopping; the mixed effects of 
government intervention; the ability of teleshopp~ to 
investment capital; the degree of co~e with 
current trading patterns; and the way that teleshopping requires co-
ordinated efforts by different firms. Each of these is taken in 
turn. 
3.3.1 Technological lssues 10 tele-retailing 
The technological element of teleshopping, has a dual edge. At the 
overall level it has been argued that there is increasing managerial 
competence and acceptance of high technology (Tables 3.12b p.57 & 
3.14d p.58), but there is also a great deal of management resistance 
to new technologies because of a fear of the new (Table 3.19a p.61). 
This reluctance is unsuprising as there is an increased risk of 
dramatic failure if the management strays from its area of proven 
competence. The failures of other teleshopping services attest to 
the hazards of experimentation in such an unkown area. (Tab Ie 3. 19c 
61) N th les it is through trial and error that the common p. . ever e s, 
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stock of knowledge is enlarged and the risks ln further trials are 
reduced (Table 3.12b p.57). 
New techniques including the use of computerised methods 'of 
production (Table 3.13c p.57), and the prospect of robotised stock 
handling (Table 3.14) seem slow to trickle down to retailing (Table 
3.21b p.62). Only recently has there been any significant move 
towards the new forms of cash handling and stock control which have 
been loudly heralded through the 1970s (Table 3.21b p.62). 
Of course the continual experimentation with new systems helps to 
roll back the technological frontier. It provides the opportunity 
for manufacturers of technical equipment to develop new products. 
However, there is great scepticism amongst terminal suppliers about 
the prospects for electronic services such as teleshopping (Table 
3.20 p.61). The general inadequacy of the present communications 
systems upon which teleshopping is based (Table 3.25g) 1S a ltl8Jor 
impediment to the appeal of teleshopping both as a mode of retailing 
and of shopping. Despi te general technological advances (Table 
3.12a p.57) and improvements in communications systems (Table 3.12c 
p.57), the low penetration of two-way cable systems is a continuing 
problem m this area. In the UK this is in spite of (some say 
because of) governmental enthusiasm (Tables 3.16a p.58 and 3.23a 
p. 63). 
3.3.2 Goyernment action 
Sheer uncertainty about governmental action may dampen the prospects 
for teleshopp~. The lack of precedents for many of the regulatory 
issues surrounding the introduction of teleshopping technologies 
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means that progress towards a firm legal framework may be slow 
(Tables 3.23c&d p.63 and Table 3.25f p.64). It is not yet known 
whether the liberalisation of telecommunications networks in the UK 
and US wi 11 lead to an improved. or reduced chance for te leshopp ing 
provision (Tables 3.16a p.58 and 3.23b p.63). Local government 
support for teleshopping, as a complement to their home-help 
serV1ces, 1S a catalyst for teleshopping (Table 3.16b p.58). 
However, the impact of this development will be limited because 
local authorities are short of funds (Table 3.23f p.63). 
3.3.3 Allocation of capital investment 
Although the introduction of innovative payment systems might be 
seen to be part of the same overall trend (Table 3.14c p.58), they 
might equally be in direct competition for capital investment (Table 
3.21b p.62); the need to amortise the prior investment may itself 
delay the introduction of teleshopping. In banking one major aim of 
such systems has been to reduce the cost of handling transactions 
(Table 3.15 p. 58), yet the move to introduce EF4I'PoS has been subject 
to considerable resistance from retailers. Dissent has surrounded 
the new transaction charges which banks wish to introduce as part of 
these new systems; which would be good for banks (Table 3.18b) but 
bad for retailers (Table 3.25d p.64). 
3.3.4 T81e retailing versus current retailing methods 
The general apathy towards the technology of teleshopping is found 
again amongst store retailers (Table 3.21b p.62). For superstore 
operators, this indifference has been attributed to an overriding 
interest in building larger, more centralised stores (Table 3.21b 
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p . 62) . As long as there 1S extra trade to be made out of an 
extension of present trading practices, teleshopping 1S a risky 
alternative (Table 3.12h p.57). On the other hand, as the number of 
new sites for superstores declines there may be a search amongst 
these companies for alternative av:enues,/ of growth (Table 3.14b 
p.58). In this context teleshopp~ services could be used to 
extend the catchment area of a store, or to increase the penetration 
within the catchment, without new store construction (Table 3.18b 
p. 60) . In this way teleshopping can be intrOOuced in a less risky, 
incremental, manner (Table 3.18c p.60). Although teleshopping may 
reduce the expensive wait for planning permission to open a new 
store (Table 3.17d p.59), it takes second place to efforts to boost 
trade and enhace the image of the stores that retailers already have 
(Table 3.21b p.62). 
Another reason for the adoption of teleshopping by superstore 
retailers is that there are signs that the mOOe of retailing is 
reaching its limits, as the profitability of supermarkets shows 
signs of declining, in the US at least (Table 3.14b p. 58). A causal 
factor 1n this is the increasing cost of employing a large staff, 
and of training employees (Table 3.14b p.58). Teleshopping should 
allow a more intensive use of the labour force, if not a reduction 
1n the payro 11 (Tab Ie 3 . 17b p . 59) , even though warehousing and 
delivery service staff are generally more expenS1ve. Even if less 
employees were needed this runs counter to the presently polarised 
wage structures between shop workers and managers (Table 3.24b 
p.63). There is also the fear of union resistance to teleshopping 
to prevent the early introduction of teleshopping (Table 3.25a 
p.64). 
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For non-store retailers a big problem is the rlse of production 
costs of printed matter (Table 3.14b p.58). In theory, teleshopping 
removes some of the inflexibility of printed matter. It is easier 
to make special offers whilst stocks last and to adjust pricing 
according to the rate of demand (Table 3.17d p.59). The low quality 
of the graphics so far available, however, implies that product 
information will have to be duplicated in printed form which is 
still costly. Even when videodiscs are introduced the costs of 
producing moving picture catalogues will be substantial (Table 
3 . 24c p. 63) . 
Another theme concerns the implications of teleshopping for 
retailers' trading practices. The inappropriateness of teleshopping 
for every type of product or form of shopping means that it will not 
challenge all retail modes. So some retailers feel safe to ignore 
it (Table 3. 25e p. 64) . For those forms of trading which can be 
converted to teleshopping there are new sets of marketing problems 
/ 
(Table 3.25e p.64). The interactive channels to the consumer do, 
however, give the marketer new tools to work with (Table 3.17d 
p. 59). 
The real attraction of teleshopping for retailers is the reduction 
III amount of capital tied up in property (Table 3.17a p.59). There 
are other stock handling advantages to be gained from following this 
route (Table 3.17c p.59). Although the lack of experience amongst 
store operators with home delivery services may be dampen this 
appeal (3.25d p.64) and home delivery is thought to be relatively 
expensive (Table 3.24c p.63). A compromise may be to develop a 
system of staging posts, where consumers can come to pick-Up their 
order (Table 3. 18c p. 60) . .Again the trends III goods handling run 
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against this as the costs of small deliveries has contributed to the 
decline of ~aller trading units (Table 3.21a p.62). 
Part of the high cost of home deliveries 1S the difficulty ,of 
minimising the distances which the delivery van has to travel 
between drops. This is compounded by the expected low penetration 
of teleshopping m any geographical area for some time to come 
(Table 3.25). In order for delivery charges to be low there must be 
both a mass market (Table 3.25b p.64) and a large minimllmn order 
S1ze (Table 3.24c p.63). 
3.3.5 The need to collaborate 
The inexperience of store retailers in delivering goods could be 
offset by sub-contracting the serv1ce to third party deliverers 
(Table 3.18b p.SO), but the retailer would no longer directly 
contact the consumer (Table 3.17d p.59). This problem highlights 
another dimension of the adoption of teleshopping. To institute a 
teleshopping service it is necessary to obtain the co-operation of 
many different agencies (Table 3.25c p.64). The initial operating 
difficulties of joint enterprises are hard to iron out (Tables 3.19c 
p.6l, 3.22b p.62 and 3.25d p.64) As with EETPoS this can result in 
conflict over which agency carries the burden of the costs. There 
are also implications that present trading relationships will have 
to change (Table 3.25c p.64) .. 
3.3,6 Summary 
Rapid change is a feature of retailing (Table 3.14b p.58), and 
structural change normally opens up new growth opportunities for 
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innovative forms of business (Table 3.18a p.60). The reluctance of 
retailers may be overturned by companies from other sectors or by 
new small companies seeking to exploit new markets (Table 3.18a p.60 
& b). In the past such challenges to the status quo have met fierce 
resistance from the retail establishment. One retaliatory act has 
been the de-listing of manufacturers who supply the upstart 
retailers (Table 3.20 p.61). Established retailers also have a 
powerful political voice (Table 3.23e p.63). The rising barriers to 
entry 1n retailing (Table 3.14), may also make entrepreneurial 
teleshopping services very difficult; the initial capital stake to 
set one up is very large (Table 3.24a p.63). 
'Theories' of retail change do not provide solutions to the 1ssues 
raised 1n this section, despite the claims of Doody and Davidson 
(1967) and Rosenberg and Hirschman (1980). The uncertainty is not 
ho~ 
whether there is a market for teleshopping, but(big the market is at 
a given level of profitability. The key issues revolve around the 
rates of return and the opportunity costs of capital invested 1n 
teleshopping. 
Teleshopping 1S not a homogeneous form of retailing. In practice, 
it represents a variety of levels of investment, of restructuring of 
retail distribution, and of quality of service. The risks involved 
in each teleshopping venture will vary accordingly. 
3.4 A commentary on the teleshopping literature 
The teleshopping literature was examined separately from mainstream 
retail research so that the main features of the debate concerning 
teleshopping could be easiliy identified. 
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The first part of the chapter provided a definition of teleshopp~. 
The most important attribute of teleshopping is that it is dependent 
upon specfic set of technologies. Nevertheless, teleshopp~ has 
strong similarities to other, more conventional forms of home-
shopping. 
3.4.1 Shortfalls lD the literature 
The publications which provided the source material for the 
disscussion of demand issues share the outlook which was criticised 
in Chapter Two. That ~s, it stresses personal circumstances which 
affect choices and the objective characteristics of the product. 
There is no attempt to delve into the causes of the trends which 
form the substance of the demand-for or demand-against debate. 
The identification of trends which are creattng new movements in 
demand begs the question; what is driving these trends? Most 
teleshopping, and retail research, stops at the level of finding out 
what consumers appear to want. Changing patterns of work, and 
training, and the restructuring of labour relations which has been 
taking place in recent years are clearly important to teleshopping. 
Such changes also alter the types of products which are available to 
consumers and the proportion of the workforce able to participate in 
the new goods and serv~ces. Changtng labour conditions also affect 
the conditions under which retailers approach the market. Yet, the 
reasons for these changes are taken to be outside of the remit of 
, 
retail research. The separation of retailing from the rest of the 
socio-economic system means that the analysis of teleshopping ~s a 
merely a veneer. It skims over the important social changes of 
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which teleshopping 1S a symptom, and 
insubstantial nature of retail research. 
contributes to the 
Several points which ar1se from a review of the demand-side 
literature also cannot be passed over without comment. The themes 
which were drawn out here are not so clearly discernable in the 
literature as might be thought. Certainly, references to such 
1ssues as: managerial decision making; the limits to managerial 
innovativeness; the effect of investment strategies; the way 
teleshopping implies a restructuring of distribution channels; and 
the effect of regulatory structures are all present, but they are 
not considered in any detail. They are not presented with reference 
to theory, not even innovation theory: nor, for the most part, do 
they relate to the real historical circumstances under which 
teleshopping has emerged. Clearly, the combination of abstract 
speculation and empirical description which is the hallmark of the 
teleshopping literature is inadequate. 
Changes 1n trading conditions are normally seen as a demand-issue 
which impinges upon retailing through competition for consumer 
spending power. It is just not good enough to regard retailers as 
direct m1rrors of externally consituted demand. Although the 
changing structures of supply, and the power relations within them 
have been referred to in the literature, they are not broached 1n a 
direct manner. In none of the publications which consider 
restructur~ is the struggle between labour and capital considered, 
nor is the competition between capitals for labour-power. This 1S 
strange when one considers that the main competitive weapon of 
retailers is to minimise labour costs. The use of part-time female 
labour 1n retailing 1S reaching its limit as a means of cutting 
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costs. This is an historically specific development, which 
illustrates the futility of abstract speculation about teleshopping. 
To understand the prospects for teleshopping the first requirement 
1S to place it into a theory of retailing and the second to 
interpret that theory in the real economic and social context which 
confronts retailing. Chapter Four begins these tasks. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A RADICAL REAPPRAISAL OF RETAILING 
The previous two chapters have summarised the academic approaches to 
retailing and to teleshopping. The chief criticism of the published 
literature 1S that it lacks theoretical insight. 
tradition of empiricism 1n retail research. 
There is a strong 
Usually, the only 
theoretical reference is a tacit acceptance of the consumer utility 
ax10m. This 1S so even when the institutional nature of retailing 
is being considered. Under this convention, change within retailing 
is ultimately determined by consumer demand, which itself is just 
the aggregation of individual consumer utilities. There are 
exceptions to this, some have been noted, but the criticism 1S fair 
to most studies of retailing. The poverty of retail theory is even 
accepted by some of the leading retail researchers (Davies and 
Kirby, 1985). 
Existing retail theory is further impoverished by an artificial 
separation of retailing from the rest of the econom1C and social 
system. Retailing is treated as though it has an independent right 
of existence. Yet, retail change is most commonly attributed to the 
impact of external environmental pressures, usually changes in 
demand. Even when retail change 1S related to the competitive 
conditions of supply, as well as trends 1n consumer- demand, the 
different factors are lumped together without regard to the internal 
relationships between the conditions of supply and demand. This is 
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certainly true of the mass of speculative teleshopping research. 
This body of work presents a series of for and against arguments, 
but offers no logic to explain how teleshopping relates to the 
under lying dynamics of society. Teleshopping is taken isolation, 
and in isolation it is meaningless. 
In this chapter the process of reconstructing what is known about 
the conditions for teleshopping is begun. The first stage is to 
identify the form and function of retailing in the reproduction of 
social relations. For this, marxist theory is adopted. The first 
attraction of marxism is that it provides a framework for the 
integration of production and consumption. The second attraction is 
its dynamism, it seeks to understand the way that society moves. In 
this way it gives a greater insight into the overall process of 
retail change, of which teleshopping is a part. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds from the fundamental abstract 
notions of marxist theory, through a specification of retail capital 
to a consideration of the nature of retail change. In the next 
section, some of the basic concepts of marxist theory are used to 
locate retailing within the overall structure of capitalist 
commodity production (the work in this section is expanded upon in 
Blomley and Ducatel, 1987). Its position within the economic sphere 
gives retail capital a specificity 1n the overall circuits of 
capital. 
Retailing 1S also a point at which overall commodity production 
meets the world of private reproduction, the consequences of which 
are presented m the second section. In the third part of the 
chapter, these components are then used 1n a discussion of the 
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nature of competition with retailing. An important distinction is 
made here between the horizontal competition which takes pla~within 
commodity markets, and the vertical competition between capitalists 
at different levels in the supply chain. 
In the fourth section, these forms of competition are further 
explored through the introduction of the concept that the processes 
of accumulation and competition lead to a centralisation of capital 
into large dominant groups. The fifth section of the thesis 
examines innovation as a tool of competition. Its role in extending 
the realm of capitalism and in the production of higher profits 1S 
considered. The analysis of innovation is then enriched by 
considering the way that competition and innovation give movement to 
the marxist analysis. The main theoretical development of the thesis 
1S drawn to a close in section six with a discussion of the longer 
term swings in accumulation and innovation which have punctuated 
capitalist development. 
After a summary of these points 10 the seventh section of the 
chapter, the eighth section reV1ews the fieldwork which was 
undertaken to support the thesis. 
4.1 The circuits of capital 
It is in the nature of marxist research to start by abstracting from 
the material conditions of commodity production. The abstractions 
provide a fundamental definition of capitalist society. The task is 
then to move, from this highest level, through many intermediate 
levels of abstraction, towards the concrete. However, apart from a 
few passing comments 10 Marx's own work, retailing has not been 
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conceptualised within the capitalist social formation. Clearly, a 
thoroughgoing integration of retailing into marxist theory is not 
possible in this thesis; that would be a major work in itself. Yet, 
the absence of such a resource presented a barrier to the completion 
of this thesis; the purpose of which is to understand retail change 
through the example of teleshopping. That 1S why a first-cut 
reconciliation of retailing and marxist theory has been attempted 
here. This chapter represents the first step in this process. 
In order to simplify the discussion a fairly orthodox version of 
value theory is used in this thesis. It is acknowledged that the 
Sraffian critique of the marxist theory of value has profoundly 
damaged its cred ib i Ii ty (Steedman, 1977; Steedman e:t. al., 1981) . 
Indeed, many marxists would now regard the theory as useful only in 
that it aids the analysis of labour relations in capitalism (Elson, 
1979). However, the Sraffian alternative to value theory is not 
capable of drawing together the complex interactions found in the 
real wor ld in the same way as does Marx's value theory. In a work 
such as this, which is in many regards exploratory, mathematical 
rigour 1S less important than the working through of a theoretical 
perspective on retail change and teleshopping. For the present 
purposes value theory is embraced more or less without question. 
4.1.1 Overall circuits of capital 
In marxist theory, the defining characteristic of capitalist society 
1S its particular mode of production. Under capi talism, productive 
activities are commodified. This means that consumption is not the 
direct purpose of production. Rather, production is the creation of 
commodities for exchange. The purpose of this exchange, within 
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capitalism, is the accumulation of wealth. 
Two social institutl.'ons are the 1 g' 1 o l.ca precursors of capitalist 
exchange, The first l.S the establishment of individual property 
rights. From property rights emerges the practice of using one 
particular commodity as a measure of all other commodities. This l.S 
money: the second social institution necessary to capitalism. 
Wealth and property are closely related phenomena, The difference 
between them is that wealth implies a comparison of social status, 
whereas property, in itself, does not. However, the distribution of 
property l.n society l.S a distribution of wealth. The status of 
individual members of society can be defined with respect to this 
distribution. Indeed, the capitalist mode of production depends upon 
this social relation for its perpetuation. To look at it in a very 
simple manner, society can be split into those who have control over 
property and those who do not. As a consequence, the propertyless 
classes are coerced into working for the propertied class in order 
to gain the material wherewithall to maintain themselves. This . l.S 
the basis for Marx's theory of exploitation. In constituting 
themselves as workers, the propertyless commodify their only 
possessl.on; their ability to work. 
"The capitalist epoch l.S therefore characterized by the fact that 
labour-power, in the eyes of the worker himself, takes on the form 
of a commodity which is his property; his labour consequently takes 
on the form of wage-labour. On the other hand it is only from this 
moment that the commodity-form of the products of labour becomes 
universal" (Marx, 1976 p.274) 
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The separation of production and consumption, has the further 
implication that workers, of necessity, become consumers. Workers 
are not only alienated from their labour, by the commodification of 
their labour power, but also from the fruits of their labour. That 
1S, they not only give up a portion of their life and strength 1n 
return for a sum of money, they also relinquish any rights to the 
goods on which they have toiled. 
In marx1sm, this is a necessary corollary to capitalistic relations 
of production. The whole aim of capitalism is the accumulation of 
wealth. Before wealth can be accumulated, however, it must first be 
created. Marx argued that weal th can only be created in the 
material transformation of nature through the application of human 
effort. He formalised this into the labour theory of value, in 
which for capitalists to accumulate wealth they must appropriate the 
value created J.n the production process. The value created 1S 
greater than the sum of the value consumed during production. 
The material transformation of nature, and its consequent 
valorisation does not automatically extend the wealth of the 
capitalist. In the first place, production is a process that must 
be continually fed. As these commodities can be only purchased with 
money, a constant source of money capital is necessary. In the 
second place, the goal of the capitalists is to increase their 
monetary wealth, not merely their stock of commodities. The extra 
wealth is locked up in the commodity until it has successfully been 
exchanged by the producer into money. Commodities are created for 
the purpose of exchange, but they can only be exchanged if they have 
a use. Thus, commcx:i it ies must have an exchange-value and a use-
value, if the value within them is to be realised. 
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It is the need for commodities to be realised 1n monetary terms that 
makes the reconstitution of the worker as a consumer so important. 
To the workers, wages allow them to consume the use-values bound up 
1n commodities. To the capitalists this wage-money allows them to 
realise the exchange-values which are bound up in commodities. The 
act of final exchange, between consumer and capitalist is of 
critical importance to both. Except that, they come to the 
transaction with profoundly different purposes in mind. 
From the point of V1ew of capital, the process of production just 
described can be conceptualised as a circuit. As it proceeds through 
this circuit capital changes form: from money capital, to commodity 
capital, to productive capital, to commodity capital and thence back 
to money capital again. This can be illustrated 1n the following 
way: 
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etc . 
The overall circuit of capital can be subdivided according to the 
three different types of capital of which it is composed. Money and 
commodity capital move through the sphere of circulation, whereas 
commodity and productive capital are to be found in the sphere of 
production. Circulation and production appear to one another as 
disjunctures in the overall process of capital accumulation. Yet, 
they are necessary to one another. If capital is interrupted in its 
journey through its various phases, the completion of the whole 
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circuit is made impossible. "If C'-M' comes to a halt in the case of 
one portion, for example, if the commodity is unsaleable, then the 
circuit of this part is interrupted and its replacement by its means 
of production is not accomplished; the successive parts that emerge 
from the production process as C' find their change of function 
barred by their predecessors. If this continues for some time, 
production 1S restricted and the whole process is brought to a 
standstill. Every delay in the succession brings the co-existence 
into disarray, every delay l.n one stage casues a greater or lesser 
delay in the entire circuit, not only that of the portion of the 
capital that 1S delayed, but also that of the entire individual 
capital" (Marx, 1978 p .183). 
4.1.2 The double reel of capital 
Figure 4.1 gives a more detailed presentation of the circuits of 
cap i tal. Product ion is now sp lit in to two Departmen ts . Department 
I produces capital equipment, commodities which are consumed within 
production. Department II produces goods for final demand, or for 
the consumption sector. It has already been said that the sphere of 
circulation compr1ses two forms of capital: money capital and 
commodity capital. Commodity capital can be further subdivided into 
been 
labour power and commodi ties which have ( previously valorised. 
Together, this means that there are three fluxes within circulation: 
labour-power, money capital, and physical commodities. In one of 
its functions (Harvey, 1982) money transmits value created by 
production through time and space. Money is necessary for the wage 
relation. Labour-power which is a commodity used up 1n production, 
1S exchanged for money at one time and place, and at a later date 
and elsewhere the wages can be reconverted into material 
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The exchange boxes in the diagram can thus be seen as sites of 
conversion of the value form of commodities. The owner of a 
commooity gives it up in exchange for money, or vice versa. In 
proouction, represented by circles in the diagram, money has no 
direct part to play. Here, inanimate commodities and living labour 
are brought together. The outcome is not a change of value form, 
but the qualitative transformation of commodities. That is, the 
creation of a new use-value. Within the diagram, the exchange box 
1n which retailing is located sits astride the circle representing 
reproouction. The private world of reproduction is represented as a 
site of production because a transformation of use-values takes 
place inside the domestic or private sphere, even though no 
exchange-value is created. 
4.1.3 Commercial capital 
It is now possible to move towards a discussion of retail capital in 
the circulation of capital. Retailing has not been seriously 
discussed by marxian scholars. Marx himself only gave it a passing 
mention. To get to grips with retail capital as part of the overall 
circuits of capital we have first to refer to his theorisation of 
capital which ~s adapted to the sites of value form change; 
commercial capital. 
From Figure 4.1 the existence of different functions within the 
circuit of capital can be deduced. Each function is attendant upon 
one of the phases of capital. The exchange boxes and the flux lines 
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which link the production must operate so that capitalism can 
reproduce itself. The necessity of exchange In the realisation of 
value has already been discussed. The flux lines are also 
necessary. Money, labour and commodities must be able to move 
through space to the sites of production and exchange to keep 
production going. It is important to accumulation that commodities 
should be exchanged as efficiently as possible. Therefore, part of 
the available labour power and the total product of society is 
consumed in ensuring the maintenance of the channels and structures 
of exchange. Admittedly, Figure 4. 1) being a simplification, cannot 
show this, however it is in the functions of distribution and 
exchange that we find retail capital. 
Marx makes a clear distinction between activities which are part of 
production and those that have a subsidiary role. One of Marx's 
fundamental assertions 1S that not all labour is productive. 
Rather, the values of commodities are derived from the 'socially 
necessary labour-time' that has been put into their creation. That 
1S, "the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the 
conditions of production normal for a given society and with the 
average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that 
society" (Marx, 1976 p. 129) . Marx distinguishes the labour which is 
used to add use-value to a commodity from that which is merely part 
of the process of realising its value. Labour which is involved in 
the buying and selling of goods, accounting, and so on, "no more 
creates value than the labour that takes place in legal proceedings 
increases the value of the object in dispute" (Marx, 1978 p.208). 
Thus, capital, such as retail capital, which is engaged in changing 
the form of capital, cannot contribute directly to the creation of 
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surplus value. Furthermore, the costs that such commercial capital 
~curs in realising the value held within the commodity must be 
taken from the surp Ius value prcx:iuced. Marx calls these costs the 
fallx frais (overhead costs) of production. There are, however, 
forms of labour which do not fit neatly into the productive/non-
prcx:iuctive categories that Marx has set up. He realises this, and 
treats labour involved ~ the transport and the storage of 
commodities as productive in as much as such labour J.S necessary to 
the consumption of the commodity. "The quantity of products is not 
increased by their transport ... But the use-value of things J.S 
realised only in their consumption, and their consumption may make a 
change of location necessary and thus also the production process of 
the transport industry" (Marx, 1978 pp. 226-7, emphasis added). 
Under this definition, retailing is a hybrid of both productive and 
non-productive processes. 
The analytical separation of the functions of capital does not ~ 
itself mean that there will be an institutional separation between 
productive and commercial capital. However, a division of labour 
between the producer of commodities and the selling agent, was seen 
by Marx of potential mutual benefit. The productive capitalist 
would be willing to forgo some surplus value in order to speed up 
the realisation of the capital which is bound up in the finished 
commodity, so that value created in production can be re-invested 
more rapidly in further prcx:iuction. By the same token, commercial 
capital J.s able to make money without becoming involved in the 
production of commcx:iities. Thus, commercial capital has a logic of 
its own which is internal to the general circuit of capital and 
takes the form: 
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H - C - H' - ..... and so on. 
The specialisation of function should allow a more skillfully 
operated, and therefore faster, exchange market. The amount of 
capital which 1S tied up in commodity form is less than it would be 
if the commercial capitalist had invested in productive capital 
instead. A further advantage of splitting commercial capital from 
productive capital is that it can service more than one productive 
unit. In fact, its turnover 1S limited only by the productive 
capacity of the whole branch of enterprise that it serves and the 
rate at which it can sell the commodities in the market place. In 
this way it can make an indirect contribution to the generation of 
surplus value, by increasing the rate of absorption of commodities 
by the market. 
Another way in which commercial capital can contribute to the 
generation of surplus value is less intuitively obvious. This has 
its basis in the assumption that each enterprise has to compete for 
the ava'ilable investment capital. Thus, one use of capital cannot 
reJufr1 (above average profits without causing a reallocation of 
labour and capital until a new equilibrium is reached. As the total 
~ 
surplus value is shared out amongst the producers, the land owners 
and the commercial capitalists, and as they are m mutual 
competition for investment capital, there must be a tendency for 
each to have the same rate of profit. It follows that as commercial 
capital does not create surplus value, the smaller the ratio of 
commercial capital to industrial capital the larger the general rate 
of profit. 
The faster the commercial capitalist can sell goods, the smaller the 
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amount of money extended ~ order to move a given value of 
commociities in a given amount of tlm· e. Thus, the s~ze of the 
commercial capital declines relative to the value of goods it is 
servicing. As a result, the amount of capital extended to cover 
circulation costs declines relative to total surplus value. Surplus 
value ~s proportional to the quanti ty of goods produced. As a 
result, the general rate of profitability rises. 
Whilst a faster turnover leads to a generally h~her rate of profit, 
as far as the commercial capitalist is concerned the profit on each 
item falls. Again this is due to the establishment of a general 
rate of profitability. If the rate of profit is 15% then for each 
£100 advanced, a commercial capitalist will make £15 profit, whether 
the capital turns over 10 times or 100 times. "The merchant's profit 
is determined not by the mass of commodity capital he turns over, 
but rather by the amount of money capital he advances in order to 
mediate this turnover" (Marx, 1981, p.426). 
4.1.4 Retail capital 
From this exposition of Marx's views on commercial capital we can 
see the that the function of retailing in the circulation of capital 
is to realise the value stored in commodities by selling them to 
consumers. While necessary to the valorisation of production, the 
act of realisation does not add value to the ~ commodities. 
Productive capital ~s involved 1n the transformation of the use-
value of commodities to make a profit. For retail capital, the 
profit is derived from removing the burden of the final realisation 
of consumer 'commodities from the productive capitalist. Here the 
am is exchange for exchange's sake, not production for exchange's 
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sake. Because retailing adds little to the value of commodities its 
profit must mostly be taken from the surplus-value created In 
production. However, the net profit which the producer retains 1S 
not necessarily less because a retailer has stepped between the 
producer and the consumer. We have noted above that the act of 
exchange would have to take place anyway. If the interposition of a 
separate institution, such as retailing, can improve the efficiency 
of the market enough to conteract the sub-division of surplus-value, 
the producer also benefits. Nevertheless, to the productive 
capitalist commercial capital is a cost of circulation, it is always 
viewed as a drain on surplus value. Thus, the relationship between 
commercial capitalists and productive capitalists is likely to be 
punctuated by conflict. 
4.2 Consumption and final exchange 
Section The previous r examined the function of retailing within the 
circulation of capital. This section concentrates on the place of 
retailing within the private, non-economic sphere of reproduction. 
The difference in purpose which the consumer and the capitalist have 
when engaging in final exchange, or retail exchange, has already 
been mentioned. Also, the importance of retail exchange In the 
maintenance of the wage relation has been introduced. 
Returning to Figure 4.1, retailing and shopping face each other 
across the divide between the economic sphere and the private sphere 
of reproduction. At the frontier is the act of retail exchange. 
Retailing is a purely economic act, but shopping is both an economic 
act of exchange and a social act of consumption. 
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It ~s impossible here to fully integrate retail capital into the 
theories of the social meaning of consumption. Apart from the few 
comments ~ this section about the manner ~ which the consumer is 
able to negotiate the direction of retail change, the consumer's 
point of v~ew ~s not thoroughly explored in this thesis. To be 
sure, this is unsatisfactory, but considerable extra work would be 
needed to begin to mesh this thesis with the ideas of Baudrillard 
(1974), Veblen (1918) etc. Clearly such work should be on the 
agenda of radical theory and policy if it is not already (for 
instance Myers, 1986) 
For the present purposes a rather restrictive view is taken which is 
that the logic of capital accumulation is dominant m the 
determination of the pattern which retailing actually acquires. It 
is in the nature of exchange relations that the vendor is more often 
.. 
able to set the agenda than is the buyer. The buyer either accepts 
one of the choices open or holds back from the exchange. 
An examination of two studies of the reproduction of needs indicates 
some of the factors at play in the determination of consumption 
requirements (Gintis, 1972; Terrail, 1985). The first feature is 
that social institutions help to configure individual expectations 
about society. These can take the form of symbolic or traditional 
insti tutions, such as religion or the family. They mayor may not 
be strongly linked to the prevalent mode of production. Secondly, 
social roles interact with, and are given legitmacy, by the manner 
1n which production ~s organised. An ind i vidual's needs and 
consumption will also relate to the direct and indirect demands that 
ar~se from their position in society. Their possible courses of 
action, the way that they associate with other people and the 
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congruence of their activities with social institutions, will be 
related to the repetitive experience of their own personal 
reproduction. This in turn will be founded on the environment they 
inhabit and their individual abilities. 
By its nature consumption is more flexible than time spent earning 
/ 
wages. Nevertheless a good deal of consumption reflects the need of 
workers to reproduce themselves as productive forces. Thus, the 
absolute level of the 'restricted dimensions of consumption under 
capitalism' 1S mediated by the demands that are made upon 
individuals 1n order to sell their labour power 1n society. For 
most workers, their labour, if productive, 1S employed to create 
products which are alien to them; their work is not a matter of self 
express10n. In the same way, the relations under which production 
takes place bear upon consumer behaviour. Alienation in the work 
place is prejudicial to the attempts of workers to capture a degree 
of autonomy 1n their more expressive role as consumers (Saunders, 
1986). It can be seen that consumption and production are part of 
the same process because, "the level and nature of worker's needs 
are not to be found in the intrinsic qualities of things but 1n the 
nature and level of capitalist suciety itself" (Lebowitz, 1977-8, 
p.437). 
The position of retail capital is contradictory. It 1S the site at 
which the two quite distinct logics of capitalist and consumer 
engage. It has to help in the legitimation of the wage relation. In 
consumer exchange the interests of the worker are pitched against 
the interests of the consumer. This is why the needs of consumers 
f . ked b ag nt ,n the rhetoric of class are so 0 ten 1nVO y man eme ~~
struggle. Antagonism can occur directly where common interests 
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within work are diluted by conflictual consumption activities. 
Shopping 1S just one aspect of complex private reproduction. It is 
however at the margins of the private sphere; the shopper also 
participates rn the economic sphere. In this light the naked 
individualism expressed by the consumer utility axiom, which 
underlies most studies of shopping, captures little of the real 
meaning of consumer behaviour. The role of consumer is fraught with 
contradictions. The very concept that people are consumers divides 
the activity of satisfying needs from the rest of their life, 
particularly their productive activities. This separation 1S 
replicated rn the tensions which exist between consumers and 
workers. The concept that needs are supplied through the market 1S 
also unsatisfactory. The market is not merely the site of need 
satisfaction, it is also the point at which capital realises the 
value of commodities. 
4.3 Competitioo and retail capital 
The order of presentation in this chapter has been as follows. 
Firstly, the position, function and logic of retail capital within 
the wider circuit of capital has been outlined. Secondly, attention 
has been given to the interface between the act of retail exchange 
and the sphere of consumption. This section focuses on the factors 
which give capitalism its frantic dynamism. The first of these 1S 
its defining characteristic; the law of accumulation. The second 1S 
the ever present partner to accumulation; competition. 
Competition, along with property rights and money, 1S one of the 
historical conditions for capitalist reproduction. The reason it 
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has not been introduced until now ~s that competition takes place 
between individual firms. It ~s only by moving down a level of 
abstraction from that used so far, to include the interaction 
between individual firms, that the dynamic nature of capitalism'can 
be understood. 
In general capitalists are 1n competition for sources of money 
capital in two ways. In the first place, competition is a struggle 
for a greater share of the money which is available to realise the 
value bound up in commodities. In the second place, it is a fight 
to attract investment capital. The first battle takes the form of 
price and non-price competition. The second involves a struggle to 
keep a higher than average rate of return. Of course, these two 
objectives are in conflict. 
4,3,1 Horizontal competition and retail capital 
There two ma1n methods of competition open to retail 
capitalists. The first is to cut the cost of circulation below 
competitors. The second ~s to sell a larger share of types of 
commodities in which they trade. They might also try to incorporate 
more value creating activities into their business. This ~s an 
unstable option, however, because of the economies which arise from 
separating production from circulation. 
Cutting the costs of circulation simply means more efficient 
operation. Unlike productive capitalists, retailers do not meet the 
problem that replacing labour power by fixed capital narrows the 
scope for value creation. Exchange activities are merely a drain on 
surplus-value. 
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To 1ncrease their sales of the mass of commodities produced 
retailers must either 1ncrease the geographical spread of their 
activities, or 1ncrease the penetration of spatial markets in which 
they are already established. The former requires an extension of 
the present distribution system. The latter involves either selling 
to a higher percentage of the population in an area, or selling more 
to the existing clientele, or both. To achieve this they might make 
their distribution system more accessible to consumers, or they can 
try to attract more customers by undercutting the competition, or 
they can extend the range of goods in which they trade. 
Attempting to compete by increasing the density, or extending the 
geographic range of the distribution network must eventually begin 
to yield diminishing returns. Similarly, reducing prices can only 
contribute to accumulation if it can be offset by economies of scale 
elsewhere 10 the distribution system. Such economies might come 
from a reduction of circulation costs from dealing in higher 
volumes, or from an effective cross-subsidy from products sold above 
their true value. Price reductions may also be undertaken to drive 
competitors out of business. Here a lower rate of return 10 the 
short term 1S a tracie-off against the capture of a larger market 
share in the longer term. 
4.3.2 Vertical competition and retail capital 
The competition for an above average rate of profit is also waged 
between the vertical links 10 the supply chain. The fact that 
retailers are not mainly concerned with the production of value is 
important here. The function of retail capital is the realisation 
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of surplus value created elsewhere in the circuit of capital. Thus 
retailers are in contention not only with one another, to reduce the 
costs of circulation to a minimum, but with the productive 
capi talists in Department II, to take a greater than average 
proportion of the surplus value created. 
The idea that certain sectors of an economy appropriate the surplus 
value created in other sectors 1S very important for a consideration 
of the relations between productive capital and retail capital. 
Because the retail capitalist 1S not directly involved in the 
creation of value, the nature of the exchange relations between 
groups of productive capitalists and groups of retail capitalists 18 
important. These relations cannot simply be seen as a market ~ 
which the producers compete to sell their wares to a number of 
retailers. In the first place retailers share in the surplus value 
which has already been created in the commodites. In the second 
place, they are not seeking use-values but exchange values. 
The fortunes of retail capitalists are tied to those of the 
productive capitalists with whom they deal. If the branch of 
industry with which the retailer deals is subject to a higher or 
lower rate of surplus-value than average, the amount of value 
realisable by the retailer will be affected. This would also be 
true for a retailer tied to a specific source of commodities, for 
instance when the retail company 1S merely the agent of the 
productive capitalist. In this case the distribution of surplus 
value between the producer and its agent is decided centrally. It 
is more common to find retailers having a range of suppliers to 
choose from for any specific co~odity, and for the producers to be 
able to sell their commdities to a number of different retailers. 
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Under these circumstances the division of surplus value ~s 
negotiated on the basis of the power relations between the parties 
involved. 
If one producer ra~ses its efficiency above the average In its 
branch of production it is able to accrue surplus profits. If it 
does not use the opportunity to lower its commodity prices, 
other producers lower their prices to compete with the 
or if 
more 
efficient producer, retail capital makes a short-term gain. The 
amount of value created is only altered to the extent that the more 
efficient producer is able to penetrate the market. In effect, the 
retailer retains an above average share of the surplus value. It 
doesn't matter which producer a retailer deals with, once an average 
pr~ce for a commodity 1.S established retailers are immune to 
inequalities in the rates of profit. 
This situation cannot be maintained indefinitely, because the 
producer companies returning a below average rate of profit, will 
suffer an emigration of capital. The producers will eventually lose 
the fight to prevent the more efficient technique of production from 
becoming dominant. If the new technique derived its competitive 
advantage from a higher organic composition, there will a decline in 
the total value produced, and thus a decline in the general rate of 
profit. Which will, of course, affect the retailer's rate of 
profit. 
While producers seek to to add surplus value to their products, or 
to expropriate the surplus value of their competitors, retailers a~ 
to increase the turnover of their capital. In effect, a r,eduction in 
circulation costs is just the same as an increase in the speed with 
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which goods are sold, SlI1ce both imply less capital is advanced to 
serv~ce a given value of commodities. The prcxiucers of a commcxiity 
also gain from this because there is more retained surplus value to 
be shared out. 
For the retailer there is considerable short-term advantage to be 
gained from increasing capital turnover. It allows the retailer to 
grow more quickly than competitors. As there will be an average 
commodity wholesale price, the faster turnover retailer will retain 
a larger proportion of the surplus value than other retailers. This 
will even out, to give a slightly improved rate of profit for the 
whole sector, and a lower margin on a given value of goods sold. 
4.4 Concentration and centralization 
Capitalists who through competition are successful lI1 achieving an 
above average rate of surplus value, are better able to offer a high 
rate of return on investment. To secure a longer term advantage from 
the increase in surplus value, either the total market or the 
individual capi talist ' s share of the market must be expanded. Here 
we meet the twin processes of concentration and centralisation. 
Aglietta (1979) defines concentration as "the expansion of ownership 
over a process of valor isa t ion II (p. 216) . In other words, , as the 
amount of value channelled through an individual capital grows, 
concentration grows. It would be wrong to define concentration 
simply as a gain in the share of sales of a particular use-value. A 
"process of valorization" may be extended across any number of 
different types of commodity, or use-value markets. 
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4,4.1 Centralisation and competition 
All things being 
the amount of 
Concentration is merely an effect of accumulation. 
equal, as the to tal soc ial cap i tal expands so does 
capital in the hands of each individual capitalist. Centralization 
on the other hand is the "concentration of capitals already formed, 
destruction of their individual independence, expropriation of 
capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into few 
large capitals" (Marx, 1976 p,777). 
Centralisation carr~es on ~ two ways, by driving the competition 
into insolvency, or by the takeover of a competitor as a going 
concern. Centralisation permits concentration in the absence of the 
growth of total social capital. Of course, takeovers and mergers 
are much quicker routes to the concentration of an individual 
capital than simple concentration. Also, centralisation allows 
capitalists to undertake larger projects sooner than if they had to 
wait to accumulate the necessary funds by straightforward 
reproduction. liThe world would still be without railways if it had 
had to wait until accumulation had got a few individual capitals far 
enough to be adequate to the construction of a railway" (Marx, 1976 
p. 780). 
However achieved, concentration aids in the construction of barriers 
to entry in specific use-value markets. The progress of dominant 
capital has been punctuated by the introduction of labour processes 
which not only gave economies of scale, and absolute cost advantages 
but are also supported by capital intensive advertising campaigns 
and other forms of non-price competition. The logical counterpart 
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of this is the diversification into other product markets and 
industries. This protects individual capital from a downturn in one 
particular use-value market. 
In a situation where there are a few highly concentrated capital in 
a specific use-value market it might be expected that the nature of 
competition changes. Certain marxists have argued that the relative 
and absolute size of certain capitals allows them to contravene the 
rules of value theory, by virtually creating their own conditions of 
accumulation (Baran and Sweezy, 1968). Such capitals are often 
called monopoly capital. 
The use of the word monopoly in this context is ambiguous because 
rarely 1S a whole market administered from one centre of 
accumulation. In practice, the term monopoly capital is used to 
describe a centre of decision making which is absolutely large as 
well as having exercising power in a use-value market through its 
market share. To increase precision these capitals will be called 
dominant capitals from now in this thesis. 
The idea that dominant capitals are able to flout value theory has 
been shown to be both theoretically and empirically incorrect 
(Semmler, 1982). Competitive tools such as barriers to entry can 
just as easily to turn to disadvantages in declining markets by 
becoming barriers to exit. Because competition takes place in 
capital markets as well as use-value markets, even very large 
dominant capitals are unable to overturn value theory through the 
use of entry barriers. HoweveG they are often able to use the 
enormous resources at their disposal to gain a breathing space, a 
facility which smaller capitals do not eOJoy. 
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Dominant capitals create two new kinds of competitive relation 
(Wheelock, 1983) The f; t tOtO 
. .rs ~s compe ~ ~on between a dominant 
capital and smaller capitals. Here the advantage ~s held by the 
dominant capital, due to its economies of size and power. Surplus 
profits can be retained by the dominant capital because of barriers 
to entry, In this sort of competition market prices are able to 
affect profits rates, through a redistribution of profits from the 
less to the more efficient capitals. 
The second type is competition between dominant capitals. This 
requires that the sector be large enough to contain more than one 
dominant capitalist. Here, the establishment of a general rate of 
profit is achieved by competition between the dominant capitals on 
the capital markets. 
4.4.2 Comgetition and concentrated retail capital 
The redistribution of profits from concentrated retail capital to 
smaller retail capitals takes place both through the setting of 
market prices, and the negotiation of discounts from producers. 
i) Horizontal competition 
The pr~ce competition by concentrated retail capitalists depends 
on the construction of barriers to entry. So long as there is open 
access to the wholesale markets, entry barriers to retailing are 
notoriously hard to construct. They depend upon the economies of 
scale which can be achieved through investments in buildiRgs, 
transport facilities and man~ement skills. Any particular 
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combination of these factors will prevent the further expansion of 
the intensive or extensive market at above the average rate of 
profit. At this point the particular marketing techniques have 
reached saturation. 
Smaller retailers which are not directly tied to capital markets can 
operate at a lower rate of profit, although even they should produce 
profits equivalent to the average rate of interest. As a result, 
smaller retailers are able to conduct their trade 1n spatial markets 
or 1n product categories which concentrated capitals find too 
):Ifiprofitable. 
The extensive saturation of a particular technique of marketing will 
also curtail the geographic extension of a concentrated retail 
capital when it comes into direct competition for a trade area with 
another retailer operating at the same level of efficiency. 
Once one particular style of trading runs out of steam, retail 
capitalists are faced with two broad options. 
either by moving into other sectors of trade, 
backwards and undertaking production, this 
vertical competition and concentrated capital, 
One is to diversify, 
or by integrating 
raises the issue of 
which 1S taken up 
next. The other is to renegotiate the work of consumption in such a 
way as to revolutionise the prevailing mode of retail competition. 
For this to happen, there must be the opportunity for a significant 
and long lasting increase in the retention of surplus-value. This 
issue is discussed in the next section. 
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ii) Vertical competition 
When one producer has the monopoly of a commodity which has the 
competitive advantages of price or product differentiation, 
retailers are relatively less able to dictate the size of their 
share of the surplus value created. On the other hand, retailers 
which have a large clientele, or which are much more efficient at 
turning over commodities have a powerful bargaining position. Thus, 
the relative profit rates of retailers and producers are liable to 
shift as this balance of power shifts. In any branch of industry, 
there is likely to be a variation in the balance of power between 
one retailer and its varl0US producers and one producer and its 
varlous retailers. Thus, there will be no fixed wholesale price, 
rather retailers or producers will be able to drive bargains with 
each other. 
Retailers will buy above or below the average price depend~ upon 
their buying power. From the point of view of the producer the 
relinquishment of a larger than average proportion of the surplus 
value to the retailer is an effective driv~ down of the rate of 
profit. For its long term security the producer must be able to 
convert the extra volume into extra value, by introducing economles 
of scale. The competing away of retailers who are buy~ 
commodities above the average wholesale price, of course, reduces 
still further the value retained by the producer. This makes it 
even more essential for the producer to gain economies of scale. 
Larger capitals may also be able to set the conditions under which 
exchange takes place. For instance, retailers may demand long free 
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credit periods or producers may be inflexible 1n arranging 
deliveries. These are tactics which indirectly contribute to their 
share of surp Ius value. 
The retailer can push the producer's share of surplus value back 
only so far; producer's must strive to return at least the 
prevailing rate of interest. Even then, if the capital invested in 
production is immobile the retailer can force the producer to carry 
on at a low rate of profit. The immobility of capital arises when 
significant sums have been invested in plant and buildings, which do 
not have a resale value, or when this capital is protected from the 
overall movement of the capital markets. A classic example of the 
latter would be a wholly owned family firm. 
Alternatively, retailers might deal with firms in sectors of trade 
where the entry costs are very low, so that petty commodity 
production is dominant (Rainnie, 1984). When this happens the 
producer becomes little more than a sub-contractor for the retailer. 
The low prices to the retailer form an effective bar to the invasion 
of productive capital into this area. In order to compete with the 
petty commodity producer, productive capitalists would have to be 
efficient enough to return more than the average rate of profit at 
these impoverished prlces. Moreover, the retailer when faced with 
such low entry costs may be making surplus profits from the 
inability of the producer to increase its organic composition at the 
same rate as productive capital. 
The retailer is protected from the equalization of the extra rates 
of surplus value by the nature of petty commodity production, which 
does not appeal to capital markets for investment. However, as the 
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organic composition becomes lower than the social average the 
possibilty of introducing a new production technique which is less 
costly than petty commodity production Lncreases. The labour 
intensity of petty commodity production, which enable the retailer 
to make surplus profits is also its weak spot. Even if the labour-
power 1S dramatically below its social value there are limits to 
which its cost can be driven down, the labour force must be able to 
reproduce its labour-power. Eventually, a capitalist will replace 
labour-power by fixed capital, so expropriating surplus value from 
the value laden activities of the petty commodity producer. 
4,5 Capitalist innovation 
Under capitalism innovation becomes a competitive tool. It does not 
occur for its own sake, it must also contribute 1n some way to 
accumulation. Innovation can thus be conceived of as an attempt to 
extend the realm of commodity production or to increase the rate of 
profit or both. 
4,5,1 Innovation to propagate demand 
The limited extent of total consumer purchasing power means that any 
extra revenue is obtained at the expense of other capitalists. Marx 
recognised three ways in which demand can be expanded: "firstly 
quantitative expansion of existing consumption; secondly: creation 
of new needs by propagating existing ones in a wide circle; thirdly: 
production of new needs and discovery and creation of new use 
values" (Marx, 1973 p408). The options open to the capitalist are 
the following. 
1) To sell more to each individual, to increase the market 
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penetration or to expand the geographic extent of operations. 
2) To develop products or services which either reduce the efforts 
required of consumers, or lncrease the quality of existing 
consumption and production. 
3) To create new products which require new forms of behaviour and 
interests. 
The first of these is a directly competitive strategy, which does 
not involve innovation, but may include the diffusion of an 
innovation. The second and third are innovatory. The second can be 
sub-divided into two types. First, innovations which involve the 
movement of the boundaries between the private and the economic 
spheres. As this boundary is the site of retail capital (see Figure 
4.1), this is a form of creation available to retailers. Earlier we 
saw that retailing and shopp~ lie on either side of the 
demarcation between exchange and private reproduction. The actual 
location of this boundary, however, is subject to change. When this 
happens, retail capital expands into or withdraws from the sphere of 
consumption. Second, the actual content of consumption activities 
can be altered. This requires a change in the prcx:iucts which are on 
offer, as for instance in the switch from the sale of raw to ready 
to eat foodstuffs. 
To make sense of what is happening here it is necessary to return 
the concept that commodity production is possible because of the 
cleavage between production and consumption. The material 
transformation of use values which takes place in production 1S 
creative of value, whereas that which takes place in consumption 1S 
not. This 1S the case even if the physical actions undertaken are 
identical. So, the point at which the division is made between the 
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work of production and the work of consumption lS constantly 
renegotiated as capitalists innovate to expand their businesses. In 
doing so, the content of the work of consumption is redefined. New 
surplus value lS created by taking use-values out of the work of 
consumption and into the work of production. 
The logic of rolling back the frontier with the sphere of 
consumption is contradictory. Capitalists want workers to undertake 
more of the work of consumption, because it lS unpaid and lS 
therefore not a cost on them as wage labour. The notion that 
consumption time is also leisure time is shown to be wanting in this 
regard (Preteceille, 1985). Capitalists also want to extend the 
sphere of capital by persuading people to shift the balance of their 
non-work activities towards a greater share of commoditisable 
consumption. 
The third type of demand fostering activity is different from the 
second only by degree of novelty. As all innovations have to 
compete with established products and services, those which generate 
new activities will have to gain a meaning in the terms of present 
consumption. Clearly, an innovation which requires new forms of 
behaviour will foster demand more easily if it can be linked to some 
definable, if latent, need. 
4.5.2 Innoyation to increase the rate of profit 
The rate of profit can be increased by cutting the costs of 
production and circulation. Specifically, this involves reduc~: 
the payroll; the costs of the material inputs; or the rate of 
f h f oduct ;on In the marxist literature depreciation 0 t e means 0 pr 4. 
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most attention has been given to the effect of innovations which cut 
labour costs, and the de-skilling process which it seems to imply 
(Braverman, 1974). This 1S at least partly due to Marx's 
proposition that there will be a tendency for the rate of profit to 
fall, as a result of the replacement of variable capital by fixed 
capital, that 15, labour by machines. There is a reduction in the 
opportunities to create value. As retail capital is mostly a cost 
of circulation there is no theoretical reason why it could not 
become so efficient that it puts itself out of business. In 
practice, there will only ever be a tendency towards zero, there 
will always be some costs. Also, retail capitalists have an 
institutional inertia of their own, which will be self-perpetuat~. 
Cutting labour costs, however, 1S not simply the replacement of 
human actions by machines. Remember, the purpose of such innovation 
is to 1ncrease the rate of return on capital investments. This 
return is a function of the way in which total labour time 1S 
divided into the time needed to reconstitute labour-power(tn) and 
the time given to the creation of surplus value (tv). In the total 
period of work (T) there will be times when value creative activity 
decreases or ceases altogether. There are three ways in which the 
rate of surplus value can be increased (Palloix, 1976 p.49). 
1) a decrease in tn. 
2) a rise in tv by way of a rise 1n T 
3) a decrease in T-tv with T remaining constant. 
A reduction of tn is the production of relative surplus-value. The 
other two produce absolute surplus value. Furthermore, the first two 
increase the extensive use of labour, while the third increases the 
intensity of labour. 
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The retail capitalist cannot 1ncrease the production of surplus-
value in these ways as there is no surplus value created. Yet, 
wages are a cost to retail capitalists just as they are for other 
capitalists, so that a decrease in tn of retail workers 1ncreases 
the retention of surplus value. Similar ly, 1ncreases in the 
intensity of work are beneficial to all forms of capital. However, 
retail capital does not seek to keep T constant but to reduce it, 
and so decrease T-tv. 
Marx saw the labour process as made up of productive forces and the 
social relations of production (Therborn, 1976). The first of these 
refers to the ability to transform nature and the second to the 
particular social organisation and social implications of 
production. Innovations which cut costs can address either of these 
aspects. They might involve the reorganisation of labour in such a 
way as to increase the intensity of its use, or so that there is a 
dec 1 ine in the total amount of labour needed. On the other hand an 
innovation might take the form of a new investment in fixed capi tal 
to achieve the same ends . Capital ists may also re- invest in fixed 
capital which has a lower value component than has previously been 
the case. This would require an innovation, which takes the form of 
the reduction of either tn or T-tv, by one of the capitalist 
retailer's suppliers. 
4.5.3 The motion of competition 
The discussion so far has abstracted out of the time bounded nature 
of competition. For instance, a general rate of profit does not 
come into being immediately there is a shift in the profitability of 
one section of capital, to the detriment of another. If this was 
-108-
the case there would be very little scope for accumulation. At any 
point in time capitalists will be returning more or less the average 
rate of profit. It is time lags 1n the system which allow one 
capitalist to gain a competitive advantage over another. This takes 
the form of a redistribution of surplus value from one capitalist to 
another. 
The time-lag is a pre-requisite of innovation. For instance, if a 
productive capital 1S able to introduce a labour saving process 
before its competitors, then the decline in value created will be 
felt more by the competitors than the innovator. The price of the 
commodity does not fall immediately. Instead the innovator hopes to 
make surplus profits. This 1S directly detrimental to its 
competitors, because their rate of return will be lower. It is only 
when there has been a redistribution of capital in response to this, 
and the probable adoption of the new process by the competitors, 
that the effect of the lower rate of surplus value emerges. 
Meanwhile, the innovator has had surplus profits to re-invest, which 
might have been used to develop another surplus-profit making 
innovation. 
An alternative strategy for the innovator is to cut the price of the 
innovation immediately. This will allow it to take market share 
from its competitors. If the penetration is deep enough, it may 
allow the innovator to completely undermine the opposition, as 
realisation becomes more difficult for them. This may also put the 
innovator 1n a position not only to extend effective control over 
the sites of value realisation, but may also allow them to gain 
ownership of the process of valorisation. The competitors may be 
driven to the wall or bought out. New entrants are deterred from 
-109-
entering the market because of the declining rate of profit, and the 
tendency to surplus capacity. Innovation 1S made less likely 
because the high entry barriers surrounding the 
capitals in such mature markets make it very risky. 
concentrated 
The market lifecycle concept 1S more useful 1n this context, 
containing, as it does, the idea that as the market concentrates and 
centralises the intensity of innovation declines. This is a two way 
process, innovation lies 1n a circle of causality with market 
structure. The reasoning for these effects 1S largely based in the 
positive correlation between use-value market power and the 
centralisation capital. One of the reasons for centralisation 1S 
the slow down of natural growth of the market, as the use-value 
innovation matures. There is less room for less efficient companies 
in a direct confrontation for market share. 
For a number of reasons, the process of consolidation never seems to 
reach its logical conclusion. Individual capitals may spawn new 
cap i tals . Parts of a firm which are underperf orming , or are 1n a 
tight market may be sold off. New use-value markets may develop, 
which allow for a decentralisation of capital. The point is that 
the tendency to concentrate meets countervailing forces. 
Innovation can be potent as one of the countervailing forces that 
constantly thwart the centralisation of capital. Small companies 
are able to exploit niches 1n a product market which it 1S 
unprofitable for larger firms to attack. Innovations are rarely 
born with a ready made market. The economies of scale which allow a 
concentrated capital to maintain a stream of surplus profits do not 
apply here. Hence, small specialised companies are able to compete 
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on relatively favourable terms with the larger capitalists. 
Furthermore, it 1S generally in the interests of dominant capitals 
to tolerate such small innovative companies. They absorb much of 
the risk of innovation, do a lot of the sorting out of teething 
problems, and finally they build the market until it 1S of a size 
where barriers to entry can be erected. 
For the most part the power relations between retailers, and the 
level of centralisation of their individual Ese-va.lue market, will 
influence the rate of innovation m the same way as it does in 
production. There is no reason why the process of concentration and 
centralisation should be any less effective amongst factions of 
retail capital than it is between other capitalists. Except, of 
course, innovations in retail form are not protected by patent or 
copyright, so the retained surplus profits from innovations m 
retailing are likely to be less long lived. By the same token, 
retail capital 1S more likely to adopt an imitative strategy 
(Freeman, 1974) with respect to innovation. 
4.6 Structural crlses and renewal 
The inequality in rates of surplus value between different portions 
of capital has a more importance than the localised competition 
between capitals would suggest. It has been proposed as the major 
motive force behind the long term fluctuations in the economic well 
being of capitalism (Mandel 1975, 1980). These well marked 
fluctuations have a 40 to 60 year timespan in which a boom period 1S 
followed by economic stagnation and then decline. 
It should be said that the existence of long waves is disputed. 
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This is due to a lack of agreement about: the correct indicators for 
economic sickness or health; the causality within the long waves; 
and the actual timing of the long waves. Nevertheless, even 
economists who are highly sceptical about the possibility of regular 
cycles in economic performance accept that capitalism is subject to 
periods of relative wealth and periods of relative poverty. For 
instance, "no one who has examined the dynamics of capitalist 
econom1es over long historical periods can doubt that they 
experlence significant long-term variations 1n their aggregate 
performance" (Rosenberg and Frischtak, 1983 p.146). 
Certainly, the duration and severity of each period of capitalism 
cannot be reduced to simple, or even complex, harmonic motion. "It 
is too great a generalisation to say that all cycles within the 
expansionary waves entail long, intense booms and short, less-marked 
downturns or that cycles in the contractive periods have hesitant 
upturns and more durable, intense slumps. Empirical evidence 
suggests that each cycle has its own distinctive structure and 
character which cannot be simply subsumed within epoch-spanning 
general patterns of fluctuation" (Marshall, 1987 p.9S). 
Even if these "long-term variations" are accepted as something more 
than the product of random effects, the mechanisms for the upswings 
and downturns are in dispute (Table 4.1). Despite the differences 
of opinion about what are causes and what are effects, it can be 
seen from Table 4.1 that most long wave theories depend upon some 
restructuring of the productive system to spark-off an upswing, and 
that the downswing is related to over-capacity and saturation of the 
key industrial sectors. 
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All of the theories, with the exception of Forrester's (1976), 
stress the importance of technical revolutions as part of the 
restructuring of industry. Clearly, new technological systems imply 
a new set of labour relations in production, as well as new products 
and new markets, although not all long wave theorists acknowledge 
the significance of the labour process. The decline of the period 
of boom is associated with saturated demand and/or over-production. 
The dis-equilibrium between departments 1S thought by bourgeois 
theorists such as Freeman at ~ (1982) and Forrester (1976) as the 
root of the crisis, as it leads to over-capacity In the capital 
goods sector, whereas Mandel (1975) regards inbalance as an ever 
present feature of the capitalist system. 
Table 4.1 Long Haye theories 




Upswing: associated with profound economic 
and social upheaval (war, revolution 
etc.); major technological changes; 
the opening up of new markets; 
changes in the money supply. 
Downturn: need for re-investment in 
productive capital at the same time 
as a lack of loanable funds due to 
over-investment. 
Upswing: new technological organisation of 
society leading to changes in the 
relative prices of commodities 
leading to shifting sectoral-spatial 
patterns of income and investment. 
Lags in the process lead to scarcity 
and the eventual upswing. 
Downturn: the process eventually runs out of 
steam. 
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Freeman et al, 1982 
Van Duijn 1983 
Upswing: a group of innovative entrepreneurs 
emerges; their innovations transform 
the organisation of production. 
Downturn: " creative destruction: " the 
process of competitively whittling 
away profits and a dampened 
psychological spur. 
Upswing: a cluster of basic innovations 
emerges to create new industries and 
markets. 
Downturn: as the scope for substantial 
innovations in the dominant 
technological system declines the 
innovations become progressively less 
radical. The markets saturate and 
there is widescale devalorisation and 
stagnation. 
Upswing: social and economic restructuring 
from the previous depression leads to 
the slow emergence of a new 
technological system and a labour 
force with the new technical skills. 
Inter-firm product-process linkages 
eventually produces a technological 
web of industries. 
Downturn: consolidation of the technological 
web leads to saturation and eventual 
over-capacity and decline. 
Upswing: a cluster of basic innovations 
produces new industrial sectors and 
subsequent growth. 
Downturn: growth gives way to maturity; as 
the markets for capital goods 
saturate an over-capacity and over-
accumulation in fixed capital becomes 
evident. 
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Upswing: depletion of capital stocks during 
last depressive phase leads to demand 
outstripping supply. There 1S an 
expansion of the capital goods 
sector, as the level of business 
confidence picks-up. 
Donwturn : in order to meet demand the 
production of capital goods becomes 
over-expanded in relation to the 
rna ture mar kets . There is an over-
production of capital goods leading 
to devalorization as the economy 
moves back into recession. 
Upswing: external forces (e.g. the opening 
up of new geographic markets, the 
introduction of new technologies of 
production) and the profound defeat 
of the working class lead to a 
reinvigoration of the rate of surplus 
value . Capital flows into the new 
higher profit areas; leading to a new 
high demand for cap i tal goods. The 
average rate of profit in the capital 
goods sector is bolstered. 
Downturn: overaccumulation in the capital 
goods sector leads to a realisation 
crisis; decelerated accumulation 
leads to over-production as 
investmen t is wi ttrlrawn . 
1: Comprehensive discussions of these theories can be found l.D 
Freeman ~ al. (1982), and Marshall (1987). 
2: The dates refer to the first appearance of the specific theory, 
not to the date of publication in English. 
3: The specific references are, respectively: Kondriatieff (1978), 
Rostow (1978), Schumpeter (1939), Mensch (1979), Freeman et al. 
(1982), Van Duijn (1983), Forrester (1976), and Mandel (1975) and 
(1980) . 
The Mandelian (1975, 1980) interpretation 1S the most consistent 
with the approach adopted here. For Mandel, long waves are made 
possible by capitalism finding new ways to substantially, and for 
long periods, l.Dcrease the rate of surplus value in certain sectors 
of the total economy. This has taken the form of the exploitation 
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of newly opened up sources of labour, raw materials, or markets. It 
has also been the result of transformations in the forces and the 
social relations of production. Each epoch of capitalism 1S 
characterised by a different labour process" based around a new 
technological infrastructure. 
Mandel (1975) maintains that there have been three new sources of 
surplus profit since the emergence of capitalism. These have been 
three backward areas: agricultural regions in the central capitalist 
states; under-developed countries; and less technically advanced 
sectors of the economy. The factors which the surplus profits 
depend upon are a surplus of capital, the relative immobility of 
capital and the relative limits to the equalization of different 
rates of profit, due to the protection afforded by oligopolies. 
The unbalanced growth of certain sectors of capital based on 
specific labour processes clearly underlies each period of 
cap i talism whether it be described as an epoch, or a long wave. As 
Aglietta (1979) pointed out, a specific labour process carries with 
it implications about the nature of consumption. The capitalist 
system is after all an organic unity. A specific organisation of 
production will carry with it demands for a certain level of social 
development and a certain level of technical skill, each of which 
will only be brought into being slowly as one epoch period makes way 
for the next (Dunford and Perrons, 1983). 
Aglietta (1979) goes on to identify two historical regimes of 
accumulation, an intensive regime and an extensive regime. The 
first of these implies the reorganisation of labour without the 
direct intervention of capitalist production into the private sphere 
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of reproduction. The intensive regime involves a restructuring of 
working class life by the capitalist logic of production. The first 
regime constantly met barriers to the expansion of accumulation, due 
to the problems of creating an adequate effective demand. A stable 
effective demand was ensured J.n the intensive regime, because a 
working class norm of consumption is established which smooths out 
the disequilibrium between Department I and Department II. 
The concept of a regime of accumulation underlines the essential 
uni ty of prociuction and consumption. Using this uni ty Aglietta 
(1979) shows how "advances J.n prociuctivity in Department I find 
their outlets J.n the expanSl.on of Department II. The fall l.n unit 
exchange-values J.n this department sufficiently increases the 
prociuction of relative surplus value to enable real wages to rl.se. 
Accumulation can thus progress at a rapid pace in both departments." 
(p. 86). 
The development of a working class norm of consumption, and the 
regulatory norms which underwrite it, 
understanding of long term retail 
are clearly important to an 
change. They influence the 
quantity and quality of the products sold to consumers. Different 
regimes of accumulation will have different effects upon the work of 
consumption. The changing nature of labour relations will not only 
affect what consumers needs are, but will directly impinge upon 
labour relations within retailing. Finally, crises in the production 
of surplus value m Department II or a real decline in the real 
value of the consumers spending power will ultimately make 
accumulation more difficult for retailers. 
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4 . 7 Summary 
This chapter has had one very important function within the thesis. 
It has provided the analytical tools with which the investigation of 
retail change through the example of teleshopping can proceed. The 
first section located retail capital within the overall circuit of 
capital. The second looked at the implications for retail capital of 
its specific position at the interface between the economic and the 
private spheres. In the third section the nature of horizontal and 
vertical competition was discussed. The effects of the concentration 
and centralisation of retail capital was discussed in section four. 
Innovation as a means of extending accumulation and the rate of 
profit was examined in section five. Then, 1n section seven, the way 
that capitalism J.S not just reproduced as the same institutional 
pattern but undergoes periodic transformation was discussed. 
The critical points which have been raised so far can be summarised 
as follows. 
1) Capital must be conceived of as a circuit. As cap i tal passes 
through this circuit it changes its value form. There are 
specific types of capital which are adapted to these points at 
which it changes of form. One of these is commercial capital. 
Commercial capital is devoted to the exchange of commodity 
capital to money capital. Retail capital J.S a sub-form of 
commercial capital which serves the very important function of 
ensuring the final re lease of the value bound up 1n 
commodities, by exchanging them for money. 
2) Commercial capital, pure and simple, does not create value, so 
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that it must make space for itself as a separate institution 
within capitalism by providing economies of scale. Marx has 
demonstrated how this can be done. It is m the paradoxical 
nature of commercial capital that it does not directly make 
greater profits by turning over more commodities. This is due 
to the equalising effect of the general rate of profit. 
3) Yet, retailing has a specificity of its own. It is a hybrid of 
both productive capital and commercial capital. Its 
institutional separation is based upon the economies which it 
affords by specialising m exchange. Thus, the productive 
activities are necessarily unstable. In any case, as a sub-
form of commercial capital its watchword 1S exchange for 
exchange's sake. 
4) The position of retail capital also means that it 1S the 
closest form of capital to the private sphere. 
takes part m the legitimation of the social 
It therefore 
relations of 
production through final exchange. In part this is simply 
through the converS10n of latent needs and desires into 
commodified use-values. 
5) The dynamic transformation of capitalist society can be 
attributed to the action of the law of accumulation and its 
partner ; competition. Competi tion can take the form of the 
struggle for a finite amount of investment capital, or the 
battle for the sales to the consumer. It is also conducted 1n 
. two directions: horizontally and vertically. The horizontal 
mode of retail competition shows the inherently geographical 
nature of retail capital. The vertical mode of competition 
indicates retail capital's dependence upon the rate of surplus 
value in the branch of production with which it deals. 
7) The nature of horizontal and vertical competition is amended by 
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the formation of centralised retail capital. Although it 
hard to build barriers to entry to the retail trades, 
1S 
the 
concentrated retail capitals compete through the extension of a 
particular labour process until they meet diminishing returns, 
through market saturation. Vertical competiton 1S 
substantially altered by concentration either on the part of 
the producer or the retail capital. In each case the 
distribution of surplus value is at 1ssue. Concentration in the 
vertical market also prevents the establishment of a true 
wholesale price for commodities. 
8) Innovation can either take the form of the enlargement of 
demand, or the raising of profits. Demand can be enlarged 
either by selling more of the same goods, by creating new 
products which supply existing needs, or by the creation of new 
needs. Innovations which cut costs can either save on labour 
power, or they can save on fixed capi tal costs. Savings on 
labour power can be achieved either by the production of 
relative or absolute surplus value. In 
means of doing this were described. 
relevant to retail capital. 
section 4.5.2, three 
Only two of which are 
9) Capitalists can also use time lags 1n the redistribution of 
capital to gain advantage over their competitors. This can 
offer them the opportunity of monopoly profits. If used 
skillfully the headstart gained by introducing a cost saving 
process or a demand creative commodity can be built into a 
posi tion of domination over a market. In a similar way, 
capitalists can use their dominance in a horizontal market to 
improve the profitability in relation to their suppliers, or 
customers. 
10) The different rates of surplus profit have also been used to 
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make sense of the long waves in economic growth which have been 
a feature of capitalism. These long waves can generally be 
seen as periods which start when the immanent barriers to 
accumulation are broken down, through a sudden advance of 
surplus value. Then the boost which this gives to accumulation 
multiplies its way through the capitalist production and 
consumption system, until the progress becomes dampened and 
gradually loses its fire. A full understanding of the 
longevity of these waves requires the integration of the ci~it 
of capital with the mode of consumption of the wage-earning 
class. Clearly, retail capital is implicated in this, and will 
restructure 1n response to the overall pace and direction of 
the movement of capitalist social relations. 
4.8 A note on the fieldwork 
The nature of teleshopping, as a form of retailing which is not yet 
widely available (if it will ever be) makes it hard to investigate. 
Teleshopping experiments which have taken place may not be 
representative. In any case, most of the conclusions are still under 
wraps. Inevitably some of the arguments presented are speculative. 
An honest effort has been made to find answers to the questions 
which have arisen in the course of the research. This has taken the 
form of a search through published sources: the trade literature, 
the academic literature and company reports. The search was 
strengthened by thirty interviews with decision-makers 1n var~ous 
agencies involved 1n the development of teleshopping. These 
interviews were conducted in the United States in April and May of 
1986 and in the United Kingdom between October 1986 and April 1987. 
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The selection of interview prospects was based on two main criteria. 
The first objective was to replace speculation about teleshopping, 
of the sort found 1n most teleshopping literature, by directly 
investigating the decision process of retail corporations about 
teleshopping. The second objective was to find out which factors 
are dictating the actions of the range of agencies which are either 
directly involved, or potentially involved, in teleshopping, and the 
technologies which teleshopping requires. The world of teleshopping 
and its technologies is quite small, so that formal sampling was 
ruled out. Instead, the names of key individuals inside a cross-
section of relevant agencies were drawn out of the trade literature. 
Letters soliciting an interview were sent to the people on the list, 
with a high success rate. Of thirty three letters sent out thirty 
interviews were set up, and there was only one outright refusal, and 
two non-responses. 
It was a suprlse that there was so much readiness to talk about this 
subject. It was relatively straightforward to arrange interviews 
with board members of the firms consulted. Most of the interviewees 
were willing to be frank, even if they were unwilling to allow 
themselves or their companles to be attributed in the text. Of 
course, the depth of insight which can be achieved 1n a single 
interview is limited (Oakley, 1981), and the results of this front 
door approach are not always reliable (Douglas, 1976). As Melville 
Dalton (1959) warned: 
"In no case did I make formal approach to the top management of any 
of the firms to get approval or support for the research ... I have 
seen other researchers do this and have watched higher managers set 
the scene and limit the inquiry to specific areas ... 
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as though the 
problem existed m a vacuum. The findings in some cases were then 
regarded as controlled 
experiments" (p. 275). 
exper imen ts .. Bu t ... who controlled the 
However, it lS In the minds of the decision-makers of capitalist 
companles that the motives for investment strategies 
If marxist scholars wish to address the current 
crystallize. 
movement of 
cap i tal ism then en try must be gained to these mner sanctums. Marx 
was quite definite in his insistence that we should penetrate "into 
the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there stares us 
m the face 'No ~ittance except on business' [to] force the secret 
of profit making." (quoted in Harvey, 1982 p.148). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HORIZONTAL COMPETITION AND TELESHOPPING 
In the preV10US chapter competition was cited as a fundamental 
factor In moulding the pace and direction of retail change and 
innovation. The way retailers react to an innovation is, In the 
last resort, dependent upon their assessment of its significance in 
the struggle to realise above average rates of profit. Retail 








1S that individual retailers compete In a 
includes: their 
position the 
multitude of historical circumstances. 
own in ternal logic; the 
circuit of capital; and a 
A tenet of the marxist 
approach is that the present appearance cannot be understood without 
an appreciation of both the underly~ processes and the historical 
manifestation of those processes. So, while the purpose of this 
chapter 1S indicate the significance of teleshopp~ as a 
competitive tool for retailers, it can only be done by first 
examining the development of retail capital. 
To make this task more manageable specific sub-sectors of overall 
retail capital are drawn out for investigation. 'The danger that 
the isolation of any particular sub-sections of capital may be 
deemed a chaotic conception (Sayer, 1982) is ackowledged. Some of 
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the chaos is unavoidable as the way in which statistics are collated 
enforces the acceptance of a priori taxonomies. Unfortunately, the 
categorisations used by both state and trade agencies do not 
correspond to marxist analytical divisions, even if such divisions 
could be distinguished at the empirical level. The independent 
investigation of sub-particles of retail capital is problematic, 
because a slice of the total circuit of capital 1S considered in 
isloation in this chapter. The wider linkages of retail capital 
will be considered in the next chapter. 
In this chapter the spotlight 1S turned on the horizontal 
competition between capitalists. The sub-sections chosen to aid the 
discussion are grocery retailing and mail order. The reasons for 
selecting these two are as follows. First, they provide contrasting 
examples. Mail order 1S a sector of retailing defined by its mode 
of operation, while grocery trading is defined by the type of 
commodities it sells. Second, for mail order, teleshopping requires 
a minor change of operating technique, whereas it requires a maJor 
change for grocery retailers. Third, these two sectors have been 
identified, in the teleshopping literature, as having the greatest 
immediate potential for the adoption of teleshopping. Fourth, the 
experiments which have taken place so far mostly fall into these two 
categories. 
This chapter is divided in~ two parts. The first part of this 
chapter is an historical examination of the progress of the grocery 
and mail order trades, with particular attention to the processes of 
concentration and the modes of competition adopted at each phase of 
their development. In the second part, these insights enhance the 
understanding of teleshopping, as a competitive tool for retail 
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capital. The argument in the chapter is based substantially on the 
fieldwork interviews which were carried out in Britain and the 
United States. The use of interview material in the text 1S 
signalled by the term - (INTERVIEW). 
5.1 The development of retail capital 
This section investigates the historical development of the grocery 
and mail order trades. It 1S argued that the major peric.x:is of 
capitalism are reflected in the organisation of the retail trade. 
There are at least five reasons why this should be so. First, just 
as Department II is dependent upon the products of Department I, so 
retail capital emerges or adapts to the new commodities which result 
from major technical or organisational changes in prc.x:iuction. 
Second, retailers are linked by an umbilical cord to the rate of 
surp Ius value in spec if ic sectors of industry. Changes in the 
relative rates of profit of producers will influence the rate of 
profit of retailers. Third, the labour process affects the average 
wage costs 10 society. Although retail workers do not contribute 
directly to surplus value, retailers are just as affected by changes 
in relative labour rates as other capitalists. Fourth, retail 
capitalists must compete for the pool of available labour against 
other capitalists. Fifth, the prevailing norm of consumption of the 
working class affects retailers because retail capital lS 10 the 
front line of providing consumer goc.x:is. The mass prc.x:iuction of 
consumer goods must be accompanied by mass appeal retail methc.x:is. 
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5.1.1 The historical roots of the grocery trade 
i) The emergence of capitalist retailing 
Formal grocery retailing emerged in the latter half of the 
Nineteenth Century in response to the formation of centralised 
workplaces. For instance, the Co-operative Society was set up 1n 
Rochdale 1n 1844 by workers themselves because of the absence of an 
adequate retail distribution system for the work~ class. This co-
incides with the upward phase of the last half of the 1800s, however 
the growth of co-operative trad~ was slow, and geographically 
concentrated in the areas which had already seen the emergence of an 
industrial working class. 
Accumulation in the retail trade was severly limited by two external 
factors: the undeveloped state of the technologies of transport and 
storage; and the insufficiently sophisticated nature of production 
in Department II. Thus, grocery retailers of the period unavoidably 
undertook a large portion of the final processing of goods and were 
generally highly skilled and specialised purveyors of certain types 
of products. Such retailers were therefore hybrids of productive 
and commercial capital. The corollary of these barriers 
to accumulation was that the petit bourgeois retailers of the time 
were relatively insulated from capitalistic competition. 
Working class consumption did not r1se significantly until the 
1870s, with the growth in volume, and fall in costs, of imported 
foodstuffs. These developments were due to interactions between: 
the increasing reliability of transport and communication links; the 
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beginings of the capitalist production of foodstuffs; and the onset 
of capitalist retailing. 
The availability of manufactured groceries which were branded and 
long lived enabled the co-op and the cash multiples to cut through 
the higher margins of traditional retailers by: reducing the amount 
of capital servicing a given quantity of commodities; employing 
workers with lower levels of skill; and centralising the buying and 
managerial functions. For the first time it was possible to operate 
a chain of stores offering a consistent range and quality of 
merchandise. This arrangement enhanced the buying power of the 
multiple retailer well beyond that of any individual retailer. 
Capital began to flow into the retail trade. Some retailers were 
able transform themselves into retail capitalists, in other cases, 
merchant capital was extended forward. Many famous grocers such as 
the Home and Colonial, Sainsburys and the International Tea Company 
were all founded m the cash multiple expansion of the last few 
decades of the Nineteenth Century. 
The fact that retail capital could undergo a masslve growth during 
tl1e. 
(time of so-called Victorian depression is worthy of further 
investigation than can be given here. It seems likely that five 
factors are involved m this countertendency. First, due to 
regional inequalities of development, the depression was unevenly 
distributed, and so any decline in spending power would be spatially 
limited. Second, it was a period of trade union success in forcing 
t Thl·rd, prices of consumer goods were falling, wage ra es up. 
h · al ~~des Fourth the capitalist contributing to t e rlse m re "~. , 
retailers were insulated from the depression, which was primarily 
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affecting Department I, as they were more involved with mercantile 
.capitalists who were importing commodities from other countries. 
Fifth, multiple shop trading gave the capitalist retailer a 
competitive advantage over traditional retailers, particularly 
through bulk buying and administrative economies. With these 
advantages multiple traders would have been in a good position to 
take trade from the old fashioned retailer even if spending power 
was falling. 
The division of labour between the retailer and producer capitalist 
which began at this time was more organisational than financial. 
Many of the multiples would deal only in between three and six lines 
of prOV1Slons. In these cases it was quite common for the retail 
capitalist to control the processing operations, that is to be the 
producer capitalist, for up to 50% of its turnover (Jeffreys, 1954). 
It was only in the third epoch of capitalism, from the turn of the 
century, that a true division between producer capitalists and 
retail capitalists began to take effect. 
The ease of growth of the multiple shop began to decline from the 
turn of the century as the form of trade became more common and as 
the range and variety carried in each store proliferated. From 1914 
a period of amalgamation and merger between the multiple store 
groups took place. As the inter-war period of generally depressed 
economlC conditions progressed, the slackness and uneveness of 
working class demand was a constant problem for the grocery 
multiple. Also, their trad~ conditions were made more difficult 
by the suburbanisation of their core customers in the slum clearance 
programmes of the 1930s. 
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Price-fixing between distributors and producers became quite common 
between the wars, and trade associations grew markedly. An 
indication of this is the lncrease in the items subject to resale 
price maintenance from 3% of consumer expenditure in 1900 to 30% In 
1938. The paradoxical result was that despite the declining mass 
consumer spending power, competition moved from price based to 
serv1ce based, with much more stress upon home deliveries. 
During the inter-war years the employment of female and youth labour 
began to playa prominent role in the retail labour process. Such 
labour was attractive because it was far cheaper than time-served 
retail labour and its use was made possible by the deepening 
commodification of grocery products. 
The process of replacing male by female labour gained pace during 
the Second War and immediately afterwards, because manpower was 
extremely short. In manufacturing "Rosie the Riveter," the female 
war worker, was seen as a temporary solution to a male labour 
shortage. In the retail trade, however, it became a long-term 
policy. 
ii) The growth of self-service trading 
The key features of grocery trading in the post-war period have been 
its dynamic economic and spatial centralisation, and the further de-
skilling and marginalisation of the labour force. 
The centralisation of the retail grocery trade 1S even more acute 
than it appears in Tables 5.1, and 5.2. In 1961 the 3 compan1es 
with more than 1000 stores (Allied Suppliers, International, and 
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Moores Stores) were effectively holding companies. The regional 
subsidiaries had a more or less independent operating management and 
a continuing retail identity (Metcalf, 1968). By 1986 the situation 
was quite different. There had been considerable centralisation 
both J.n ownership and direct control. To such an extent that six 
supermarket groups accounted for 40% of the sector's trade (Table 
5.3). 
Table 5,1 Market shares of grocers lD the UK. by operating type 
% 63 68 
Independents 50 43 
Multiples 29 40 
Co-ops 20 17 







Table 5.3 Market shares of multiples 
















74 78 84 
38 25 21 
46 59 67 
16 15 13 


















The centralisation process followed a different path in different 
firms. Sainsbury and Asda Stores have grown almost entirely 
internally. Sainsbury's last UK retail acquisition was in the 
1950s. Whilst the superstore division of Asda, which was only 
founded. ill 1965, has grown solely by opening its own purpose-built 
stores. On the other hand, the Dee Corporation and the Argyll Group 
have grown very rapidly by merger and acquisition (Figures 5.1 and 
5.2). Tesco, which in the early 1960s grew more through take-overs, 
has, Sillce the middle 1970s, concentrated upon internal growth 
(Figure 5.3). 
The search for organisational and labour cost reductions within this 
style of trading has caused a constant increase in the size of 
stores. The result of this policy was an increase ill the average 
size of stores, while the number of stores declined markedly, Tesco, 
for instance, closed 226 stores between 1977 and 1980 (Table 5.4). 
One of the key almS of increasing store Slze has been to reduce 
circulation costs by keeping the payroll to a mmllIlllm. Indeed, a 
comparison of 16 of the leading supermarket chains, showed that the 
ratio of wages to profit levels is falling. In terms of sales per 
employee the efficiency increases are quite significant and are 
greater if account is taken of the decreasing ratio of full-time 
employees to part-timers. A black cloud on the horizon, however, is 
that wage costs as a percentage of overall sales tend~to rise (Table 
5. 5a). 
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Figure 5.1 6eneaology of the Dee Broup 

































































Hermans Sporting I i 
600ds Inc. (USA)--.~----------------------------~ 
DEE tORP. 
Footnotes: 
1: Thos. Linnel - subsidiary of 
L: wheatsheaf Holdings - subsidiary of 
3: Keymar~ets - subsidiary of 
4: Fine Fare - subsidiary of 
Lewis and Peat 
Rank Hovis MacDougall 
Fitch Lovell 
5: Thos. Linnel - becomes subsidiary of 
Associated British Foods 
Buiness Peat 
6: International - becomes subsidiary of British American Tobacco 
7: Mac-Markets - subsidiary of Unilever 
(Sources: The Times and Who Owns Whom) 
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Figure 5.2 Genealogy of the Argyll Broup 
1965 Caven ham Moores Allied Wrights 
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1: Cavenham Foods - becomes a subsidiary of Societe 6enerale Occidentaie 
2: Morris & David Jones - becomes a subsidiary of RCA Corp. 
3: Oriel Foods - becomes a subsidiary of RCA Corp. 
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Cartiers Superfoods 





(Sources: The Times and Who Owns Whom) 
Footnote: 
1: Budgen - subsidiary of Booker ~cConnell 
Table 5.4 Two leading grocers: number of stores and store sizes 
1973 1978 1982 1986 Tesco 
No. of 772 673 586 395 
stores 
avg sales 5100 8000 13200 19000 
area (ft2) 
Sainsbury 
No. of 194 222 211 229 
stores 
avg sales 7500 11300 14700 17700 
area (ft2) 
(Source: Annual Reports) 
Table 5.5 Performance ratios for 16 leading supermarket groUps 
(Source: Annual Reports) 
Notes for all of Table 5.5 
1: The companies were: Argyll, Asda, EH Booth, Dee, Fine Fare, Hillards, 
Hintons, Keymarkets, Kwik Save, Lennons, Wm Low, Morrisons, Safeway, 
Sainsbury, Tesco, and Wm Jackson. 
2: It was not possible, in the time available, to have access to the annual 
reports of all of these companies for all years. Even when the return was 
available, the method of reporting the statistics sometimes changed from one 
year to the next. So, the number of companies for which a ratio has been 
calculated for each year is given as 'no. of observations. ' 
Table 5.5a Total wages bill/sales turnover ex. YAT 
1980 1982 1984 1986 
No. of observations 6 10 14 12 
mean ratio 7.23 7.23 7.90 8.10 
upper quartile 8.27 8.44 9.04 8.92 
lower quartile 6.28 5.97 6.90 6.47 
Table 5. 5b Fixed asset turnover 
(net book value of fixed assets/sales turnover ex. VAT) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 
No. of observations 7 10 15 13 
mean ratio 8.0 7.2 5.9 5.0 
upper quartile 9.1 7.3 6.7 6.0 
lower quartile 5.7 5.9 5.1 4.0 
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· Table 5,5G Gearing 1 (long term debt + sbort term debt/eguity) 
and gearing 2 (long term debt/equity) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 
No, of observations 7 10 15 13 
mean of gearing 1 1,8 1,2 1,3 2,9 
Sainsbury gearing 1 0,8 0.8 0,9 1.1 
TesGo gearing 1 1,4 1.1 1.3 1.3 
Asda gearing 1 1.4 1.0 2,0 1.7 
No. of observations 7 10 15 13 
mean of gear iog 2 1.4 0.8 1.9 2.2 
Sainsbury gearing 2 0.08 0.02 0,05 0.13 
TesGo gearing 2 0.00 0.19 0.29 0.20 
Asda gearing 2 0.01 0.18 0.28 0.29 
Table 5,5d Profit margins (net profit/sales turnover ex, vat) 
% 1980 1982 1984 1986 
No. of observations 8 15 15 13 
mean ratio 2.82 2.85 3,24 3.83 
upper quartile 3.97 3.68 3.71 4.97 
lower quartile 1.52 2.07 1.99 2.66 
-137-
The labour costs of large-scale stores are the ultimate barrier to 
realising more of the value in the commodities which pass through a 
store. Notwithstanding the marginalisation of the retail labour 
force (Labour Research, 1986), there are absolute limits to the 
productivity of a retail store. Large stores, such as superstores, 
require a large centralised staff. 
Considering that a superstore, including car park covers an area of 
60,000-80,000 sq ft, the favoured locations on the edge of towns 
near a motorway junction have become scarce. Competi tion for sites 
is fierce and has absorbed a large part of the recent fixed capital 
investment of superstore traders. Such stores now cost between £12m 
and £2Om to develop. The property divisions of Asda and Sainsbury 
are amongst the largest property developers in the country. In the 
process there has been a remarkably clear decline in the fixed asset 
turnover of these companies (Table S.Sb) and the level of gearing of 
the leading grocery chains has increased, in spi te of repeated 
capitalisations (Table S.Sc). 
In the face of superstore saturation the large retail grocers are 
starting to look for alternative routes forward. Alternatives which 
include the internationalisation of trade, such as Dee's recent 
acquisition of Hermans Sporting Goods Inc., or diversification, for 
instance Sainsbury's move into DIY. 
One of the results of the increasing store Slzes of the large 
multiples lS that as the area they serve grows larger they have 
become less and less convenient for the small top-up shopping 
expedi tion. This has opened a niche in the market for small limited 
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range outlets, which are open for long hours each day. In some 
quarters they are seen as potential avenues for the regeneration of 
the small independent and co-operative store (The Grocer, 7.12.85). 
Convenience-store trading may well provide a fresh path to 
concentration alongside the superstore mode. S f th h o ar, oug , the 
specific capitals involved are not traditional grocery retailers. 
The leading protagonists in this area are Sperrings, Misselbrook and 
Weston, Booker McConnell, Imperial Foods, and BP Oil (with the 
Foodplus chain). 
iii) The decline of self-service trading? 
High fixed capital investments are entry barriers to the grocery 
trade. Concentration has proceeded by first the driving out of 
petit bourgeois traders, then the absorption or driving out of the 
small or less efficient multiples, including the co-operative 
societies. This process has its limits, concentration becomes more 
difficult as competition passes from struggle between small 
capitalists retailers and concentrated retail capital to direct 
confrontation between concentrated retail capitals. The increasing 
cost of acquiring sites 1S merely a symptom of these limits to 
concentration. 
Another sign that superstore trading is reaching saturation is that 
the disparities 1n efficiency between supermarkets groups have 
tended to narrow in recent years, this is best reflected 1n their 
respective profit margins (Table 5. Sci). In these circumstances 
pr1ce competition to gain more of the use-value market reduces the 
rate of profit. Particularly when the wage costs are increasing 
with respect to the volume of goods sold. 
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The approach of saturation has caused a switch from the pr1ce-wars 
of the late 1970s to the service differentiation strategies of the 
1980s. Sainsbury admits that the philosophy behind own label 1S to 
compete on reputation and not on price (Anuual Return, 1985). 
Efforts to improve the ambience of the store, and to provide more 
and more customer services, such as banking facilities, creches and 
restaurants within the store are examples of this general process. 
There 1S also a tendency towards extending the ranges of goods on 
offer, this is one of the justifications for the larger stores 1n 
the first place, and the recent decision, amongst some major grocery 
companies, to start accepting credit cards. 
iy) Development of the grocery trade: slllnmary 
Accumulation in the grocery trade was first made possible by the 
separation of the production of value and the realisation of value 
which had been merged in traditional retailing. At this stage most 
of the economies of scale were imposed upstream from retailing. 
Although there was scope for a general de-skilling of retail labour, 
and the dislocation of the administrative functions from the retail 
store. 
The history of grocery retail capital has been one of concentration 
by extend ing its geographical sphere of inf luence . This has taken 
the form of a steady driving back of petit bourgeois retailing, and 
then of less capable retail capitalists. 
Retail capital continually collides against the difficulties of 
physically distributing commodities. The limit of the technologies 
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of transport and communication, and the prevailing labour process 
are a barrier to the total centralisation of all retail functions 
into one geographic location. There is always a trade-off between 
the lower operating costs obtainable by centralising store locations 
and the extra sales which can be made by being conveniently located 
for the consumer. As consumer mobility has increased, economies of 
scale have been made possible by the dual process of increasing 
store s~ze and store catchment. Self-service stores' led to a 
reduction in costs which could be passed on to consumers (to gain a 
larger share of the use-value market) or can be returned as profits. 
Any store-based mode of retailing, such as the self-service store, 
will eventually produce declining returns to scale. There ~s a 
contrast here with the mail order trade. Mail order trading can be 
understood as an attempt to bring as much of the labour process into 
a central location as is possible. 
5.1,2 The historical development of the mail order trade 
The mail order trade derives from two roots. Its orientation towards 
textiles and the sale of goods on credit to working class households 
grew from early mill owner's attempts to develop a consumer market 
for their products. The other strand of development comes from the 
department store style of mail order, this depended upon the 
emergence of reliable systems of communications and transport. 
this section the two origins of mail order are used ~ turn 




i) Mai 1 order creci it and catalogues 
The mail order trade is direct descendent of the scotch drapers, who 
conducted a peripatetic trade through the villages and smaller towns 
during the 1800s. Working either as an employee of the wool and 
cotton mill owners or as a partially independent trader, he would 
offer his wares on credit, taking a small weekly sum from his 
predominantly factory worker customers. The scotch draper offered 
goods not locally available or not affordable by his clients. 
Through personal contact he would know when to top up the weekly 
payments with further sales. 
By the 1930s the wandering salesmen had been replaced by a 
comb ina t ion of postal order ing, pr in ted catalogues and customer 
agents. The customer agency provided the mail order company with a 
cheap and reliable labour relation to replace the salesman. 
Agencies reduce the risk of bad debt compared to the use of direct 
mail order, as a trusted customer accepts the task of making sure 
other customers pay up. Mail order continued to trade mainly with 
isolated or low income households which was a distinct competitive 
advantage In the depression era, when a small weekly commitment was 
eas ier to find than a larger immed ia te sum. 
The maln competitive tools of the mail order trade continued to be 
the agency and accessible credit right through the 1960s and 1970s, 
and using these methods the sector was able to make considerably 
greater progress than other forms of retailing (Table 5.6) . 
Littlewoods' six catalogues doubled In volume from 1975 to 1979 
(Retail Business, 1980). This expansion of sales depended on fixed 
interest credit, and the growing disposable incomes of their 
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customers (Table 5.6); credit still accounts for 95% of mail order 
sales. 
By the early eighties other forms of consumer credit, mainly credit 
cards, were competing directly against the mail order houses' rigid 
and stigmatised version. Also, the recession of the early eighties 
struck most sever ly in the heartland of mail order consumers, the 
skilled and semi -skilled working class. There was a decline in the 
fortunes of mail order capitalists (Table 5.7). 
The arena of mail order competition shifted during this period. 
Mail order's main competitors, the clothing store retailers, were 
meeting their own accumulation problems by segmenting their 
marketing efforts, and hom~-in on the higher spending middle-class 
consumer. In the process there was a resurgence of specialist 
shops, and the proliferation of designer retailing (the laying on of 
Table 5,6 Mail order houses: share of retail trade and installment 
credit 
Year 
% share of all 
retail trade 





1975 1980 1984 
4.7 6.6 5.5 
60 66 66 
(Source: Retail Business) 
Table 5.7 Mail order houses: profit margins 1980-86 
Year 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 
Empire 6.3 4.9 2.8 0.2 1.8 2.6 4.1 
Freemans 7.8 5.5 5.8 3.3 5.6 7.5 8.1 
Grattan 3.5 4.0 5.1 1.9 3.4 5.8 7.7 
GUS (retail) 7.8 9.4 8.9 9.4 10.0 
Littlewoods -0.1 1.5 3.5 4.4 
(retail) (Source: Annual Returns) 
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hands by Fitch and Co., the design consultancy, has become almost 
ritualised amongst retail companies). 
Mail order's response was to develop direct mail 'specialogues' 
(specialised catalogues), based upon individual credit. The aim of 
direct mail is to extend the appeal of mail order by loosening its 
rigidi ty. The marketing director of Empire Stores observed: ' agents 
have become rarer and more people use catalogues to shop for 
themselves and their immediate families. We used to talk about the 
three C's of mail order as being commission, credit and convenience. 
Nowadays convenience is at the top of the list and commission at the 
bottom' (Crofts, 1985). Grattan has been the most energetic 1n 
introducing direct mail, buying Kaleidoscope from W.H.Smith and, 1n 
1985/6, the Scotcade label. 
Segmentation has also been used to stretch the appeal of mail order 
upscale. The leader in this is Freemans, which has sought to use 
the reputation of well known fashion designers to enhance the cachet 
of their collections. The image concious Together and, subsequently, 
BYMAIL catalogues are the result, which have been produced 1n 
associ&tion with the designer and retailer Jeff Banks. Kays a 
subsidiary of Great Universal Stores (GUS) has followed suit by 
producing KIT, a large format, magazine-style, high fashion 
catalogue. It has been suggested that it is the potential for such 
developments which has attracted the recent take-over of the Grattan 
concern by the self-conciously style orientated Next pIc (Guardian, 
10/7/86 p.11). 
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ii) Technological base 
The mail order trade was able to centralise more rapidly than other 
forms of retailing because most of the employed labour force 1S 
drawn into a central location. By centralising, the capitalist mail 
order companies were able to gather large economies of scale, and so 
~pose entry barriers to the general mail order business. The 
centralisation of mail order, however, depends on the level of 
development of transport and communications technologies because 
they determine the flexibility and responsiveness of mail order. 
The overall periods of capitalism are reflected in the mail order 
trade through its techno logical dependence. One root of mail order 
trading derives from the department store, which was made viable by 
improvements in transport and communication. With the coming of the 
railways, and the emergence of the middle-classes, travel to central 
shopping facilities became possible for a larger number of people. 
The transport and communications technologies also provided the 
means for a good deal of ordering by post and delivery by rail. In 
this way the competitive trading area of a retail company could be 
extended a great distance. For instance, "grocers rn Faversham, 
Kent, 'rather grouched' at Lord Harris having his provisions sent 
down by train." (Winstanley, 1983 p. 35). Improvements in transport 
technologies, therefore, have a mixed effect on the mail order 
trade, they increase mail order's speed of response and flexibility, 
but simultaneously make stores more accessible to consumers. 
Recent developments rn telecommunications and computer technology 
have been whole heartedly adopted by mail order companies and 
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involved them in a masslve investment during their troubled years at 
the start of the 1980s (Table 5.8). Clear evidence of the 
rationalisation and re-investment in computer equipment that was 
going on in Empire and Grattan during the early 1980s is expressed 
in the higher gearing (debt/equity ratio) of these companies, and 
that long term debt seemed to be under control towards the end of 
the pericx:i. The fixed asset per employee also rose during this 
pericx:i, although the relative amounts of book value to cost of wages 
stayed roughly the same or fell. The net book value of plant assets 
rose to between 45 and 55 per cent of the total fixed asset value. 
The effect of this capital expenditure is clear from the ratio of 
book value of fixed plant assets to the cost of wages which rises 
quite distinctly. (Table 5.9). 
These investments were made as part of a strategic re-think of mail 
order's internal labour process. Under the agency system, up to 75% 
Table 5,8 Mail order houses: long-term debt/equity ratios 
Year 80 81 82 83 84 85 
Empire .22 .13 .15 ,10 .10 .09 
Freemans .14 .16 .11 .07 .05 ,04 
Grattan .33 ,31 .20 .21 .21 ,18 
GUS .14 ,14 .17 ,16 .15 .15 
Littlewooos .30 .22 .16 .13 
(Source: Annual 
Table 5,9 Mail order houses: plant assets per employee 
(net book value) 
Year 80 81 82 83 84 85 
Empire 1.5 1.7 1.9 2,1 2,1 
2.7 3,7 4.0 4.1 4,0 4.2 Freemans 
Grattan 2.2 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.4 












(Source: Annual Returns) 
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of their labour costs were taken up in the paperchase created by 
long-term credit payments (INTERVIEW). The computerisation of 
customer records and inventories has been used within mail order 
companies m three mam ways: to the speed up the response to 
customer orders, to increase stock handling efficiency, and finally 
to improve the accounting control over bad debt. 
The speed of response to customer needs has been improved through 
the introduction of telephone ordering and the computerisation 
of delivery and stock checking facilities. The first attempt 1TI 
this area was conducted by Freemans with 'Order Line' which did not 
enter public service until 1981. Freemans managed to gain a 1 to 2 
year lead in this area, before all the major competitors followed 
suit. The mail order companies resisted telephone ordering because 
of the cost of having staff on call for extended hours each day. 
The introduction of telephone ordering, however, gave Freemans a 
competitive advantage as it weathered the recession better than its 
competitors and 'Order Line' grew to 40% of sales by 1982 and 60% by 
1986 (Freemans Annual Returns). 
The mail order compan1es have found that an additional benefit of 
the customer databases 1S that they can be sold to other compan1es 
for marketing and credit referencing purposes. For instance, 
Grattan set up Precision Marketing International and acquired the 
Wescot credit referencing agency 1TI 1985. GUS has also been 
expanding its credit referencing division, CCN, throughout the 
1980s, with further acquisitions in this area in 1984 and 1985. 
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iii) Mail order development: summary 
the sector The mail order trade is both a bastion of tradition and 
of retailing most committed to high technology. Mail order 
companies are traditional in that they are still highly dependent on 
the textile business which supported in their very earliest days. 
The need to make mail order as responsive as possible, however, 
makes them very open to the possibilities of new communications and 
transport technologies. 
The agency system has been undermined in recent years, through 
competition and the decline of mail order's traditional market. To 
meet this challenge mail order retailers have attempted to seek out 
new ways of transacting the final exchange. An essential part of 
these strategic moves has been to use the flexibility which 
information technology offers to explore new avenues of development, 
such as: the sale of consumer databases; target mailing; more 
flexible credit systems; and the reduction of order processing time. 
5.1.3 The development of retail capital: a summary 
The development of mail order can be differentiated from that of 
grocery retailing on the basis of the labour, processes which each 
adopts to overcome the geographical problem of physical 
distribution. In the past mail order solved the problem by 
devising a tier of, effectively sub-contracting, customer agents to 
handle the final stages of distribution. The use of customer agents 
meant that the majority of the labour process was susceptible to 
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centralisation at an early stage of mail order's development. Mail 
order is ultimately limited by the flexibility of the communications 
technologies which it uses, and costs of processing delivery and 
payment information. 
11he supermarket trade provides a contrast to the mail order trade in 
that it has met the physical distribution problem by externalising 
as much of the work of consumption as possible. In so doing it has 
followed a path of: de-skilling shop labour, of replacing counter 
service by self-service; and of centralising the shopping facilities 
as much as is possible. In the process, the grocery trade has 
centralised into a few powerful capitals, each fortified by the 
entry barriers of fixed capital invested in stores. 
5.2 Teleshopping as a retail innovation 
This section looks at the way that teleshopping has been received 
within the mailorder and grocery trades. Given that teleshopping is 
a form of non-store shopping, superficially, it is not suprising 
that it has met with a better response in the mail order trade. For 
them it 1S an improvement innovation, for grocery retailers it 
requ1res a major re-think of their basic precepts. 
If the theoretical roots of innovations as a means of appropriating 
surplus profit are borne 1n mind, the contrast between the position 
of mail order and grocery retailing on teleshopping can be re-
interpreted as a reflection of the dominant mode of competition 1n 
each sector of trade. In either case teleshopping will have to 
offer some of the benefits which are required of an innovation. It 
must either offer a means of increasing the volume of goods sold, or 
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a means of reducing the costs of circulation. 
Whether teleshopping can fulfill these objectives is the Issue of 
this section. The majority of the section is an examination of the 
points of view expressed in the fieldwork interviews, taking In 
turn: the mail order trade; the grocery trade; and specific 
teleshopping schemes. This is followed by an interpretation of 
these views within the theoretical context of this thesis. 
5.2.1 Mail order and teleshopping 




general mail order houses, 
teleshopping. In the 
except Freemans are 
first instance, 
teleshopping offers them a means of increasing penetration of non-
store modes of shopping, without having to substantially invest in 
new equipment and techniques nor to change the competitive 
orientation of their company. That IS, it fits into the main 
competitive themes noted In the previous section: the need for 
greater flexibility of servlce; the need to attract consumers from 
more upscale social segments; and it IS compatible with the new 
computerised outlook of mail order companies. 
i) Teleshopping and the technologies of mail order 
Teleshopping can be seen as complementary to the traditional 
catalogue business, replacing some of the labour costs of a 
telephone ordering system and as faster and more flexible than a 
postal ordering system. This is because the customer can be linked 
to a comprehensive, real-time database and ordering system, which 
can be run 24 hours a day, without an equivalent increase In labour 
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costs. 
Setting up and maintaining teleshopping databases presents no great 
problems for the mail order companies. As we have seen they are 
co~nitted to information technology. Correspondingly they have 
large numbers of middle to sen10r level computer personnel, 
Littleuo~s has about 300 "~ , which seems to generate a greater 
commitment to formalised research and development than has been 
common 1n retailing, which 1S where most the development of 
teleshopping systems has been taking place (INTERVIEW). 
At the moment, teleshopping does not offer a self-contained mode of 
competition so far as the established mail order are concerned. 
This is a technological limitation, as none of them are willing to 
risk a non-catalogue approach. The Littlewoods ShopTV experiment 
was started without the support of a catalogue, but one was 
introduced within a year of the start of operations. The manager of 
ShopTV said: "With experience we are saying that the service 1S 
good, but the catalogue is an extra feature of tne service and one 
which we won't be quite so happy to drop. Its most useful function 
is as a reminder that ShopTV is there" (INTERVIEW). 
As long as teleshopping 1S seen as complementary to catalogue based 
mail order trading, its adoption seems relatively assured. 
Teleshopping pure and simple, as Comp-U=Card have developed it (see 
below), 1S more controversial. In directly comparing a printed 
catalogue and a product database the first issue which concerns mail 
order operators is that the database approach is relatively hard to 
use. The catalogue selling technique 1S known to depend largely 
upon consumers browsing through the pages in a fairly random manner 
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until something catches their eye: 
"People pick it up, its 1000 pages thick, and they start turning a 
page at a time. After turning 5 or 6 they realise this is going to 
take an awful long time. That's because they have got to the detail 
before they've had the strategic browse. Then they quickly take the 
rest of it and flick through it" (INTERVIEW). 
Whereas the screen based systems "force you to make decisions which 
you don't have to make when you enter a shop. What you are actually 
doing is corrunitting down a narrow path, and at the same time 
shutting all the doors, for that scan, on all the other items" 
( INTERVIEW) . 
Consequently, the appropriateness of teleshopping for the sales of 
fashion products is doubted. "You can't do that with fashion. Good 
fashion you can put a premium price on I feel because fashion is the 
flag in mail order and the profit is in fashion, because that 1S 
where the market 1S I cannot see it coming" (INTERVIEW). Fashion 
goods not only account for most of the turnover and profit of the 
mail order compan1es (Table 5.10), but are integral to their 
historical development. They are loathe to move towards a mode of 
business which stresses, different, and lower profit lines. 
Freemans argue that the teleshopping experience lacks the personal 
the.;) rove 
appeal of the telephone ordering system, which is why r not become 
involved 1n teleshopping so far. They maintain that the telephone 
ordering system has the advantage of bringing the customer into 
me. 
personal contact with(company on occasions other than when there is 
a complaint. The catalogue based telephone ordering system 
represents "the most effective way of showing and a pleasant 
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sociable way of ordering" (INTERVIEW). 
iii} Tbe flexibility of teleshopping 
The most appropriate form of marketing to traditional catalogue 
buyers may not also be the best for those likely to adopt 
teleshopping. The users of ShopTY are a long way from traditional 
mail order agents, being mostly male and white collar. Other 
catalogue compan1es have developed their offerings with this in 
mind, and are developing teleshopping specialogues and m1n1-
catalogues which fit the consumer segment more accurately. 
Teleshopping offers greater flexibility tb the mail order company 
than the catalogues, which have to be kept current for six months. 
Great Universal Stores are using this flexibility In their 
experimental cable teleshopping scheme: "shortly we will target 
according to time slots, at five o'clock we will put out toys. If 
there 1S cold weather 1n the North of England we can put out 
merchandise for the cable systems there of wellies or umbrellas" 
(INTERVIEW) . 
Table 5.10 Shares of mail order trade by product type 
clothing foot- textiles house- leisure gifts & toys other 
wear etc. hold jewel 'y 
women & men 
children 9.5 All mail 31.1 11.9 8.3 6.9 11.1 10.8 3.8 6.6 
order 
Grattan 32.6 9.7 9.3 15.4 14.1 8.8 6.2 4.0 
(1981) 
(SOURCES: Retail Business and Grattan Annual Return) 
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The eventual appeal of teleshopping for mail order companies IS its 
potential as a tool to fine tune their marketing techniques: 
"Why do we pursue all this? It is our belief that target marketing 
will allow the direct marketing men to spend more on target shots 
but to do less of them. The home shopping is seen as the end of a 
triangle where: we confetti mailed 31 million households; then we 
targetted and got it down so that now we are doing 5 million 
households; then we are hoping to go further and further down. We 
are hoping to reach the situation where you are 1n your front room 
and you turn on your tv set and we are able to identify when you 
begin to browse. When you show interest 1n some particular product 
whether by index referencing or whatever it 1S. The dream 1S to 
pick that up and to introduce you to what [COMPANY X] has to offer 
then using techniques which pick up your greater interest he [the 
direct marketer] 1S able to be more responsive. So that if you 
finish up flipping between two products he is able to identify that 
and begin to start offering you a deal to fix the sale and so on. 
Having gone through that he can get into a situation where he can 
offer you goods which are complementary to goods you have already 
bought. The marketing man can spend money into direct relation to 
the amount of interest that you are showing. The deal that you get 
will relate to the way that you react to the product. Right now 
compan1es have to offer £15 off a Hoover washing machine to 
everybody, what the marketing man is saying is: No, if you really 
want that Hoover then my algorithm should tell me that I don't 
really have to knock all that money off" (INTERVIEW). 
iii) Reyiew 
Overall the mail order compan1es are quite sanguine about their 
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ability to adopt teleshopping. All of the major companies except 
Freemans regard it as inevitable. Even Freemans IS careful to point 
out that the systems and procedures necessary to put teleshopping 
into place are Issues of degree, not of fundamental change. 
Nevertheless, if teleshopping is to replace the printed catalogue, 
quite fundamental changes in the marketing concept must be accepted. 
Either, the product mix nrust be adjusted so that sales can take 
place without the support of the printed page, or the technologies 
of teleshopping must be improved to allow a equivalent display 
quality to the catalogue, or the circumstances which influence 
consumption decisions must change to become more advantageous to 
teleshopping. 
5.2.2 Grocery teleshopping 
With the incremental advantages of teleshopping for mail order 
companIes, it is clear why most of them are involved in experiments 
with teleshopping. This is not the case with grocery retailers. In 
the grocery trade, the mode of competition is quite different. The 
maIn focus of competition is on the siting and operation of stores. 
This leads to an attitude amongst senior management which is 
negative to teleshopping, and prejudices the chances of serIOUS 
financial commitments to grocery teleshopping. 
i) Conflicts with supermarket trading 
All of the interviewees from the grocery trade, were instinctively 
committed to their best assets: their shelves. Fear of losing the 
impulse buy, a cornerstone of the supermarket trading style, and the 
problems of reformulating their marketing strategies, to an indirect 
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mode, deters even those retailers most sanguine about teleshopping. 
The most obvious reason for this reluctance to consider teleshopping 
given by the large supermarket chains is the idea that people will 
not buy goods unseen. "We believe that even customers that trust us 
still want to see the piece of meat they buy, still want to test 
their own shopping abilities 1n choosing the best quality or 
whatever" (INTERVIEW). 
This 1S despite the experience of Club4Q3 and Telecard Supershop 
that people will buy fresh goods from tele-retailers. Peter Young 
of Club403: "I never thought people would buy fruit and vegetables 
and meat through the system. So we didn't put them on to start 
with. Straight away people started to say, we want to buy frozen 
food and fresh vegetables and bread and and meat and that sort of 
thing. If you think about bread: if its got Sunblest on it or 
Mothers Pride, you can buy it by name. A lot of people with big 
freezers buy 20 loaves. So we introduced bread. We then introduced 
meat and other fresh products. We found that providing people were 
sure that the quality of of those goods was up to the standard they 
required they were quite happy" (INTERVIEW). Similarly, Telecard 
claimed that 65-75% of their orders included fresh fruit and 
vegetables, and 45% had fresh meat on them (INTERVIEW). 
The next major objection which superstore operators raise IS that 
delivery services cannot be charged for at an economic rate. "There 
is a fault in the entire logic ... There is an argument that some form 
of delivery service will once again become the thing. The difficulty 
is that it was once there, but it became unviable on an economIC 
basis. If it is done, it has to be done economically. They won't be 
able to add a penny to beans because people won't buy it ... there 1S 
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no way that people can afford to spend more for their shopping than 
they are today .. they are actually trying to spend less on food as 
percentage of their total shop, not more" (INTERVIEW). 
a 
For maJor supermarkets, adopting teleshopping is also problematic 
because of the effective exit barriers due to their heavy investment 
in real estate. The ever larger stores means that they have a 
considerable interest ~ not promoting innovations which might 
undermine the amortisation of this fixed capital. This 
consideration lS salient when one considers the 10 to 20 year 
depreciation period of modern stores (INTERVIEW), and that the 
largest groups mostly operate newly constructed stores. 
The superstore operators willingly admit that their reluctance to 
adopt teleshopping is a bar to its future progress. The competitive 
pressures within which they operate prevent them from sparing the 
managemen t time or finance to deve lop te leshopp ing . It We are aware 
that we are preventing teleshopping from happening. We are not 
doing it on purpose. If we don't open a minimum of 12 superstores a 
year in five to seven years time when so-called saturation occurs we 
will have dropped from 25% of the superstore business to 12%. My 
job would be harder ... 1 won't be able to achieve some of the returns 
this company will need to survive against Sainsbury who will have 
potentially 65% of the London market. A lot of decisons are forced 
on you in business" (INTERVIEW). 
This statement from the marketing director of one of the top five 
supermarket chains indicates a related point; that the barriers to 
entry which they have erected mean that any competitive grocery 
retai ler has to have a maj or share of the trade in order to survive. 
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Retailers need this purchasing power to get deep discounts. As 
tele-retailers will sell exactly the same products as conventional 
retailers, it is unlikely that a new tele-retail capital will be 
able to compete on price with the established capitals. 
Mass retailers find that small markets are actually very hard to 
address. A major issue for supermarket operators lS the rate of 
growth and the potential for growth of the use-value market. For 
any marketing proposition there lS at any time a notional upper 
limit to the number of consumers, and the amount of money at their 
disposal. It is this issue which most concerns both mail order and 
grocery multiples about teleshopping. The size of the market is 
presently limited to the number of subscribers to viewdata services. 
As Prestel has only about 30,000 domestic subscribers this is a very 
small market. The past growth of supermarket chains constrains them 
to address very large markets. They are unable to contemplate 
teleshopping as a commercial venture until the market grows 
substantially. These issues will be taken further in Chapter Six. 
In these circumstances any grocery teleshopping development from 
this quarter is likely to appear first annexed to existing stores. 
This would cause operating problems, because of the conflicting 
space requirements of a supermarket and a warehouse facility, and a 
double set of overheads (INTERVIEW). It may also lead to direct 
competition between the two operations for the same customer base. 
A dual servlce such as this would also requlre a dual prlce 
structures, which it was thought would be difficult to administer, 
and are potentially damaging to a corporate 
(INTERVIEW) . Addi tionally, teleshopping may 
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marketing stance 
intefer with the 
margins of profit to be made, and thus affect the pr1ce of their 
capital stock (INTERVIEW). 
The potentially damaging consequences of trying to supply 
teleshopping services for these retailers are compounded by their 
own skills gap. In the first place whilst they have a great deal of 
ability in selecting sites for new stores and in buying, they do not 
have the computer skills that are to be found in the mail order 
trade. The cost of developing these skills, and the time and risk 
involved are maJor problems for these compan1es. 
Another fear of the supermarket retailer 1S that teleshopping would 
make possible a service which aims merely to provide the bulky items 
which do not require inspection. If teleshoppers are less inclined 
to purchase perishable or delicatessen goods, due to the limitations 
of the technology, the rest would have to be "sold at a 
prohibitively high price if it is to come out of a retail unit 
because the core isn't there anymore" (INTERVIEW). For a trade 
which is placing a high priority on extending the product range and 
the level of service, such a prospect is hard to contemplate. 
In the case of grocery teleshopping, the current mis-match between 
the maln competitive thrust and the innovation of teleshopping 
creates an impasse. The comb ina t ion of trad it ion, large vested 
interests and a broadly imitative business ethic leads retailers to 
doubt whether they will be able to benefit from the application of 
teleshopping. No one company wants to be the first to enter the 
market, because of the risks and costs of being the innovator, 
Although, "If others were to make good profits from teleshopping 
that would be a different story" (INTERVIEW). 
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iii) Teleshopping staging posts 
It has been suggested that convenience-stores might form the basis 
of a local bulk pick-up point, for a tele-ordered grocery basket 
(Chapter Three). The managing director of one of these new 
convenience-store chains agrees, although he regards this as a long-
term rather than medium term proposition, and as not without its 
problems: 
"The convenience-store at this stage is l.S about the selling of 
convenience items. It l.S easy to go around and pick up two or three 
items. What you are talking about instead of 3000 lines is double 
that at least, with a cadre of people who can wrap and pack and pick 
and all that sort of stuff, which would be somewhat of a different 
proposition. The two being on the same block would not be 
incompatible. While we are looking at 2000 sq ft of selling space 
we are talking about another 500-600 sq ft of non-selling store 
space, if you had what you suggest you would need double that. 
Without going into sophisticated racking on 2 floors etc, etc, you 
start then to worry about the building that you would acquire, 
landscapes being a problem. Town planners can't cope with what we 
are doing half the time let alone if you make it 2 storey, and 
substantial vehicles rolling in to supply the outlets in residential 
areas. I query too whether the staging of the distribution function 
and re-warehousing m the smaller units is sensible. It then a1m.ost 
starts to become a cash and carry, but on a sophisticated scale, 
where you pay the staff to do the picking and packing. What I do see 
l.S that you could overcome the delivery problem at a more 
h 
centralised warehouse. You could take the order in you could wack 
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it into a chill bin of some description and actually come out at 10 
~ the morning. It could be re-stored in some mechanised racking 
system, in bins that could be pulled down into a drive-through 
delive'ry hatch in something that could go straight into the boot. I 
would think that would build be a superb concept" (INTERVIEW). 
iii) Reyiew 
In the interviews several mail order representatives seemed to think 
that grocery shopping would lead the way ahead of mail order and 
other types of shopping. This was also the attitude expressed by 
Prestel's representative and is inherent in their tr~er service 
concept. Ironically, several of the directors of the grocery chains 
interviewed expressed the opinion that grocery trading would be the 
last to adopt tele-retailing. "I know something like this is going 
to come in I feel it is going to happen on the non-food side, before 
it happens on the food side. I think that people like Next and 
others are not just going to smarten up Grattans catalogue they are 
go into a whole new area of technology, they are going to offer 
things in their stores and facilities. I've no doubt about its 
be ing worked up now" ( INTERVIEW) . 
It will be clear by now that grocery retailers have an historically 
conditioned reluctance to countenance teleshopping. Mostly this 1S 
a consequence of the strict discipline of the current mode of 
competition. Teleshopping is not compatible with this regime. It 
undermines the current investment patterns of grocery retailer. It 
is nonsensical to develop teleshopping against an extending product 
range. There is a large skills gap between teleshopping trading and 
superstore trading. It would also require a large speculative 
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investment to set up such a scheme. Finally, maJor grocery retailers 
are unable to contemplate teleshopping because they could not accept 
the small Slze of the customer base to start with, and the 
subsequent slow growth. 
Nevertheless, superstore grocers are worried about teleshopping, 
they accept that they" ignore it at their peril" (INTERVIEW). Their 
problem is to learn about teleshopping, without investing huge sums, 
or harming their reputation. Thus, while some are watching from the 
sidelines, others are getting involved 111 a marginal way, by 
providing infrastructural support to teleshopping schemes run by 
interested third parties. 
5.2.3 Teleshopping schemes 
The maJor teleshopping schemes and their sponsors are presented 111 
Table 5.11. Since the interviews were conducted reports have come 111 
that Club403 and Telecard have been withdrawn. 
The involvement of maJor retailers with the social servlce 
teleshopping schemes, is one way in which retailers can investigate 
teleshopping without running too many risks. There are only two 
such experiments in the United Kingdom, the Gateshead Shopping and 
Information Service CGSIS) and its clone in Bradford, Centrepoint. 
i) The Gateshead Shopping and Information Service 
The GSIS was the first computerised home-shopping servlce 111 
Britain. It arose from a Tesco-sponsored study of shopping 
cond it ions 10 Ga teshead (Davies and Champ ion, 1980) and the 
subsequent enthusiasm of one of its authors Ross Davies. This study 
-162-
showed that at least 3% of the local population experienced 
difficulty ~ gaining access to basic shopping facilities. The 
authors of the report suggested that the problem could be eased by a 
computer aided shopping facility. This led to a pilot project, 
funded by Tescos, and overseen by a joint management committee of 
the University of Newcastle (where Davies was based), Gateshead 
Metropolitan Borough Council, and Tesco. 
Table 5.11 Summary of teleshopping experiments 1n the United Kingdom 
a) Commercial grocery sery1ces 
Name Operator 
1. Club403 Viewtel 
(Birmingham 
Post & Mail) 
2. Telecard Telecard 
Supershop 
b) Social sery1ce grocery serV1ces 
Name 










c) Mail order type services 
Name Retailer 
1. ShopTV Littlewocds 
2. Tele-Select Great Universal Stores 
3. Telestore Empire Stores 
4. Grattan 




















From very crude beginings, in 1980, GSIS expanded through a mixture 
of private and state grants (Davies, 1985). By 1984 the scheme was 
based on a fully interactive viewdata facility which was located m 
the Tesco superstore and based on a Rediffusion mainframe computer. 
The number of registered clients had grown to 430, about 75% of whom 
use the service on a regular basis, contributing to a throughput of 
about 900 orders a month with a value of £7500 (Eason, 1984). 
Additional retailers have been attracted to the scheme starting with 
a bakery and a dispensing chemists, which were adjacent to the 
superstore, m June 1983. C&A was invited to join in January 1984 
and the present complement was made up in September of the year when 
Kays the mail order company and a dry cleaner, Hartons, began to 
offer their services via GSIS. Nevertheless attracting retailers to 
the scheme has not been easy owing to the small number of customers 
involved (Davies, 1985). More recently, the state funding has dried 
up and, aside from the workers wages which are paid by the Manpower 
Services Commission, the project ~s being entirely supported by 
Tesco (INTERVIEW). 
Tesco claim that a large part of their motivation for this original 
involvement was their long held concern for equality of access. The 
GSIS was a chance to build on that with the ideas coming from Davies 
as much as from Tesco. From Tesco's point of view it gave them a 
lot of good publicity, "at the same time it was linked into a more 
long term R&D type thing with computerised shopping. Our ex-DP 
[Data Processing] director, Donald Harris was interested in it, he 
~ seen electronic shopping in the States, at the same time Tesco 
was very interested in EPoS [Electronic Point of Sale], it all just 
gathered momentum. The thing was held together by Davies, the 
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initial ideas were from Davies, and Tesco were happy to be 
associated with it" (INTERVIEW). 
By increasing the accessibility of consumers, of course, Tesco also 
increased the penetration of their store. This, it should be said 
is not a major incentive for them, as the 1ncrease In volume 1S 
quite low. It did bother the local shopkeepers though, who opposed 
the GSIS's extension into the old mining community of Chopwell. The 
local retailers claimed that they provided all the shopping 
facilities required in the village already and that it was a misuse 
of public funds. In this case the objections were defused by Tesco 
taking responsibility for the funding of that particular part of the 
GSIS (Davies, 1985). 
Pe. 
Teleshopping is not considered tofpart of the Tesco's maln strategy. 
Although, "it would be wrong for me to say that it excludes it. But 
our main priorities are to open new stores. There 1S this thing 
called super-store saturation over the horizon, there are a lot of 
things spoken about when it will arr1ve and what it 1S. This 
company has its own views on that, we have a very active development 
strategy, we have a commitment to more proJuct, we are putting more 
food into our business than ever ... We have just acquired Hillards, 
to add 40 stores to representation, and to increase our market 
share. In the long term the food superstore business is not big 
enough for Tesco, we have to be into something else in the United 
Kingdom. It is no secret that we will have to diversify into either 
non-food operations or somewhere else in the world. Teleshopping 1S 
just another aspect that fits alongside all of that really. It 1S 
not something that is at the forefront of everybody's minds, but it 
1S happening 1n the business. I t is viewed as long term 
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development. Almost R&D, if retailers ever get involved m that" 
( INTERVIEW) . 
Under the cover of these protestations of disinterest, Tesco 1S 
extend~ its social service teleshopping experience by including a 
teleshopp~ facility into its new Surrey Docks store in Southwark. 
This will be another social service scheme, but at the moment there 
1S no local authority involvement. Being purpose built, the store 
will enable more efficient stock handling, and will extend the 
knowledge of what can be done with a teleshopping service. The 
question still arises, why should Tesco allocate 2,000 square feet 
of selling space to this non-profit making activity, in a brand new 
store, if teleshopping is such a far-off dream. 
As with other retailers Tesco see little commercial prospect for 
teleshoppi.ng, unless a preml.um can be charged for delivery. They 
accept that a small proportion of society might be able and willing 
to pay for the convenience of having goods delivered. That l.S, the 
retailer would expect an extra source of revenue from the delivery 
serVl.ce. But, because this will be a minority demand, it will have 
to be run from within existing stores. 
ii) Bradford Centrepoint 
The GSIS l.S without doubt very popular amongst its users, and 
subject to financial constraints, it was only a matter of time 
before other local authorities started to provide a similar sort of 
serv1ce. The only one yet to emerge is the Bradford Centrepoint 
scheme. As with the GSIS, Centrepoint depends upon the co-operation 
of private and public interests. A locally based supermarket group, 
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Morrisons, occup1es the role of retailer, but the funding has come 
solely from central and local state sources. As part of the funding 
agreement the retailer is not allowed to be seen to profit from the 
serV1ce, so that an averaged out profit margin of 5% of the turnover 
is returned to Centrepoint. 
Centrepoint started 1n November 1985 with a fully interactive 
viewdata service based in Shipley, 7 miles from the Morrisons Store 
which provides the retail support. At the end of October 1986, 
Centrepoint was already offering a full range of supermarket 
products with 10000 items on the database. Each day about 70 
deliveries were sent out and the average basket size had risen to 
roughly £9, from a average of £3.40 1n early 1986. There were about 
650 registered users, although it was expected that this number 
wou ld rise as the winter weather and dark nights drew on. As with 
the GSIS, the demand for the service outstrips the ability to supply 
the serv1ce and in Centrepoint's case at November 1986 they were 
adding to their register at the rate of 20 users per month 
(INTERVIEW) . 
The attitude of Morrisons to this scheme is in line with the general 
caution of the large grocery retailer to teleshopping. The origins 
of retailers as traders has a strong significance in family firms, 
such as Morrisons, where technical investments are casted against 
"sales of tins of bins" (INTERVIEW). The Morrisons involvement in 
Centrepoint, then, 1S explicable not only in terms of its low cost 
to the company, but also 1n another attribute of the more 
traditional regional multiple. It has close ties with the local 
community and has a vested interest in co-operating with City Hall. 
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Social teleshopping provides a useful way for large retailers to 
.experiment with this innovation without incurring either great cost, 
or great embarrassment if it is seen to be a non-starter. However, 
there is no evidence that the retailers involved are actually making 
use of the experiment in any formal manner. The reasons for this 
are clearly related to the present dynamic nature of competition 
which bears upon the large supermarket chains. No investment in 
teleshopping 1S immediately profitable for these retailers. Also, 
most retailers do not have a formal research and development 
programme. The only retailer actively taking an interest In 
pe 
teleshopping is Tesco, and their involvement seems to(partly made up 
of· covert strategy, else why extend the scheme, and partly the 
result of personal contacts and contingent circumstance. 
iii) Comp-U-:Card 
The independent compan1es formed to exploit teleshopping are not 
bound by exit barriers or the reification of management attitudes. 
The cautious and incremental approach of the mail order houses has 
been rejected by Comp-U-Card which has adopted a more radical 
atti tude to the innovation. A distinct marketing ploy is used by 
Camp-U-Card in which they do not make their profits by selling the 
products but by selling the information about products which 1S held 
on a database. This is an interesting contraction of the role of 
the retail capitalist. Comp-U-Card membership, which costs £20 per 
year, allows a consumer to access their database of information 
abou t 40, 000 consumer durab Ie products. Comp-U-:Card c laims that its 
prices are roughly 10% below shop prices. 
Members have the choice of using the databases to compare prices or 
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to directly order the goods described. The ratio of look-ups to 
actual purchases 1S about 8 to 1 (INTERVIEW). Orders can be made 
either by credit card or cheque, but in the latter case the order is 
not processed until the cheque has cleared. Both the storage and 
the delivery of the products on the database are dealt with by third 
parties. Comp-U~ard gets most of its products from regional 
retailers, who can give better prices and a higher order fulfillment 
rate than manufacturers. The result of this system is that Comp-U-
Card contracts the role of retail capital to that of pure commercial 
capital. It deals only 1n information. 
iy) Telecard 
Telecard was also developed through a contraction of the role of the 
retailer to that of information broker. In this case the goods 
()~ (stored 1n the shops of the Lalani conven1ence chain, and are 
delivered by the transport company, Square Moves. 
Part of the logic for developing this teleshopping scheme was to 
avoid the barriers to entry which the larger capitals have been able 
to construct around the grocery trade, through control over real 
estate. Grocery retailing may still have one of the highest entry 
rates of new, small enterprises, but it also has one of the highest 
failure rates. The managing director of Telecard acknowledged this. 
"I eI1Joy foed retailing, I have been in it all my life and I love 
the immediacy of it. But to get into straight retailing in this day 
and age is: one, a fairly risky operation; and two, you've got to do 
it ill a big way. Therefore you have got to have the funding. To 
raise that funding ... l couldn't do it and it is fairly risky. You 
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could set up an operations and within two years Sainsbury could open 
up a superstore two miles away and the whole lot can walk away from 
you" ( INTERVIEW) . 
Telecard was specifically aimed at the small proportion of the 
people living ~ the London area who subscribe to a videotex 
service, their target was only 2% of households. The logic of their 
service was to make surplus profits by charging a premlum for 
delivery. Large orders were delivered free but the cost of the 
goods was 10-20% greater than that charged ~ a maJor multiple. 
These prlces were partly increased by the lack of buying power of 
the retailer associated with the scheme, and partly by 
organisational difficulties and costs, such as having to make up an 
order in a store rather than a purpose built warehouse, and to pay a 
third party deliverer. Of course, the high prices limited the size 
of the target segment, but this was also limited by the number who 
are subscribers to the telecommunications network which Telecard 
used: British Telecom's Prestel. People might have joined Prestel 
to access Telecard, but it represents an extra cost to the shopping 
servlce. 
5,3 Teleshopping as hozontal competition: an interpretation 
Clearly, teleshopping is too novel to represent an immediately 
useful competitive tool for large mail order houses or grocery 
retailers. The issue addressed here is whether any sense can be 
made of the response to teleshopping which has come from the mail 
order and the grocery trades in terms of marxist theory. 
The historical development of each sector, discussed ~ section 5.1, 
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indicates that competition ln any perl'cd l' ed lS cana lS within 
specific labour processes and structures of fixed capital. This 
situation can continue only as long as extra relative surplus value 
can be wrung out of these main competitive foci. 
5.3.1 Periods of retail change 
Each maJor adjustment in the mode of retailing in these sectors has 
corresponded with periods during which the capitalist system was 
undergoing structural crlses. The mode of competition at any time 
has also reflected the dominant labour processes, and their 
associated technologies. This lS expected given the organic unity 
of capitalism. For instance, the "abbreviations in turnover-time of 
circulating capital due to perfection of new systems of transport 
and communications, improved methods of distribution, accelerated 
rotation of stock and so on" (Mandel, 1975 p.115), are relevant 
factors in the sudden increase in the rate of profit which 1S need 
to set off an upswing. 
As retailing has become capitalistic it has begun to playa maJor 
functional part In the upswings of capitalism. Unfortunately 
whether retail revolutions pre-date or post-date the maJor upturns 
in capitalist economies is an issue beyond the scope of the present 
investigation. The rough sequence of events seems to point to a 
process of feedback where improved distribution contributes to the 
expansion of production, which allows an expansion of the new retail 
form and so forth. 
An example 
accumulation 
of this integration, ln the intensive 




serv1ce store was the maJor post-war innovation 1n the grocery 
trade. Its success can be attributed to the diffusion of the 
automobile. Cars were commonplace much earlier 1n the United 
States~ so that supermarket trading had been a successful feature of 
grocery retailing since the early 1930s. Zimmerman (1955) tells us 
that people drove up to 50 miles to shop at one of the early US 
supermarkets, the Big Bear in New Jersey. 
The problems associated with the widespread adoption of the car, 
that is bringing its price down to a level which would allow the 
mass market to start, were central to the tribulations of getting 
the intensive regime of regulation underway (Aglietta, 1979). The 
fact that neither the economic upswing, nor supermarkets got under 
way 1n Britain until after the war, seems too closely related to be 
purely coincidental. 
5.3.2 The present structural cr1S1S 
At the present time, the most important feature of these sectors of 
retailing 1S that they are both facing the saturation of their 
current mode of competition. Mail order is already in the process 
of restructuring, whereas the superstore operators are still a few 
years away from saturation, and so are still putting all their 
energies into constructing stores. 
The problem which these now concentrated retail sectors face is how 
to revolutionise their mode of competition in a way that allows them 
to increase their rate of profit in a dramatic and sustained manner, 
or that opens up new vistas of extensive or intensive market growth. 
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There 1S a case to be argued that retailing responds to the working 
class norm of consumption by adopting the dominant labour process. 
The easiest example of this 1S the congruence between the 
superstore, which has the mass collective labour force typical of 
Fordism and sells mass prcxiuced products to a mass market. A similar 
compar1son might be made for the 'big book' mail order catalogue. 
There are strong indications that the solution to the current crisis 
of capitalism will involve the transmutation of the labour process 
so that it is more flexible and less collective (Aglietta, 1979; 
Murray, 1983; Meager, 1986). A key component in this process 1S 
generally held to be the flexibility which computer and 
telecommunications technologies offer, particularly in the way that 
prcxiucts can be customised in an economically efficient manner. 
On this basis, teleshopping certainly seems to have some of the key 
characteristics which a retailing technology would requ1re to be 
consistent with a Neo-Fordist labour process (Palloix, 1976), in the 
way that retailing has reflected the dominant modes of competition 
in retailing in the past. There are, however, several problems in 
accepting this interpretation. The first is that it is by no means 
clear that a Neo-Fordist labour process will become the domincmt 
labour process, or that teleshopping will be the only Neo-Fordist 
solution. Second, the labour process within retailing will have to 
respond to the specific logic of retail capital, and to the fact 
that it is involved in the realisation of value not the creation of 
value. Third, teleshopping as a new mode of retail competition will 
Fnind it harder to usurp the prevailing mode of competition than any 
previous incoming mode, because it is the first time that retail 
capital has been composed of dominant capitals. 
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5,3,3 The problematic of teleshopping 
The mail order trade is able to adopt teleshopping because it solves 
specific problems with which they I are already faced. The 
competitive task for mail order lS to compete with traditional 
retailers for a larger slice of the use-value market which it 
encompasses. So, teleshopping lS seen as a means to increase the 
efficiency with which this can be achieved. It uses a set of 
technologies which they are familiar with, and which can be 
introduced ill an incremental manner. 
Eventually, teleshopping will provide them with new avenues of 
accumulation by increasing the accuracy, flexibility and the 
timeliness of their marketing. The major difficulties which they 
have in adopting teleshopping relate to its present level of 
technological development. At the moment it does not constitute a 
replacement for the printed catalogue, so there is no reduction ill 
circulation costs in that direction. For technical reasons, it would 
be hard to use tele-retailing to increase their share of the total 
amount of finished textile commodities realised. Al though, Comp-U-
Card has challanged the conventional wisdom on the need for printed 
catalogues by not using supporting printed matter. 
For grocery retailers teleshopping regulres a significant break from 
their mam skills. It will need new and starkly different forms of 
investment. The grocery market 1S fairly static and the major 
capitals ill the sector have such a large share of total food sales 
that further efforts to increase market share will not yield a 
significant amount of extra growth. Teleshopping is not seen as a 
means of increasing their share of the total mass of commodities 
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produced because it seems inappropriate for many of the product 
groups in which they deal, particularly the higher profit lines. It 
1S for these reasons that superstore groups are seeking to 
concentrate by integrating backwards or diversifying. 
At the moment, teleshopping offers superstore traders little 
prospect of further concentration. The extra sales which they could 
get from increasing the effective accessibility of their stores are 
not great enough to offset the dis-advantages and risks of this 
option. The mav or barriers to the use of teleshopping as a mc:de of 
competition are that: the present market size is small; delivery 
serv1ces are labour intensive when compared to superstores; the exit 
barr iers raised by having a large fixed investment m stores; and 
the entry barriers of finding the time and learning the skills to 
undertake teleshopping. As a result the maJor retail grocers are 
un convin ced that teleshopping holds out much prospect of an 
increased use-value market share and a sustained mcrease in 
'fl.A 
profi tabili ty, which are the roots of innovatery: bel=laviour_. 
It seems unlikely that any entrepreneurial teleshopping venture will 
be able to compete with superstore trading on its own terms. A 
company seeking such an option would have to somehow negotiate 
equivalent discounts to the maJor grocers, without being able to 
guarantee the volume of turnover. Thus, Telecard. was unable to gain 
sufficient econom1es of scale to carry on trading. Also, a large 
volume of business is required before the econom1es of scale In 
warehousing and order handling are achieved. 
Aside from the scale economy issues potential tele-retailers, like 
Telecard are faced with the further problem that although the 
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delivery of goods adds extra value, 
are created through competition In 
efficient retailer would expect to 
it is hard to realise. Prices 
use-value markets. The more 
make a higher rate of profit 
because the price of the goods sold is higher than the average price 
of production would be if all retailers were equally efficient. As 
the tele-retailer competes with traditional retailers in a price 
market the extra value from the delivery is hard to realise. Thus, 
there 1S a redistribution of value from the tele-retailer to the 
conventional retailer, if the tele-retailer attempts to compete on 
price, because of its higher organic composition. 
Tele-retailers may try to differentiate the value creating, delivery 
element, of their serv1ce from the realisation element. This is 
what Telecard attempted. First it set itself up as a pure 
commercial capital. Then it tried to create a a separate use-value 
market for the service and conven1ence of teleshopping, for which it 
hoped consumers would pay as a separate commodity. 
Tele-retailers might also try to cut their own costs of circulation 
sufficiently below that of their competitors to gain a pr1ce 
advantage over a non-delivery serv1ce, as has Comp-U=Card. Comp-U-
Card, however, has used an innovatory marketing mechanism to support 
its tele-retailing by selling its database of products as an 
information service. The fact that it makes most of its profits from 
this service means that it can still compete on price, despite its 
higher value component. It has the further advantage that it will 
only sell products which are relatively expensive, slow to 
circulate, and therefore attract a higher margin (Section 4.1.3). 
The advantages which Comp-U=Card has claimed are not applicable to 
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an entrepreneurial grocery tele-retailer. The only glimmer of hope 
for a small tele-retailer in the highly concentrated grocery sector 
comes from the saturation of the current mode of competition, and 
the tendency of superstore operators to lncrease the value creating 
elements of their 'offer.' In the past, it is the customer serv1ce 
elements such as packaging and personal attention which have been 
the point of weakness which the new mode of competition has 
exploited, which corresponds to the value theory expectation that 
the commercial capital should restrict itself to exchange for 
exchange's sake. 
Small grocery tele-retailers might be able to compete on price if 
they specialise into certain core areas of supermarket trading which 
are susceptible to being sold via tele-retailing. An alternative is 
that certain large retailers faced with limited future growth after 
saturation might try to invade their competitors' strongholds by 
offering a basics-only teleshopping serV1ce, but the concentrated 
capitals are aware that this could result in a zero-sum game.- A 
final possibility 1S that the intensive saturation of the superstore 
could be overcome through a combination of convenience-stores and 
tele-retailing. Entry through this method offers a path to 
incrementally build a teleshopping service to non-retail 
concentrated capitals, such as are already in the convenience-store 
business. 
5.4 Sllmmary 
This chapter has shown how the historical phases of the mail order 
and the gro~ery trades have corresponded to the main periods 10 
capitalist economic development. 
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It was also seen that retail competition is mediated through the 
constant struggle to overcome the difficulties of distributing goods 
to a geographically diffuse population. Each period of retail 
capitalist development has solved this problem through a set of 
transport and communications technologies, and a specific labour 
process. 
Mail order was seen as a distinctive form of retailing because it 
to 
can be conceptualised as an attemptfcentralise as much of the labour 
process as possible through the use of communications and transport 
technology and by econom~es of scale in administrative and goods 
storage functions. The paradox for mail order compan~es 1S that 
whilst improvements in communications technologies aid accumulation, 
transport technology innovations can hinder as well as help 
accumulation. 
Grocery retailing 1S characterised by a more straightforward 
exploitation of the prevailing regime of accumulation and the 
working class norm of consumption. The specific solution, ~ the 
most recent epoch of capitalism, the superstore, has depended upon 
mass production, mass consumption, and the widespread ownership of 
the motor car. This mode of competition is, however, showing signs 
of weakness as the population of superstores approaches saturation. 
The extent to which teleshopping can be considered a competitive 
tool the mail order and grocery trades was then considered. It 
was shown how the adoption of teleshopping 1.S relatively 
unproblematic for mail order. 
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The grocery trade regards teleshopping with deep seated mistrust. 
It is incompatible with their current mode of competition, which is 
based in the siting and operation of superstores. They do, however, 
accept that major accumulation problems are looming as their current 
competitive mode loses potency, and at least one of them is flirting 
with teleshopping, if only in a marginal manner. 
The two independent compan1es which have promoted teleshopping have 
both adopted a role as an information broker. In one case a low-
pricing structure has been adopted, along with a membership scheme. 
In the other the policy has been to develop a high price strategy, 
and to try to realise the value which the delivery service adds by 
withdrawing from direct price competition with store retailers 
In summary, teleshopping 1S unlikely to become a maJor innovation 
unless it can demonstrate the potential to substantially increase 
the retention of surplus value in a defensible way, or for it to 
lncrease the possibilities for a particular capitalist to 
concentrate. At the moment, the miniscule number of consumers 
qualified to subscribe to a teleshopping service is a serious bar to 
retailers large and small. 
One reason why the teleshopping market 1S too small to be of 
interest to grocery retailers is because the extra circulation costs 
of delivering would be too great for them to make an above average 
rate of profit, and still be able to do their present volume of 
business. The other constraint is that the number of people 
currently equipped with the technological hardware to subscribe to a 
teleshopping service is very small. This is not such a problem for 
h I l ard but the economies of scale are smaller retailers, suc ase ec , 
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not as strong as they are 1n the superstore business, with which 
teleshopping would compete. 
The S1ze of the market, however, ultimately depends upon the rate at 
which the technological hardware diffuses. This relates to the 
manner ~ which other telecommunications services are developed, and 
the extent to which such services mesh with general movements in the 
spheres of production and consumption. These issues will be taken 




TELESHOPPING AND THE STRUCTURES OF SUPPLY, 
So far in the discussion of accumulation, competition and the motion 
of capitalist social relations little has been made of the specific 
function of retail capital. Attention has been absorbed by the 
documentation of the effect of horizontal competition between retail 
capitalists. Yet, in Chapter 4, retail capital was identified by 
its special place in the overall circuit of capital, the realisation 
of commodities produced in Department II (Figure 4.1 p.83). Retail 
capital is but one moment of overall circuit of capital. Changes 
taking place elsewhere in the spheres of production and circulation 
will be changed, and changed by, the nature of retail competition. 
The purpose of this chapter, is to indicate the implications of 
teleshopping for the linkages between retail capital and other forms 
of capital. The first part of the chapter indicates the current 
status of the linkages of the grocery and mail order trades. The 
second part of the chapter considers the rQstructuring of these 
linkages which would be required by the adoption of tele-retailing. 
6.1 vertical linkages ln retailing 
6.1.1 Grocery trade links 
i) Producer capital 
The locus of control of the foodstuffs production was initially 
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where the technology of food processing was introduced. Capitalist 
manufacturers at this level were able to exploit the surplus value 
created by both agricultural producers and preliminary processors on 
the one hand, and by small scale retail production on the other. 
The result has been the emergence of a food and drink industry in 
the UK which is more centralised than UK industry as a whole. Of the 
5,000 firms in this sector, the 10 largest account for one third of 
the volume of sales (Davies et ala 1985). 
The market shares of the leading compan1es ~ each use-value market 
in the food and drink industry have, however, shown signs of decline 
since the late 1960s (Howe, 1983). This does not mean that the 
compan1es concerned are failing to concentrate, but to do so they 
have nearly all had to diversify during this period. Net margins 
fell from 6.3% in 1971/72, to 3.7% in 1979/80 not only because of 
the worldwide economic crisis, but also because of a generally 
static market for foodstuffs, and the increasing centralisation in 
the grocery trade (Davies et al., 1985). 
The vertical relations with retailers in this sector 1S a live issue 
for producers. There is clear evidence of retailers using their new 
strength to beat down the margins of the food processors. There are 
two complementary aspects to this, the growth of own-label products 
and the imposition of discriminatory discounts. 
Own-labelltng has become a significant part of supermarket trading 
(Table 6.1). It has four important bargaining purposes for the 
retailer. In the first place, it eats away at the attempts of 
productive monopoly capital to protect their surplus rates of profit 
by product differentiation. The supermarket groups' own labels are 
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now of equal, if not higher, status than the proprietary brands. 
Second, it gives them the opportunity to dictate terms to the 
producer. These terms include not only the pricing policy but the 
packaging, the technical specifications and the length of the 
production run. 
Third, the S1ze of individual retailers is sufficiently large for 
them to absorb the entire output of smaller companies. The surplus 
profit advantages of dealing with smaller companies have been noted 
above (Section 4.4.2). The practicality of these advantages 1S seen 
in that whilst Sainsbury takes only 2.3% of the product of the top 
25 business with which it trades (The Grocer, 30/11/85 p.4), a "high 
proportion of Sainsbury's own-label products are supplied by small 
suppliers" representing more than 700 firms (Sainsbury Annual 
Return, 1985) . 
Fourth, own-labelling helps retailers to be more flexible in the way 
they moves into or out of prcx:iuct markets. They gain control over 
the direction of the production process, without having the 
responsibility of realising the fixed capital tied up in the means 
Table 6,1 Own label shares of total packaged goods (%) 
Company 1980 1983 
Sainsbury 54 53 
Waitrose 42 48 
Safeway 28 34 
Tesco 20 30 
Fine Fare 17 24 
International 19 21 
Argyll 15 21 
Hillarcis 11 16 
Asda 6 7 
(Source: Euromonitor) 
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of production, or the problems of class struggle inherent ~ 
production. 
The other side of the centralisation issue is the way that branded 
goods manufacturers are now under pressure, even from retailers not 
heavily involved in own-labelling. The centralisation of the trade 
means that if one of major multiples will not take a new product, it 
is not worth marketing (Randall, 1985). This allows all of the 
larger multiples to d~mand terms, which the manufacturers claim, go 
well beyond the discounts which are due to the retailers as a result 
of the size of their business. For example, Argyll apparently sent 
out a letter to suppliers requesting a 0.25% rebate on invoice costs 
to cover damages. I tread "obvious ly I do not need to advise you 
that failure to bring yourselves into line with your competitors [in 
this respect] will only serve to make our trading position with you 
more difficult" (The Grocer, 12/04/86 p.4). The ultimate sanction 
that a retailer can invoke 1S to de-list a producer, but there are 
intermediate steps, such as allocating smaller amounts of shelf 
space to branded products, or placing them ill less advantageous 
positions. 
ii) Warehousing and transport 
A sub-theme in the centralisation of retail capital has been the 
absolute decline of the wholesale trade. It is estimated that more 
than 70% of grocery products go direct from manufacturer to the 
retailer (Wiggins and Snell, 1986). The retailers have effectively 
integrated backwards, so that stages in the process of storage 
delivery have been cut-out, this has been a long-term trend 




There has also been a partial trend towards the sub-contracting of 
the storage and delivery of retail prociucts. This has the same 
advantages as the own;label policy, the retailer avoids a direct 
confrontation with a unionised workforce and at the same time has 
little capital invested in the storage and transport facilities. 
The policy of Sainsbury here has been to negotiate the delivered 
prlce and other terms with a prociucer, then to nominate a haulier 
and leave the other parties to work out the details (Financial Times 
01/10/85 p.18). The extent to which the grocery multiples will take 
the sub-contracting tactic 
partial adoption of this 
flexibility. 
iii) Land Ownership 
lS debatable, as wi th own label, a 
form of supply may give them more 
The final linkage which the store retailer must deal with lS the 
property relation. This has two aspects, the first relates to 
property ownership and purchase, and the other the right to build 
stores when and where they wish. The most profitable superstore 
chains have been those with a large proportion of their land In 
freehold. Thus, as we have seen, a large part of the fixed capital 
investment has been committed to superstore development. 
Property development was for a time a maJor item on the agenda of 
the superstore trader, so that these companies owned some of the 
largest property development agencies In the country. As superstore 
saturation approaches, this galloping need for development lS 
passing. 
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Tesco and Sainsbury have used a technique known as 'sale and lease 
back' to help fund their development programme, but they still have 
a very high proportion of freehold property. The property 
development has been carefully controlled, to prevent them from 
either having to pay exorbitant rents in the future or being saddled 
with a property asset which is declining l.n price. Anyway, l.n the 
burgeoning property markets in the South, which is where these two 
have their strongholds, land investment 1S potentially a maJor 
source of investment. 
6. 1.2 Linkages lD the mail order trade 
i) Links with producer capital 
The 1ssues of land control and rent are not important to the mail 
order trade. This aside, the changing nature of the vertical 
linkages 1n the mail order trade shows similarities to those in the 
grocery trade. The major part of mail order trade is still the sale 
of textiles. 
Textile production was, of course, one of che foundation stones of 
British capitalism. Yet, the creation of finished goods from those 
textiles 1S one of the most fragmented of links l.n the production 
chain. It 1S the classic example of an easy to enter, petty 
commodity production sector. As an example, l.n a rare marxist 
discussion of productive-retail linkages, Rainnie (1984) shows how 
surplus value has been leached out of clothing production by the 
textile industry above, and below by the large retailers, such as 
-. 
Marks and Spencer. 
-186-
Although not documented, it seems certain that the way in which the 
mail order trade has used its clothing suppliers is entirely the 
same. The situation is exactly that described ~ the previous 
section, where a myriad of producers are forced to serve court to 
the retailer. The only difference between the mail order companies 
and Marks and Spencer, is the latter's commitment to UK production. 
The mail order companies seem willing to take advantage of the 
foriegn labour-power, which being relatively under-valued is another 
source of surplus profits. 
ii) Transport. Warehousing and publicity 
The physical distribution network for mail order companies 1S much 
more complex than the traditional grocery retail structure. First, 
the delivery to the customer devolves upon the retailer. Second, 
the catalogues must be printed and delivered. 
One particular area where much work has been done by mail order 
compan1es has been to find alternative distribution mechanisms in 
( 
order to improve the speed of despatch, and to reduce their 
dependency upon the postal service. At present, most small items 
are mailed, bulky items and white goods are shipped direct from the 
manufacturer and about half of the rest of the goods go on 
contracted or company owned transport. The leaders ~ this are 
Great Universal Stores, with their Homespeed company which accounts 
for 55% of their deliveries. Parcel traffic on the postal serV1ce 
1S kept high to help the negotiation of delivery charges on items 
sent to customers outside of the normal delivery range. 
The problems of printing are also absorbed in-house, because of the 
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S1.ze, and length of the print runs involved. Ordering systems have 
traditionally relied upon the postal service, but now both telephone 
ordering and teleshopping provide alternative routes of 
communication. 
iii) Payment systems 
The mail order retailer must devise some system for making sure the 
orders and the payments for the commodities come through. The 
payment system 1.S probably the area most subj ect to change. This 
change has also permeated into the grocery trade. The encroachment 
of new, more flexible credit arrangements, mentioned in Chapter Five 
1S only part of the story, non-cash payment systems will have a 
profound effect on the structural linkages between the financial 
sector and retail capital. 
For it to work, membership of a non-cash payment scheme mu~t be as 
portable as money; customers of any bank must be able to use it J.I1 
any store they want. In other words, there will be little 
opportunity for a captive market. However, as always, the 
negotiation of change centres the competition to gain more of the 
surplus value created in production. 
Non-cash payment systems are basically an attempt to make more 
surplus-value available to accumulation by reducing the costs of 
circulation. As there is no surplus profit to be made by sharing 
these gains out evenly, and as there is a need to generalise the 
system as quickly as possible, the competition is mainly vertical. 
Primarily, the banks wish to reduce their paper handling costs and 
to charge retailers for the use of a non-cash transaction system, 
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and the retailers want the service for free. The various non-cash 
payment systems require a considerable fixed capital investment, and 
the two parties are also warring over how these costs are 
apportioned. 
One result of the battle over payment systems 1.S the increasing 
penetration of retailers into this market in their own right. In 
any case, for retailers such systems are having an increasing role. 
This 1.S seen l.n upsurge of non-cash payents and credit cards 
described in the previous chapter (Section 5.1.2) and in Tables 6.2 
and 6.3. and the switch from the use of hire purchase to running 
account forms of retailer credit (Table 6.4). 
The amount of goods sold on credit l.n the retail sector has been 
growing mainly through the use of credit cards. When finance 
houses, which includes non-bank credit card operators, extended 
credit 1.S compared to retail credit, the relative size of the two 
sources of credit is placed into context (Table 6.5). 
One of the features of the growing importance of finance house 
running account credi~ 1.S that the finance houses are themselves 
often owned by the larger retail companies. The upsurge of in-store 
credit cards 1.S a fairly recent phenomena but one that has 
penetrated the credit card holding population with a vengeance 
(Table 6.6). In the case of Club 24 (owned by Next) and Welbeck 
(owned by Burton) the attractions of this business have been great 
enough to encourage retailers to offer credit serv1.ces to other 
retailers (Table 6.7). More recently, Storehouse have started their 
- ed"t d w1.·th the a name so neutral (Storecard) it own group cr 1. car, 
would be suprising if it were not also meant for retailers outside 
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of the group. 
Table 6.2 Payment Methods for consumer goods and services 





Direct Debit 160 
Postal Order 270 
Credit Card 10 
Credit Transfer 40 
Cash (amounts greater 















(Source: Social Trends 1986) 
Table 6.3 Consumer Credit Extended by Finance Houses and Retailers, 
1981-1984 (£m) 
Year Total Finance Houses Retailers 
1981 7861 4650 3211 
1982 9087 5639 3448 
1983 10524 6840 3684 
1984 11509 7664 3845 
(Source: Trade and Industry, Nov 1985) 
TABLE 6,4 Type of Credit Sales by Type of Retailer (£m) 
Food & Provisions 
1966 
1976 





















(Sources: Census of Distribution 1966; Retail Enquiry 1976) 
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Table 6.5 Finance House and Retailer Credit. 
Amounts Outstanding at Year End. 1981 1984 (£ro) 
1982 
Finance Houses 
Running Acc' ts 794 
Fixed-Sum 5777 









(Source: Business Monitors SDM6 & 8) 
Table 6.6 Growth of Credit Cards 
Date Turnover Increase No. of 
Started. 1984/85 Rate Cardholders 
(£bn) 1984/85 (ro) 
Barclaycard 1966 2038 32% 7.2 
Access 1972 2287 27% 8.0 
Debenhams 1980 n/k n/k 1.5 
Personal Account 
(Burton Gp) 1985 n/k n/a 1.2 
Sears Card 1985 n/k n/a 0.4 
Marks and Spencer 1985 n/k n/a 1.0 
n/k - not known n/a - not applicable 
(Sources: Company Reports and trade literature) 
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Austin Reed Credit Services 







Credit and Data Marketing Services 
Hornes Executive Club 
House of Fraser Stores 
Lombard Tricity (subsid of Nat West) 
Lombard Tricity (subsid of Nat West) 
Midland Bank Group 
North West Securities 
Storecard/Citibank (prev. Retail Credit Cards) 
Storecard/Citibank (prev. Nat West/Joint Credit) 
Storecard/Citibank (prev. Midland Bank) 
Storecard/Citibank (prev. Citibank Savings) 
Retail Credit Cards 
Retail Credit Cards 
Retail Credit Cards 














6.2 vertical linkages 1n teleshoppiug 
The previous section summarised the respective links between grocery 
and mail order and other sectors of capital at the moment. In this 
section the linkages associated with teleshopping are discussed. 
The key to the discussion, 1S that the backbone of teleshopping 1S 
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the telecommunication system (a discussion of the development of the 
telecommunications infrastructure of 
Append ix 1). Thus development of 
teleshopping is presented in 
teleshopping depends on the 
substantial convergence taking place ~ the telecommunications, 
computers and media industries. 
The section is in two parts. The first part, presents a discussion 
of the structure of capital in the telecommunications sectors, on 
which teleshopping will depend. The second part considers ~ more 
detail the implications of the restructuring of the channels of 
supply which teleshopping invokes. 
6.2.1 Teleshopping hardware: ownership and control 
In Chapter 3 the duality in teleshopping with its implications for 
shopping behaviour, and its requirement for a specific set of 
technologies was used to define teleshopping (Section 3.1). These 
set of technologies comprl.ses a combination of computer, 
telecommunications and broadcast technologie~. New technologies 
are introduced by capitalists to make a profit. Therefore, it l.S 
hardly supris~ that the ownership and control of the technologies 
of teleshopping is contentious. 
The only two combinations of these technologies that allow proper 
interactive teleshopping to take place which are likely to be 
available In Britain for the forseeable future are the telephone 
network and interactive cable systems (Appendix 1). Telephonic 
interactive teleshopping can take place using a set of techniques 
jointly known as videotex or viewdata. Cable television servl.ces 
can also offer videotex, but because they generally have a greater 
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bandwidth, are capable of much a higher quality of display. 
The traditional status of telephonic communication as a state 
monopoly has had a tremendous effect on the progress of Prestel 
(British Telecom's videotex service). The Post Office developed 
videotex for the dual purposes of increasing the rate of use of its 
equipment, and to promote the UK television manufacturing industry. 
In the 1970s the UK television industry went from stagnation to 
decline, as the demand for colour sets was saturated and the 
replacement market was increasingly tapped by Far Eastern 
manufacturers. Prestel and the BBC's teletext system, Ceefax, were 
deliberately used to try to promote flagging demand for home 
prexiuced sets. 
Prestel did not save the UK television industry for a number of 
reasons (a more complete discussion is given in Appendix 1). 
Prestel did not have the confidence of the television manufacturers. 
Mass prexiuction of videotex microchips was delayed, and the price of 
the Prestel sets stayed high. This became part of a vicious circle 
in which high costs prevented the widepsread adoption of Prestel and 
v1ce versa. 
The prospects for UK television manufacturers, along with many other 
telecommunication compan1es, have been further dimmed by the 
globalisatio~ of this sector (see Appendix 1). In this process the 
basis of the long standing support for domestic manufacture by 
individual telephone agencies (Pr'I's) is undermined. The increasing 
capital intensity of telecommunications 'projects means that 
companies solely geared towards a national market find they are 
unable to pass the entry barriers without collaborat~ with foreign 
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capital. Also, telecommunications traffic IS becoming more 
international; requiring compatible standards. 
As with Prestel, broadband cable television was promoted in the hope 
of stimulating the UK telecommunications industry, particularly in 
fields where Britain had a lead, such as fibre optic cable. 
However, through a mixture of Central Government prejudice against 
public spending lfl support of such projects, and the action of 
vested interests in UK industry, any re-invigoration that cabling 
might have brought to the telecommunications sector has been 
rendered impotent (Appendix 1). 
Overlaying the difficulties of UK telecommunications companies has 
been the effect of the privatisation of British Telecom. In its new 
guise as a public company, British Telecom is less interested in 
promoting the national industrial cause than in accumulation in its 
own right. One consequence of this is the decision to buy from 
foreign manufacturers. Another IS that it is now actively competing 
against the companies it once sought to protect. Finally, the 
privatised structure of British Telecom prevents the internal cross-
subsidy of its serv1ces. Each division 1S composed of profit 
sectors. For instance, Prestel is a profit centre within the Value 
Added Systems and Services. This means that it is very hard to build 
jomestic services, because high prices are charged on low volumes of 
::msiness to ensure an profitable return on investment (Prestel moved 
Lnto profit in 1986). 
~ part of its accumulation strategy, British Telecom is adding more 
nd more servIces to its core role as a telecommunications network 





telephone equipment manufacturer, it began to produce its own 
handsets and computerised exchanges, which it sells alongside those 
of GEC, Plessey and STC. 
Second, it ~s increasingly adding value to the telephone network. 
The common carrier principle embodied in Prestel has been shattered 
as British Telecom moves into: electronic messaging with services 
such as Telecom Gold; electronic publish~ by provid~ databases 
and electronic yellow pages and a 25% stake in the Telemap 
subsidiary of the magazine publisher, EMAP (Telelink, 1(5) 1985, p. 
5); electronic consumer services such as the computer hobbyist 
serv~ce MicroNet and its own upmarket telephone ordering catalogue; 
and mobile phones. In the last case, a joint enterprise with 
Securicor, the only competition ~s the Vodaphone subsidiary of 
Racal. 
Third, it ~s moving into competing media such as satellite provision 
and cable technology. Telecommunications satellites are of course 
part of British Telecom's core activities but it is also embroiled 
in the development of television broadcasting by satellite: as a 
partner In the Starstream consortium along with Thomson and Thorn-
EMI; in Satellite Information Services, the horse rac~ information 
serv~ce for betting shops. British Telecom's involvement In the 
development of cable television has also been substantial. It ~s a 
major shareholder in over one third of the new build cable projects. 
The influence of British Telecom ~s pervas~ve the 
telecommunications 'industry, and In the technologies upon which 
teleshopping depends. It is hardly suprising that companies such as 
















British Telecom: there IS ready built network of cable ducts in 
Coventry owned by British Telecom. The provisions of the British 
Telecommunications Act (HMSO, 1981) have also been useful to British 
Telecom. Thereare only two companies licensed to carry voice and 
data communications between the cable networks: British Telecom and 
Mercury, the Cable and Wireless subsidiary. If a cable operator 
wants to link into a teleshopping service operated from a site 
outside its own franchise it would do well to form an association 
with either Mercury (as has Clyde Cablevision) or British Telecom 
(as has Westminster Cable). 
It is quite clear therefore that British Telecom has a hegemonic 
position In the prOVISIon of the new technologies upon which 
teleshopping depends; it has control of Prestel, and a large portion 
of cable television systems. It is the nearest thing to a true 
monopoly capital in the UK economy. However, other large capitalist 
corporations are implicated Ln the introduction of these 
technologies, particularly those 
publishing, newsprint and television. 
control of the technological side 
the media industries: 
Whereas British Telecom seeks 
of these services, the media 
groups want to promote and extend as many of these new media as 
possible, and the significance of these new structural linkages will 
be taken further in the next part of this section. 
6.2.2 Teleshopping: a new division of labour? 
The most striking difference between traditional retailing and tele-
retailing IS that the structure of supply becomes more complex, 
~articularly the forward linkages between the retailer and the 
~onsumer (Figure 6.1). Tele-retailing changes the distribution 
-197-
system by: requiring collaboration between capitalists who have 
never collaborated before; breaking down traditional sectoral 
boundaries; and inciting a struggle for the new locus of control. 
In this sub-section each of these features will be taken in turn. 
i) Teleshopping: a new collaboration 
Spreadirrg the costs 
From Figure 6.1 it will be clear that the telecommunications 
services of which teleshopping is an example are dependent on the 
collaboration of a number of different agencies. It l.S not 
Figure 6.1 Supply linkages for teleshopp~ 
Producers 
,..----r---- Banks ,,-___ ... ~ ................ -......;loIooI.&.< ...... ~ ........ ------ Credit 
etc Agency 
Umbre la Group~-------------.--~ 
etwotk Operator ~------..... 
Delivery 
Service 
~ ____ ~~~SU~B~~~RI~B~E~R~~~----~J 
Receiving t I . Equipment-----------~ .~ Settlement --------~ 
Supplier Procedure 
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suprising then that most teleshopping services have been developed 
by consortia. Consortia help to spread the cost and so reduce the 
risk involved In such telecommunications ventures. The coming 
together of different agencies also represents a merging of skills, 
which helps ensure that the telecommunications service 1S 
comprehensive, and reduces the uncertainty of the venture. 
The manner In which cable television is developing in the UK shows 
the need to spread the risks of developing a telecommunications 
system. A franchise area of 100,000 homes with a penetration rate 
of 35% was expected to cost between £27million (tree and branch) and 
£42 million (switched star) (Hutchinson, 1984). The return on this 
capital was neither speedy nor assured. A result of the large risky 
investment which cable represents is that most franchise bids were 
made by consortia, consisting of a spectrum of capitalist 
enterprises. Of the original 11 franchises the maJor corporate 
investors included 9 telecommunications compan1es, 14 financial 
institutions, 8 media and leisure companies and only 2 retailers 
(Littlewoods and Currys). 
To take the example of Aberdeen Cable Services. Amongst its 45 
shareholders (November, 1986) were British Telecom (30%), Legal and 
General Insurance (15%), Standard Life Assurance (13%), and the 
American Television and Communications Corporation (10%). The 
American Television and Communications Corporation were brought into 
the consortium by British Telecom, and had previously been British 
Telecom's advisors on cabling in the UK (INTERVIEW). 
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, Reduc ing costs 
The managing director of Aberdeen Cable Services stressed: "one 
thing we are not into is picking up development costs ... The reason 
this company went for tree and branch was that we were not at the 
cutting edge of technology. All that happens with that is that you 
spend a lot of money .... we are not in that business" (INTERVIEW). 
The logic of bringing down development costs 1S so that the 
telecommunications system is not owned by the cable company, instead 
it is leased from British Telecom for the period of the licence. 
Taking the cheaper tree and branch option, however, creates problems 
when setting up interactive serV1ces, such as teleshopping. The 
mam problem is the cost of a terminal. "Our difficulty is that you 
make the information channel specific. So you have to get a modem 
that operates at radio frequencies and they are very expensive" 
( INTERVIEW) . This has also led to them engaging in further efforts 
at collaboration with a computer hardware manufacturer called 
SciTech. 
Compatibility 
Apart from the problem of hardware compatibility the structures of 
the information services must be compatible. For instance, the time 
based charging structure of Prestel is not immediately compatible 
with the monthly subscription charges on cable networks. 
The problem of setting up hardware, software and protocol standards 
has dogged. the introduction of telematics. This 1S seen most 
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clear ly in the problems of establishing EFTPoS. For instance, "the 
problem with all the EFTPoStr1·als'nh ~1 now 1S t at there 1S no 
centralised settlement procedure ... It 1S wise to do everything 
possible at' the outset to make l·t (h t e debit card system) 
comprehensive. 
vast exercise 
( INTERVIEW) . 
Sharing skills 
This is why it is taking time to come about. It is a 
getting everbody to agree to the same thing" 
Collaborations 1n teleshopping ventures have most commonly been a 
result of a merger of skills and interests. The merger of skills is 
clearly seen in the development of Telecard, which brought together 
a software house (IDS), a traditional retail store (Lalani), a 
videotex system operator (Prestel) and a delivery company (Square 
Moves). Although, as noted in Chapter Five, the co-orciinating role 
was undertaken by a separate tele-retailer (Section 5.2.3). 
A merger of interests is found in the social serV1ce teleshopping 
schemes (see Section 5.2.3). Computer companies such ROCC (a maker 
of videotex mainframes) have been able to do a significant amount of 
developmental work by providing equipment, and in at least one case 
have been able to snap-up a programmer after 10 months free (to 
them) training on their own systems (INTERVIEW). The provision of 
terminals follows a similar logic, with many of the commercial 
services marketing Tandata videotex adaptors at marked down prices. 
This is of mutual benefit because Tandata gain market share, whilst 
the tele-retailer is able to market it service more effectively. 
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luegrated packages 
So far, few tele-retailers have offered an integrated link between 
payment services and teleshopping. In the cases of Club403 and 
Telecard the payments for grocery purchases were collected at the 
door. This was seen by both operators as unsatisfactory. 
a lack of control of the transactions which take place, 




delivery drivers. Telecard, in fact, avoided cash payments as such, 
J.n favour of cheque or direct debit. David Cullen, managing 
director of Telecard: "We don't take cash. We will be looking, once 
we get into higher profit lines to taking Access, or to develop our 
own credit card. But we find that credit card companl.es aren't 
interested J.n food because people habitually pay for that regularly, 
so its not very profitable for the credit card operator. At this 
stage, whilst we are on our present profit structure, out of a 
retail unit we haven't got the margin to pay the 3-4% on the credit 
cards without putting our prices up. We think that people are on the 
whole used to paying cash for food, so there is no hassle" 
( INTERVIEW) . 
The socially biased teleshopping services in Gateshead and Bradford 
rely exclusively upon cash or cheque payments, but the amounts 
involved tend to be rather smaller. Also, given the nature of their 
clientele, they could hardly expect a large non-cash payment 
contribution. It is the elderly and the disadvantaged who are least 
likely to have a chequing account let alone a credit card. 
The gap J.n on-line payment systems l.S indicative of a need for 
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further collaboration. The shopping service needs the other 
information and transactional services to make it complete. This 
need ~s reciprocated ~ the other services and even the 
telecommunications systems themselves, particularly videotex, ~ 
which teleshopping is considered to be attractive enough for people 
to subscribe to the overall service just to do their shopptng. 
The need to provide an overall package has caused the emergence of a 
new stratum of capital, which takes an editorial role ~ the 
prov~s~on of telematic services. The specialist companies, known as 
umbrella groups, which have grown up on Prestel includes, for 
instance, VieRtel, Press288, Homelink. To an extent the social 
networks such as Gateshead Shopping and Information Services and 
Bradford Centrepoint fufill a similar function .. 
New skills 
Umbrella groups are also more skilled at overcoming the new 
marketing problems which arise in the use of videotex. It is not an 
easy medium for advertisers to come to terms with. The tree and 
branch structure of the database which leads users down alleys of 
their own making does not make it a fruitful ground for the sort of 
chance, or intentional, encounter with an advertisement that 1S 
commonplace in the broadcast media. Furthermore, in such a highly 
directed activity serendipitous discovery of material 1S less 
likely. 
In teleshoppiog , VieRtel 1S the leader in this process, with at 
least three of the big five mail order houses on its VieRtel 202 
package on Prestel. Perhaps, the significance of this development 
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should not be pressed too far. Grattan and Empire Stores have both 
found this to be a cheaper, and less risky manner of gaining some 
experience of teleshopping than by taking a full Prestel account. 
Littlewoods and Kays both have direct contacts with Prestel, and are 
Information Providers in their own right. Although, the nature of 
this relationship between the mail order houses and the umbrella 
groups may become redundant if the market for teleshopping grows to 
a significant size. 
The packaging of serv1ces has the further advantage for the members 
of the package that it can help them to overcome the geographical 
penetration difficulties associated with the development of 
teleshopping. Localised teleservices such as Club 403, run by 
Viewtel, offer a more sensitive and targetted approach to 
teleshopping than does national teleshopping. Also, it is much 
easier to trace the activities of the consumers across a wide range 
of activities. So that, although the mail order company Kays has a 
separate database on Prestel it still regards it as worthwhile to 
maintain a presence on Viewtel 202. 
ii) The breakdown of sectoral boundaries 
The emergence of companies which have an editorial role is a symptom 
of the breakdown of the traditional division of labour between 
capitalists which services such as teleshopping bring about. 
In a comparison of tele-retailing with store retailing, the backward 
linkages are not necessarily substantially changed. Although, 
~1 (1986) point out the way that teleshopping Goldstucker et ~. 
eliminates both warehouse and store functions in the supply chain. 
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The most important changes, however, are likely to be in the new 
linkages; those forward of the tele-retailer. There are three ma~ 
ways in which this restructuring is becoming apparent. 
First, the specialist teleservice editing companies do not neatly 
belong into a traditional sectoral division. Viewtel is a subsidiary 
of the Birmingham Post and Mail, one of the largest regional 
newspaper groups 1n the country. Yet, its managing director 
willingly admits Yiewtel doesn't mesh with into the rest of its 
parent's business interests. "Its a pain 111 the neck to them I 
suppose. We don't fit into the newspaper business. Everything from 
the way we operate a service that's available 24 hours a day ... to 
the fact that our sales reps travel the length and breadth of the 
country as well as over to Scandinavia doesn't fit in with being 
part of the Birmingham Post and Mail .... that is why over the last 
couple of years we have moved further and further away from the 
newspaper" ( INTERVIEW) . 
Second the structures of control over the parts of a teleservice 
vary markedly. For instance, in some of the cable franchises the 
network is the property of the franchisee, in others it 1S leased 
from one of the shareholding compan1es, as does Aberdeen Cable 
Services at £6 per subscriber per month from British Telecom 
(Financial Times, 09/05/85 p.18). The division of responsibility 
for the packaging and content of cable television serV1ces 1S ill-
defined. To be sure, the cable company 1S responsible to its 
customers for the programming it transmits, but mostly it relays a 
channel which has been packaged by an outside agency, such as Music 
Box (owned by Thorn-EMI and Yorkshire Television). This division of 
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labour can lead to disputes such as that over the way Robert 
Maxwell's British Cable Services was allocating time on its Milton 
Keynes network to Rupert Murdoch's Sky channe 1 (Guard ian, 24/12/86 
p. 2). 
A corollary to the indistinct division of labour in teleservices 1S 
that many compan1es have had to become involved themselves m 
the sale of hardware without desiring to do so. The slow growth of 
Prestel, and its high subscriber equipment costs has been a further 
obstacle to the development of tele-banking serV1ces. Both of the 
Prestel-based tele-banking serV1ces have attempted to get around 
this by including special offers on Tandata adaptors to subscribers. 
This creates a further problem for the Bank of Scotland, which 
wishes to offer "purely a banking service and a high class banking 
serV1ce at that" (INTERVIEW). They are inevitably implicated m 
servicing the computer hardware market. "We are not an equipment 
supplier, we don't want to get involved in bits of hardware, we 
don't want to be bothered with all the hassle of warrantees and the 
machines breaking down. Al though, we have found ourselves in that 
to a certain ext en t" ( INTERVIEW) . 
Third, the legal framework which attributes responsibility for 
different parts of a teleshopping service becomes ambiguous. For 
instance, a cable operators pointed out that they have a 
"requirement in law to ensure that what we have on the network 1S 
under our control" (INTERVIEW). Whilst, a retailer has another and 
overlapping set of statutory duties. 
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iii) The changing locus of control 
The complex linkages and collaborative nature of teleservices and 
the indistinct division of labour within these linkages indicates 
the fluid structure which confronts a tele-retailer. In such 
circumstances it 1S not suprising that there 1S considerable 
jostling for position between the various interested parties. Even 
though the various capitals involved may get mutual benefits from 
collaboration, they are still engaged in a struggle to accumulate. 
The vertical struggles which take place intermesh with the 
horizontal struggles of the type described in the previous chapter. 
To take the example of teleshopping, a tele-retailer must strive to 
achieve a higher productivity and a lower circulation cost than its 
conventional competitor. At the same time as it 1S trying to 
I 
appropriate as much as possible of the surplus~value produced in the 
commodities. It is called upon to realise network subscription 
charges, delivery charges and transaction charges. Such 
circumstances conspire to make tele-retailing less able to compete 
horizontally. 
These issues lead to a general bickering between the var10US 
capitals which are involved in the provision of tele-retailing. The 
maLn bones of contention are over the distribution of responsibility 
for marketing and who picks up the bill for the provision of the 
hardware and software, which can appear as a circulation cost or an 
act of final consumption. These arguments are mainly a result of 
vertical competition, and are attempts to maximise the rate of 
profit or at least to gain pride of place in the emerging structure 
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of teleservice distribution. Another 1ssue revolves around the 
basic conflicts of interest which ar1se from having many different 
capital groupings in such close interdependence. Each new linkage 
which faces the tele-retailer will be taken in turn. 
vertical competition with the network operator 
The first linkage is between the network operator and the tele-
retailer. Cable companies quite legitimately regard themselves as 
retailers of programming material. One cable company's 
representative commented: "we take on the role of retailer in that 
respect, and the retailer takes on the role of wholesaler and that I 
think is the only way it can be marketed to the public. The public 
have to relate to one company, the company they are paying bills to 
and the one that is providing them with the services .... If they have 
a problem with the product the only recourse should be to the person 
who retailed them that product In the first place: the cable 
operator II ( INTERVIEW) . 
The aggressive demeanour of the large retailers, outlined above, is 
not easily squared with cable operators to force them into the back 
seat. As we have seen, the cable operator also has a statutory duty 
to police its network, to make sure it is not an accessory to any 
bad practice. Each cable operator has a local monopoly, and at most 
30 channels to offer, so. that air space 1S limited, and under the 
control of a single agency. Although, it would be foolish to 
overstate this case, the relationship between the network operator 
and the tele-retailer is likely to be nervous. 
A similar demotion of retailers 1S already apparent from the few 
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teleshopping services which have been mounted in the UK. Most of 
.them have been operated on a third party network such as British 
Telecom's Prestel. The problems which have beset the development of 
Prestel have been substantial, and the decisions which British 
Telecom takes concerning Prestel affect all of its aspiring tele-
retailers. Some of these compan1es take the view that Prestel 1S 
mostly a bottleneck to further development. The potential 
development of viewdata 1S circumscribed by the rate at which 
British Telecom 1S willing to upgrade its telephone service. 
Companies such as Comp-U- Card have conciously avoided putting their 
serv1ce onto Prestel because it would require a rebuilding of their 
entire database. Also using Prestel it is impossible to regularly 
up-date the structure of a service, as the Clydesale Bank wishes to 
do with their tele-banking service. 
A lot of these problems stem from the way that Prestel requ1res the 
routing of all calls to centralised database computers administered 
by themselves. This is clearly an abrogation of the common carr1er 
principal (Appendix 1) . This occas1ons much criticism from 
Information Providers: "Prestel don't have any involvement ID 
running databases. They are merely there to provide the service. 
It is the Information Providers who do the design and make the 
things work and who try the new things .... 1 think where it went 
wrong is that Prestel are still in that situation on the one side. 
On the other side they actually want to interfere as well. If it 
wasn't for Prestel a lot of us could make money out of it" 
( INTERVIEW) . 
A heated debate rages over how to reduce the price of the home 
terminal sufficiently to attain a critical mass of customers. 
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Predictably most of the Information Providers regard this as British 
,TelecomS duty, in the same way as they have traditionally taken 
responsibility for phone rentals. Individual InformatioD Providers 
protest that they cannot underwrite the cost of the terminals too 
much, because to do so would be financially crippling to themselves 
whilst other companies not offering such deals would also gain the 
benefit of the service. "The question is who will grasp the nettle? 
Prestel won't who are probably the most obvious people to do it. 
The Information Providers on Prestel are all in there for different 
reasons and none of us are going to grasp the nettle with the 
experience that we have all had. If I could put an adaptor m 
someone's home and know that they would only access my service, so 
that I had an added value service I could sell to advertisers then I 
might do it" (INTERVIEW). This aside, there has been a tendency for 
certain key Information Providers to sell subsidised adaptors. This 
then embroils them in the guaranteeing and servicing of hardware. 
Which is a strong inhibition to companies trying to maintain a 
clear-cut specialist image, such as the Bank of Scotland. 
Another constant complaint of the Information Providers interviewed 
was that Prestel does not give out information about its 
subscribers. Not even to the extent of their socio-demographic 
attributes and their area of residence. This is an additional 
advantage of joining a local teleservice such as Club403. 
If one sure thing came out in all the interviews undertaken for this 
research it was the alr of seething mutiny amongst InformatioD 
Providers ill connection with Prestel's organization and managerial 
'. 
competence. The complaints ranged from Prestel's high handedness, 
through their bureaucratic inefficiency, and their overriding 
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concern with technical side of videotex rather than the serVlce, to 
.frustration at the high staff turnover within Prestel which leads to 
constant breakdown in business relationships (one tele-retailer had 
8 Prestel account managers in 2 years). 
A spokesman from one of the large mail order companies declared that 
"British Telecom lS so embedded in the system: being a programme 
provider; a network operator; and being involved In 80% of the cable 
stations" (INTERVIEW). The managing director of a teleshopping 
company said that Prestel "wanted to own us; to dominate us, and we 
had to fight against that to keep our independence. They wanted 
their slice, which as a start-up company you can't afford initially" 
(INTERVIEW) . Another te leshopp ing company manager: II the maj or 
problem with Prestel is the cost of the hardware. The other big 
stumbling block is at the moment lS lack of awareness, while you are 
talking about marketing, that is something you should clobber 
Preste 1 with" (INTERVIEW). Finally, Prestel" is now avery, very 
badly run organisation" (INTERVIEW). 
Considering the amount of hyperbole which the directors of the large 
supermarkets delivered at the planning application process, the 
responsiveness of Prestel to pressure would probably induce 
apoplexy. 
The potential tele-retailer not only has the hegemonic position of 
British Telecom to contend with, the restructuring process 
introduces new relations with other capitalists in the new linkages. 
Specifically, these are the umbrella groups, the financial groups 












Vertical competition with tele merchandisers 
The marketing of teleshopping also involves the selling of a 
telecommunications network, appropriate hardware and software and 
perhaps a teleservice package as well. Among the most original 
methods has been that of Comp-U-Card, which has sold its telephone 
ordering service as a promotional offer through various membership 
organisations such as the Automobile Association. "We have found 
over the years that there 1S a lot to be gained in soliciting 
membership m association with another organisation. We have gone 
out with solo Comp-U-Card mailings ... with reasonable responses, but 
you have to put it into the context that we are still after three 
years a relatively unkoown company" (INTERVIEW). 
Each shopping serV1ce 1S branded in the name of their partner (e.g. 
The AA Members' Shopping Service), such that "the customer believes 
that if they Jom the AA ... it is part of their [the AA's] 
service .. The identity is very much with the M" (INTERVIEW). Yet, 
they claim "we have control over the shopping service. We never cut 
the margin with anybody. How we run the shopping service is our 
affair" (INTERVIEW). 
Comp-U-Card's protestations aside there 1S clearly a danger of 
becoming merely a component of an overall teleservice. Particularly 
through a loss of control over the marketing environment which 
follows on from the packaging of teleshopping with other information 
and transactional serV1ces. One umbrella group Club403, went so far 
as to pre-erupt retailers by establishing its own grocery 
teleshopping service, because they needed the transactional serv1ces 
to make their package complete. Although the groceries were 
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provided by a store owned by the Dee Corporation, the selection, 
pack~ and delivery of the goods was all the responsibility of 
Club403. 
In the longer term, the supermarket groups are unlikely to relish 
, , ' 
the giving way of the direct contact between them and their 
customers. The m8J or thrust towards using the store image as a 
brand, and to greater control over the product specifications 
militate against an acceptance of this loss of control. This 1S 
compounded by the skills and infrastructure gap between present 
activities and teleshopping. Umbrella groups will wish to maintain 
editorial control over the selection of services which they market, 
and they are likely to have overall control over the marketing 
information, which comes back from consumer purchasing behaviour (as 
does Prestel at the national level). 
Vertical competition with the financial sector 
A similar problem over access to customer information is likely to 
arise from the eventual integration of financial transactions into 
teleshopping. The V1ew of bankers operating EFTPoS experiments is 
that "who the customer is, what his job is and what his earnings are 
is something that is confidential between the customer and the bank" 
(INTERVIEW). As the bank is not interested in what the customer 1S 
actually purchasing; such information is simply not collated. "The 
retailer gets information on the average transaction value. He also 
has information on how many are credit cards and how many are debit 
cards and that is all" ( INTERVIEW) . 
A major reason for the introduction of in-store credit cards and 
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EPoS systems 1S that retailers get more marketing information than 
ever before. Themail order compan1es recognise this. "With EPoS 
and private credit cards that the High Street will begin to get 
customer information, credit information 1n its shops and on its 
computers. Some of those exclusives are no longer exclusive. But, 
we are only begining to exploit them" (INTERVIEW). 
For the financial sector such systems are only really of interest if 
they extend the logic of EFTPoS, as in Clydesdale Banks link up with 
BP petrol stations. "We were interested in it because it was another 
means of cutting down on paper, if we can get people not to write 
cheques at the filling station then it was doing the same thing 
outside the branch environment as inside it." (INTERVIEW). 
The present crop of in-store cards has given retailers the 
confidence to compete with banks in the provision of credit. As we 
saw above, mail order compan1es have always been active 1n this 
field. Companies such as the Burton Group and Next pIc have 
,-
aggressive expansion plans in the financial services markets. 
It seems much more likely that retailers will develop their own on-
line transactions systems, if only to get the full customer 
information which the banks feel morally obliged to keep from them. 
Kays mail order company have already done this by offering payment 
through their sister company Whitewell Laidlaw from within their own 
database on Prestel. 
However bankers seem unattracted by the prospect of besmirching 
themselves by associating with tele-retailing. "Why should we 
necessarily want to do teleshopping? If it 1S selling group 
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services, I could see us moving 1n that direction" (INTERVIEW). 
Vertical competition with the deliverer 
The final link which sits between the tele-retailer and the consumer 
1S the delivery service. For the mail order company this is no 
problem at all, as it is part their standard operating conditions 
(see Section 5.2.1). The telephone order company, Comp-U=Card 
mainly uses third party deliverers, mainly National Carriers who are 
contracted to deliver the goods within 24 hours, on receipt of the 
order docket (INTERVIEW). 
The more interesting delivery structures concern the local grocery 
teleshopping schemes. As noted above Telecard's delivery was 
organised through a third party, Square Moves. The advantage of 
this for TeleCard was that they could have access to a larger pool 
of vans than their volume of business alone would dictate. They are 
able to offer a mutual advantage to the delivery company because 
most of the grocery orders are delivered during off-peak times. 
TeleCard claimed that neither the loss of face-to-face contact with 
customers was serious nor had they experienced any problems in 
getting priority for the delivery of their orders (INTERVIEW). 
The social serV1ce teleshopping serV1ces have tried to keep delivery 
costs down by limiting the number of times per week each area 1S 
served. The delivery staff are employed under a Manpower Services 
Commission scheme, and the vehicles are partly owned outright by the 
teleshopping services and partly by the local authority (INTERVIEW). 
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Other conflicts of interest 
,The social service schemes are operated on a different set of 
priorities than commercial teleshopping. This in itself causes a 
certain amount of conflict between the retailer and the local 
authority. One of the aims Bradford Centrepojnt was to provide work 
experience through MENCAP, and to people who have had learning 
difficulties. The concern of the management lS to provide a 
reliable delivery service whilst making sure that the staff are not 
overburdened. For instance, the selection of each order entails a 
separate Journey around the supermarket aisles. At first, the 
retailer found Centrepoint's priorities to be in conflict with the 
smooth operation of the store. In time, the scheme began to shake 
down and these problems died away. Although, In common with the 
Gateshead scheme, there are problems of stock control and security, 
and of the control of two different staffs in one store. 
6.2.3 Sqmmary of the vertical linkages ill teleshopping 
Clearly the development of tele-retailing lS not going to be an 
unproblematic extension of the activities of retail capital across a 
virgin territory. The ground lS already inhabited by groups of 
powerful vested interests. 
Teleshopping depends upon specific technologies which are themselves 
sub-sets of the converg~ information technology sector. The core 
of information technology in the UK is dominated by British Telecom. 
The position of British Telecom ill their sector lS enshrined ill 
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legislation and protected by precedent. British Telecom has been 
able to extend its hegemony even into new-build cable television, by 
dint of being one of only two licenced telephony operators and 
through the ownership of the UK's cable ducting network. Even 
without these added advantages British Telecom would be a dominant 
capital as the seventh largest company in the country, and the most 
profitable (Business, 10/87). 
The privatisation of British Telecom has transformed the company 
into one that is now in vertical and horizontal competition, instead 
of being ~ support of,the information technology industries and 
services. Also, British Telecom's status as a private company means 







out of the 
intensive projects it 1S 
innovations that it 
The manner of involvement of British Telecom in the two technologies 
of teleshopping represents a before and after case study. Prestel 
was set up as part of the pre-privatisation policies of the Post 
Office, to help UK manufacturing, and was a leading edge innovation. 
Cable was part of the post-privatisation ethic, and is heavily 
biased to keeping control over the UK telecommunications market, and 
to making above average profits. 
The vigour of the information technology sector works substantially 
to British Telecom's advantage. Hardware and software producers 
have to observe the operating procedures required by the 
telecommunications systems, and are limited 1n their rate of 
innovation by British Telecom's rate and direction of investment ~ 
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infrastructure. Service innovators such as tele-retailers are 
or less obliged to use British Telecom's systems. 
more 
A result of British Telecom's power 1S that it can appropriate 
surplus value produced elsewhere the telematic sector. 
Intangible value such as 1S produced 1n a delivery service, or 
information prOV1S10n 1S the hardest hit. Arguably, though, the 
insistence of British Telecom that all of its ventures should return 
a profit ln the short-term may damage the long term success of 
services such as teleshopping. 
If the rate of profit of tele-retailers stubbornly stays below the 
average rate for retailers generally the innovation simply won't 
take root. Yet, even British Telecom will need to encourage a range 
of teleservices such as teleshopping if it 1S to extend the 
influence of telecommunication beyond its present influence in daily 
life. This process requires that there is a long term prospect of 
an 1ncrease ln the overall rate of profit for all the parties 
interested in such services. 
In retailin~ there has been a long-term decline ln the number of 
links ln the supply chain. Yet, teleshopping complicates the 
distribution chain markedly. This creates conflict over the 
division of labour, particularly over who bears the responsibility 
for marketing the service, who carr1es the costs, and how the 
benefits of control and profit are shared out. 
Likewise, there is a strong danger that much of the initiative 1S 
taken away from the retailer in directing the growth of the service. 






capital described above. Because the conditions for accumulation and 
centralisation of tele-retailing capital will depend upon the 
capital in other links in the chain. 
However, the aggressive movement by mail order retailers into the 
competition with capital adapted to the other links lTI the 
teleshopping supply chain certainly gives them the tools to 
rationalise the teleshopping linkages significantly. Similarly, the 
movement of store retailers into the provision of credit services 
and the increasing use of direct mail catalogues and brochures 
indicates a vertical extension of the competitive struggle by retail 
capital. Developments which are compatible with tele-retailing. 
Overall, however, the key to the discussions lTI this chapter has 
been that the lines of vertical competition in teleshopping are not 
yet firmly marked out. A restructuring of the channels of supply 
will have to take place, and this will require an unravelling of the 
complicated relationships between capitals in the new distribution 
chain. Purely from the need to return above average profits from an 
innovation the complex linkages of teleshopping will have to be 
streamlined. This could take place either through retailers 
contracting their role to that of information broker (and so 
reducing circulation costs and reducing circulation time) or by the 
merging of the present activities of retail capital and those of 
distribution, of teleservice packaging and retail financial capital. 
The lacklustre performance of teleservices and their technologies 1n 
Britain might be attributable to the problems encountered 1n 
achieving the'economies of scale necessary to bring, for instance, 












be taken up ln Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPrER SEVEN 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TELESHOPPING AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE 
IN THE US 
It will be clear by now that the future of teleshopping is bound up 
with the development of its technological infrastructure. The tele-
retailer is faced with a far more complex web of relationships than 
the traditional store retailer. The flow from production capital, to 
retail capital, to final consumer 1S complicated by the 
interposition of new forms of capital. The new linkages require the 
integration of groupings of capital which were previously unknown to 
each other. These new' relationships are simultaneously ones of 
collaboration and competition. 
As if to make matters worse, teleshopping has emerged at a time of 
profound social and econOID1C change. The restructuring of the 
capitalist system has been a response to the general economic cr1S1S 
which began in the early 1970s. Whilst the fundamental, crisis seems 
to run through the entire capitalist econom1C system, it takes 
different forms in each nation state. The historical and contingent 
circumstances vary from country to country, as do the policies with 
which individual governments seek to deal with the cr1S1S. 
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Over the period of the crlSlS the United Kingdom has undergone a 
pronounced change of political direction, associated first with 
austerity measures introduced under a Labour Government and second 
with the rise to power of a C~nservative Government committed to the 
reduction of state expenditure. This has had a direct impact on the 
development of teleshopping, first through the privatisation of BT, 
second in the de-regulation of broadband cable. 
These effects are, however, specific to the United Kingdom. In 
other countries economic restructuring has been approached In other 
ways. Teleshopping has been affected most of all by the different 
policies which governments have applied to the information 
technology industries: if information technology is not the total 
solution to the economic crisis it is seen as the key. 
It is interesting, therefore, to look in more detail at the way that 
the technology of teleshopping has been developed In other 
countries. To do this this chapter compares the situation In the 
United Kingdom with the way that telecommunications and teleshopping 
have been developed in the United States. The fundamental contrast 
between these countries is that during the early 1980s the United 
Kingdom Government has tried to move from a highly interventionist 
telecommunications policy toward towards the sort de-regulated 
environment exemplified by the United States. 
Such compar isons , it is acknowledged, carry dangers. As P ickvance 
(1986) pointed out, comparative analysis is not simply the serial 
treatment of several different countries. It must be an attempt to 
understand the empirical situation In some integrative causal 
framework. The advantage of comparative research is that it allows 
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the observation of a range of circumstances which could not be seen 
lO one country. 
A further advantage of comparative research 1S that it allows the 
researcher to see if the theoretical implications of one empirical 
situation are replicated lO a new situation. To an extent, 
comparative research can be also used to elucidate theoretical 
insights. Unfortunately the theoretical reference of this thesis to 
marxist theory is unhelpful in itself, because of the multiplicity 
of marxist theories of the state, and the by now predictable absence 
of a developed theory of retailing and the state (for an exception 
see Blomley, 1986). Such a theorisation must be on the agenda for 
future retail research. 
The three main sections of the chapter describe how teleshopping and 
its infrastructure have developed in the United States. The first 
section reviews the different accumulation logics which have been 
applied to videotex experiments. The second discusses how the 
United States exper1ence of videotex development is fundamentally 
similar to that in the United Kingdom. Virtually all the material 
in the first two sections is based upon fieldwork interviews. 
\ The third section investigates the more recent phenomenum of cable 
teleshopping, which unlike videotex has experienced a rapid growth, 
and has managed to create a mass market for itself, 10 the U~ited 
States. Unfortunately, cable teleshopping could be dealt with here /' 
only through the limited secondary sources which are available 10 
the United Kingdom. Events moved quickly since 'the United States 
fieldwork was carried out. This new stratum of teleshopp~ 
activity based upon cable television networks rather than telephony 
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has risen to prominence m the past 18 months. 
this were received from interviewees m 
The first reports of 
the United States. 
Unfortunately, at the time it proved impossible to set up 
interviews within the companies concerned. 
7.1 Videotex services 1n the United States 
The logic behind the growth of United States videotex 1S not 
immediately apparent. There have been repeated experiments m 
different formats by types of capital aiming at different markets. 
This is at least partly because the industry itself is not sure what 
its function should be. As one commentator put it: "the videotex 
industry is like gold prospecting. At one time everyone thought it 
was in the home market. Then someone said: 'there's no gold: now 
the actions in the business market.' So all the prospectors run off 
with their pail s and their shovels and start digging around for gold 
there. And they're just chasing around looking for gold" 
( INTERVIEW) . 
The United States, unlike the European countries and Japan, has no 
state sanctioned telecommunications monopoly. The nearest 
equivalent, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) is undeniably a 
dominant capital with 58% of the home telecommunications market and 
80% of the national telephone network (United States Department of 
Commerce, 1983), but it has been prevented from direct provision of 
videotex services. So that, although it may be involved as a 
supplier of equipment and telecommunications for videotex, it cannot 
assume the role of videotex operator. This situation is changing. 
AT&T in compliance with the trust-bust regulation has divested 
itself of the Bell Operating Companies from 1984 (Financial Times 
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24/10/83 pIV). It 1S now moving to the position of being able to 
directly take part In the provision of videotex on its networks. 
In the absence of a centralised telephone agency videotex service 
the onus for the development of teleshopping has lain with other 
levels of capital. Each teleshopping venture which has taken place 
reflects the specific logics of the capitals involved rather 
rather any emergent use-value market (Table 7.1). This can be 
illustrated by a brief account of the three main waves of investment 
In United States videotex. A full review of the various experiments 
1S not necessary as several competent accounts already exist 
(Silverstein, 1883; Howard, 1885). 
7,1,1 High technology videotex ventures 
The first wave of experimentation was propOgated by the high tech 
telecommunications and computer industries. The concern at that 
stage was to create a new market for the hardware. Much of the 
early effort were directed at creating standards and getting the 
technical problems sorted out. Companies such as RCA and AT&T were 
amongst the earliest entrants to this field, although AT&T was 
later prevented from developing this early involvement by the anti-
trust measures. 
Compuserve, a videotex surVlvor from the technocratic tradition, 
sold computer storage and processing on a time-share basis. It 
already had the computers and a network In place. It was a small 
step to mount a videotex serVlce, aimed at programmers and data 
processing specialists and increased the rate of use of their assets 
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during off-peak times. 
Compuserve still has a strong base of computer hobbyists amongst its 
subscribers. However, the serV1ce 1S enlisting 8-10,000 new members 
a month, and has achieved a base of 280,000 (INTERVIEW, May 1986). 
Although in nationwide terms this 1S still small, in videotex market 
terms it 1S a major share. This also indicates that there is a 
certain broadening out of the market base, away from computer 
cognoscenti towards a more general public. 
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7.1.2 Media videotex companies 
The first non-high technology interest in veideotex came from just 
the same United States media giants which were dominating cable 
television. Companies with broadcast interest such as CBS, NBC, 
ABC. Companies with interests ~ publishing and information 
packaging such as Knight Ridder, Times Mirror, Dow Jones, and Time 
Inc. The Source, a small technically orientated videotex operator 
was swallowed up by the media giant, the Readers Digest. 
The ownership by the the broadcasters of the alr time meant that 
they were able to exploit teletext as an electronic publishing 
serVlce. The newspaper publishers saw this as direct competition, 
and videotex as a possible means of fighting back. 
The newspapers had other reasons to become involved ~ videotex. 
The newsprint business was suffering increased production and 
delivery costs. Inflation was high. Interest rates were high. 
There was an overall decline in the demand for newspapers. Added to 
this was the fear and uncertainty surrounding the future supply of 
oil. Finally, there was a buzz in the air about the soon to be 
realised information society. 
Within the United States videotex industry the involvement of 
newspaper publishers such as Knight Ridder and Times Mirror was 
viewed as a response to fears that electronic publishing might be 
directly competitive to newsprint. The sponsorship of Yiewtron and 
Gateway respectively were ultimately insurance policies, undertaken 
to protect market share. The $30 million that Times Mirror spent on 
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Gateway and the $50 million that Knight Ridder invested in Viewtron 
were not likely to scupper companies with turnover in excess of $3 
billion per annum. 
The mass market which these companies were expecting to emerge for 
electronic publishing did not emerge and both services were closed 
down wi thin two weeks of each other in March 1986. At the time of 
Gateway's demise it had 2000 subscribers and although Viewtron had 
reached 20,000 consumers this was only in its last 6 months, and 
only at the cost of considerable marketing efforts by Knight Ridder 
(INTERVIEW). The parent companies concluded that the medium 
represented no real threat to their core business. A Times Mirror 
employee who worked. on Gateway said: "people would use the serVlce 
to scan the news and get the rest from the newspaper~ later ... sports 
fans would undergo the danger of eye strain and read the whole page, 
then look at the newspapers the next day to see all the pictures. 
It did not seem to me to be a competitive service" (INTERVIEW). 
The sudden rlse In subscription levels achieved by Viewtron in its 
last few months was attributable to a radical change In strategy. 
Both Times Mirror and Knight Ridder had placed their hopes in a 
locally based system with the hope that market areas could be opened 
up by selling franchises of the operating system to other publishing 
concerns. This policy together with the problem that 1n order to 
recelve the serVlce the consumer had to have a special terminal, 
this severely limited the group of consumers to whom the service was 
available. The decision to offer a text only verSlon of Viewtron 
that could be received on any personal computer pushed the 
subscriber level from its mid-1985 level of 3000 up to its final 
figure of 20,000 (INTERVIEW). Even this growth was not enough to 
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encourage Knight Ridder to keep Viewiroo afloat, particularly in the 
.absence of competitive pressure once GatewaY was closed. As for 
Times Mirror: "the thrust of the company is now to get back to the 
business of newspaper publishing" (INTERVIEW). 
The DoH Jones News Retrieval Service was initiated under a different 
set of premises than the electronic publishing of Knight Ridder or 
Times Mirror. The primary target was the business sector. Starting 
with the deep corporate pocket, then lowering the a~ towards the 
small business sector; the private investor; and then the middle-
class professional. The costs of the network development were 
partly defrayed by building from the platform provided by the 
Ticker; the Dow Jones wire serV1ce. The information on the service 
was proprietary, and more time-sensitive than price-sensitive. It 
is also used more as a research and decision support tool than a 
browse medium, which 1S what the other newsprint groups were 
original concerned to develop. 
7.1,3 Banking videotex COIDPan1es 
The third wave, of investment, was provided by the banking sector. 
It has grown from some early experiments based on Compuserye, V1a 
the establishment of Video Financial Services a consortium of banks 
seeking to exploit the potential of Viewtron, to the establishment 
of bank based transactional services such as Covidea. In May 1986 
there were some 40 banks involved in these telebanking experiments 
and the number of subscribers has grown from 17000 to 80000 in four 
years (Teleservices Report, 02/86 p.1) 
There were two maln re~ons underlying this investment. The first 
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was to reduce their costs of circulation. The second was to 
differentiate themselves from competitive financial services. 
, As Charles Forbes of Covidea, and the Chemical Bank said: "anybody 
, 
thats going to be successful in videotex needs some strong reasons 
to be in business. Banks have some very compelling reasons. The 
costs in financial institutions are largely people, paper and 
palaces based and there need to be some better ways to do that" 
( INTERVIEW) . 
The interest in telebanking has also been spurred on by a climate of 
competition amongst retail banking institutions. In part this is due 
to the deregulation of the financial sector. The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monitoring Control Act of 1980 allowed 
the entry of many non-banks, such as Merril Lynch, Prudential, 
American Express, and Sears into the business of deposit taking and 
loan offering. The bankers were afraid that these institutions were 
"begining to look, taste and feel like a bank" with the result that 
the banks might find that the newcomers would "eat their lunch" 
(INTERVIEW) . The banks have responded to this pressure by seeking 
new ways to promote themselves and their services. The retail 
market has increasingly become a focus for these efforts. Consumers 
are much less crisis-sensitive than corporate treasurers, as they 
are covered by federal insurance against bank failures. Also, there 
has been a drying up7opportunities amongst the larger compan1es, 
who (increasingly issue their own commercial paper. Finally, there 1S 
continued concern about the risks of lending to the third world. 
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7.1.4 Collaborative videotex 
The signs are that a fourth wave of investment 1S taking place 10 
which consortia comprising different sectors of capital mount a 
service which reflects their joint interests. Covidea itself is an 
example of this trend. Although primarily a banking service and 
informed by a banking perspective it is owned jointly by AT&T I Time 
Inc. , and two banks: Chemical Bank and the Bank of America. Each 
corporation represents one of the historical interests in videotex. 
The other maJor consortium, yet to reveal its hand, 1S another 
combination of corporations from the three sectors. In this case 
Trintex 1S the product of the World's largest computer company IBM, 
the broadcasting company CBS and the combined retail and financial 
might of Sears. The involvement of Sears 1S the first direct 
developmental involvement by a major retailer m videotex. 
Although, it 1S not clear to what extent Sears interest is as a 
financial institution and to what extent as a retailer. The exact 
nature of Trintex project will not be revealed until the end of the 
Trintex research period in 1988. 
This section has reviewed the experiments 10 United States videotex 
from the perspective of the companies initiating these serv1ces. 
The downstream migration of control over teleshopping seems to bear 
out the ideas of some proponents of the filiere concept (Dang Nguyen 
and Arnold, 1985). Although in this case it might be more accurate 
to stress the tendency towards collaborative experiments with more 
emphasis on marketing problems than technical problems. 
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7.2 Structures of control ln videotex 
The lack of any overall control of the telecommunications system as 
exercised by British Telecom or any central direction of the 
videotex services, as provided by Prestel, has resulted in a variety 
of videotex schemes. As we have seen the logic of accumulation 
behind each videotex project differs according to the capital 
involved. Despite the absence of an overall dominant capital such 
British Telecom, the restructuring of relations between the capitals 
concerned is still a problem. In this section we see again that the 
logic of individual capitals lead to a struggle for dominance and 
control over the medium, except that in the United States the result 
of the competition 1S not pre-determined by the power of the 
telecommunications agency. 
7.2.1 Packaging tele-services 
The need for a comprehensive package of tele-services, which support 
each other has been recognised as important in the United States as 
well as in the United Kingdom. There is also a tendency for a tier 
of specialist packaging agencies to emerge. The tendency is weaker 
than in the case of Prestel because many of the major capitals which 
have set up and operated videotex services are themselves involved 
with the media. So that, the likes of Times-Mirror are quite 
capable of developing an editorial function 10 the same way as 
Viewtel and Press288, with their newspaper background, did on 
Prestel. Electronic publishing and editing is less within the grasp 
of companles such as Compuserye with its 
So it has developed an arrangement 
technological background. 
with L.M. Berry, a maJor 




To some extent all tele-retailers need to have their serv1ce 
repackaged to fit the' house requirements and style of each videotex 
service upon which they appear. The level of involvement of a third 
party to help them adapt to the videotex service depends upon the 
sophistication which they have with the methods of tele-retailing. 
For instance, Comp-U-Store, with its experience of telephone enquiry 
systems, was mounted on the Dow Jones system without substantial 
alteration to their database systems (INTERVIEW). 
Most retailers need much more help ~ setting up tele-retailer 
serV1ces, and that 1S the significance of the invo'/vement of L.M. 
,Berry in Compuserye, and is the reason why a special area on the 
Compuserye system has been set aside for teleshopp~, called the 
Electronic Mall. As its name suggests Compuserye think of 
themselves as having the same relation to the retailers as a 
shopping mall management. In fact, the Electronic Mall J.s 
equivalent to a specialist umbrella group within an overall videotex 
system, whilst, overall, Compuserve is analagous to Prestel. At the 
higher level, therefore Compuserye's interest in teleshopping is 
mainly due to its "advertising and lead generating" qualities 
( INTERVIEW) . 
The problem of establis hing a tier equivalent to the Electronic 
Mall has deterred the Dow Jones from developing its teleshopping 
facilities very far. They do not feel that they have the competence 
to set an Electronic Mallon their OWO, and they have no wish to 
coach individual retailers ~ videotex merchandising. They would 
rather do it through a third party. In fact they did have 
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discussions with L.M. Berry on the subject. These discussion 
foundered because L.M.Berry, an arm of AT&T, was subject to the 
anti-trust consent decree which prevented its direct ownership of 
the Electronic Mall. Therefore control of the systems and 
procedures had been passed over to Compuserve, who are Dow Jones 
News Retrieval's leading competitors. 
As James Ambrosio, the Dow Jones database editor said: "we don't 
really know that business. It made sense for L.M. Berry, they were 
used to selling to advertisers. We wouldn't know where to begin. 
We would probably end up shooting ourselves ~ the foot ... The 
concept makes sense we just aren't going to do it ourselves" 
( INTERVIEW) . 
7.2.2 Linkages In videotex 
Given that videotex requlres the same components in its structure 
irrespective of the actual division of labour between the capitals 
involved it lS hardly suprising that similar logics for involvement 
or non-involvement in videotex hold sway as was seen ~ the United 
Kingdom. 
Taking the potential tele-retailer first, we see again that most of 
the interest that has been expressed by traditional retailers coming 
from mail order companles, such as Sears, L.L. Bean and J .C. 
Penney. Sears, has been involved at various levels: as a partner ~ 
Trintex; lD the electronic retailing of financial services; and on 
Compuserve. Penney has invested in the Canadian company Cableshare, 
which has developed interactive videodisc systems (INTERVIEW). 
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In the past, the Direct Marketing Association has come close to 
promoting the idea of videotex to its members, "but their members 
are not ready for it, the mechanisms are not there for it yet" 
( INTERVIEW) . By this they mean that the amoun t of product 
differentiation which takes place within videotex is limited: "there 
is no shopping environment in the Electronic Mall. Who knows where 
you are" (INTERVIEW). 
The local videotex servlce run by Knight Ridder and Times Mirror 
were notably unsuccessful 10 attracting retailers onto their 
servlces, for a simple reason. The markets which they had were too 
small to be worth bothering with for mass retailers. Compuserye 
presented more immediate access to national markets. 
As 10 the United Kingdom the issue of how to cover the costs of the 
supply of videotex terminals has vexed the videotex operators, and 
the solution of providing subsidised terminals has been tried. 
Except that this time it has been the videotex operators which have 
attempted to increase market Slze by offering cut-price terminals. 
Marketing of Compuserye took place through an agreement with Tandy 
Corporation's Radio Shack, an early Mecca for the home computer 
enthusiast and a cheap place to buy the requisite modem. The main 
service offering was software. The lack of graphics on the serVlce 
was in the long term an advantage; the service can run on just about 
any home computer. 
In its last days Yiewtron attempted to save itself by successively 
lowering the.price of its dedicated terminal from its original $600. 
In a similar way Covidea is seeking to attract the domestic user 
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onto its service by offering an AT&T dedicated terminal at $50. 
The successful videotex services are those that have not offered 
dedicated terminals at all, but have depended upon the consumer 
already being equipped with a personal computer and a modem. The 
growth of this proportion of the population seems inevitable, and so 
lS a good basis for a service which does not need an immediate mass 
appeal. This position was occupied by the likes of Dow Jones and 
Campuserve from the begining. It was another tactic tried by the 
failing Yiewtron, and was thought to be the major contributor to its 
rapid increase in subscription rates just before it was shut down. 
The limits to this process, especially for a mass retailer are 
clear. "The mass market can be broached either through having the 
electronics in the TV set or in the telephone, because those are 
ubiquitous instruments In the home. PC's will never have that 
penetration" (INTERVIEW). 
Reflecting upon the closure of the Times Mirror videotex serVlce, 
its representative interjected: "one of the lessons may be that the 
establishment of these services may not be appropriate to media 
companies. It may be better to left to the AT&Ts. Our role may be to 
provide information not infrastrucure" (INTERVIEW). It is possible 
b l.·t was the she did not know how ironic this comment was, ecause 
large print media companies like Times Mirror which had fought tooth 
and nail to prevent AT&T from entry into the market. 
7.2.3 Profit lD United States videotex 
The final and most crucial comparison In the development of 
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teleshopping by videotex 1S the way 1n which surplus value is 
distributed between the various levels of capital, the tactics used 
to ensure that the rate of profit 1S competitive and how the 
struggle for dominance over the service is being carried out. 
i) The distribution of surplus value 
When Time Inc began to look at interactive television serV1ces, they 
found immediately the problem that has dogged the development of 
teleshopping in the United Kingdom. Once all the capitals involved 
in the transaction had taken their cut, they could not maintain an 
adquate rate of profit. Whilst 20-25% of consumers would be willing 
to pay up to $8 per month to rent their service, this figure 
dropped to zero when the rental charge was raised to $15 per month. 
Time Inc. needed $25 per month to make money out of the service, by 
the time they had paid the cable operator half of the revenues and 
paid for the consumer hardware (INTERVIEW). 
ii) Making telshopping pay: the Dow Jones solution 
The DOH Jones and COIDPUSerye overcame the problem of ensuring at 
least average profits by levying time related usage fees, which are 
shared with the tele-retailers. This policy of charging an economIC 
rent and accepting low penetration has been more important to Dow 
Jones than has been the growth ,of market size. As a consequence 
their original interest in the residential market has waned. 
The transactional services available on DOH Jones system are mainly 
business orientated, with the exception of Comp-U-Store. One is an 
on-line stock trading serV1ce, Fidelity On-Line Investments, 
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operated. through a gateway on the UoH Jones system. Another, only 
available as an interactive service since early 1986, 1S a booking 
the Official Airlines and reservations service available 
Guide. 
through 
As a further signal that QQH Jones has turned away from the consumer 
market they have adopted a pricing policy which nudges the 
uncommitted user off the system. As James Ambrosio, editor of 
Database publications for QQH Jones said: 
"We signed up a lot of customers who bought inexpensive PC's, 
spending $500-$600. There are a lot of people out there who buy 
these machines because they thought their kids should have a 
computer. And when they got it they did not know what to do with it 
and maybe they bought a modem and signed up with us, because at the 
time we' d give a certain amount of free time and we weren't charging 
anything per month. So we signed up a lot of people who .... weren't 
us~ the service on a regular basis. We've changed direction. We're 
now implementing a monthly service fee and finding, as we expected, 
that those people who weren't users are dropping off the rolls" 
(INTERVIEW) . 
The QQH Jones has also rejected the transferal of its serV1ce onto 
cable networks, because it does not fall within their cost criteria. 
In order to make the rate of profit which they require they would 
have to charge $18-20 per month. Once the other cable services which 
a customer would sign up for added to the bill, the monthly 
subscription comes to $40 per month. Which would only probably be 
bought by the consumers which they already have. 
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iii) Making teleshopping pay: the Coropuserye solutiQU 
The lloH Jones position is that videotex must be sold on convenience, 
entertainment or price. They do not regard themselves as part of 
the entertainment business, so their services have to appeal on the 
grounds of convenience and price. Compuserye on the other hand has 
founded itself on the entertainment side of the videotex market. 
Its most heavily used resources are bulletin boards and the 
downloading of software for computer games. It has an active policy 
of trying to gain market share by extending the range of general 
interest items in its package of services. 
The overall strategy is to seek more 'consumer orientated' products. 
Two examples of these 'consumer orientated' entertainment products 
can be illustrated. One of them is a personalised subscriber to 
subscriber greet~s service provided by Hallmark. The other is the 
inauguration on the system of a game show, providing subscribers 
with the chance to win prizes, an avenue also explored by British 
Telecom's Value Added Systems and Services Division of which Prestel 
is a part. 
Another way lO which Compuserve has sought to broach wider 
participation is by offering more transactional serVlces. Several of 
the telebanking services have been packaged up on the CQrnpuserye 
system. They have also sought to expand their shopping services in 
order to attract a wider range of teleshopping. This was 
complemented during mid-1986 by the introduction of the first 
gateway servlces on CQmpuserye including one which will offer a 
range of general merchandise. The main way lO which new teleshopping 
serVlces are offered is through CQmpuserye encorporating a greater 
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range of retailers into the Electronic Mall. It has also been done 
by offering Comp-U-Store on Compuserve. 
Associated with the incremental broadening of the appeal of the 
system Compuserye has been increasing its profile as a videotex 
operator. This has culminated In an advertising campaign on 
television and in the glossy magazines. Nevertheless, the marketing 
lS still squarely aimed at the youngish, relatively wealthy, 
sophisticated consumer. The ploys are still based upon time saving, 
lifestyle and convenience, not price, and in this way they are able 
to gain an acceptable return on their investment. 
iv) Making videotex pay: the baokers'approach 
Unlike the videotex publishing and information services, tele-
banking services hope to gain more from the potential to reduce 
costs of circulation, rather than the options for generating extra 
surplus value, as lS the case with the Dow Jones electronic 
publishing. This lS, however, a long term prospect. Given that 
telebanking's success depends ultimately upon its mass penetration, 
along with all the services with which it is packaged, the telebank 
has to follow the long risky route of mass appeal videotex. Videotex 
companles such as Covidea have tried to develop this service in a 
less risky manner by aiming the service at small businesses. In 
their verSlon of tele-banking, they seek to appropriate a share of 
surplus-value from these small businesses, in return for giving 
lower circulation costs to the client business. 
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7.2.4 The locus of control 
As was seen in the United Kingdom, the structures of teleshopping 
are complex, and so have a tendency to dissipate surplus-value 
amongst a number of new commercial capitals. Even where, arguably, 
surplus value is created through the commodification of information, 
the high costs of circulation as compared to more conventional 
methods of obtaining those services reduces the competitive position 
of the tele-service. This is partly due to the paradox that to make 
a service worth buying a range of services must be offered, yet all 
those serv1ces represent a different capital trying to accumulate, 
and so the whole service becomes uncompetitive. The situation may 
change as the economies of scale slowly build-up, but for the moment 
the feeling is: "I'm not saying that there isn't any business here, 
its just that everyone will have to be satisfied with small 
successes. The return isn't that great" (INTERVIEW). 
The nervousness which results from the initial low rate of return on 
videotex ventures 1S heightened by the long shadow which the 
corporate heavyweights involved 10 Trintex throw over the scene. 
Whether it is intentional or not, the threat which Trintex presents 
to the long-term security of companies in the videotex business 
discourages investment. "All of the potential investors sitting on 
the fringes know that $500 million is being spent by major entities. 
Now, a lot of them think that for a few million bucks they cannot 
create a market, and so they are saying; 'why should I spend my 
million dollars, if these guys in say two years will come out with 
the answer. Why should I throw my $1 million away to catch a little 
market stake, when a few years from now these guys might throw me 
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out of business.' So I see a major dis-incentive from the learning 
process. A lot of companies would rather be followers" (INTERVIEW). 
7.3 Teleshopping on cable television 
Home shopping on cable television is a quite different creature to 
the videotex version. Originally cable shopping was based upon the 
sale of bankrupt stock at deep discounts, within a game-show format. 
This caused one interviewee to remark that "Its not merchandising, 
its en tertainmen t " ( INTERVIEW) . 
The cable shopping schemes are true teleshopping systems according 
to the definition adopted in Chapter Three (Section 3.1), but there 
1.S no integrated retvrn path to accept the order and the payment. 
This is done via the standard telephone network, using a freephone 
number and a cred it card. 
Cable tele-retailers adopt a low technology approach to 
teleshopping, with little in the way of overheads. It was ensured 
an immediate mass market because it used a technology which was 
already 1.0 place, and because of its initial very low pricing 
policy. It was able to achieve because it was selling commodities 
which had failed to achieve valorization. 
As trade has gained strength the owners of the pioneering company, 
the Home Shopping Network Inc. (HSN), have sought to sell more 
upscale merchandise. The items were sold by a combination of 
auctioneering and game show techniques over a Florida local radio. 
In 1982 they moved from radio to cable television and went 
nationwide in 1985. 
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HSN 1S presently the largest home shopping company, 1n a market 
which grew from $91,000 to $450,000 (395%) between 1985 and 1986 and 
which is expected to rise above $2 milliion in 1987 (400% growth) 
(Paul Kagan Associates, 1986). When it became a public company Home 
Shopping Network stock rose from an initial offer price of $3 to 
$7.1 on its first day's trading in May 1986 to $38 in January 1987. 
. . Shows ~e 
The rap1d1ty of this growthfthe potential profits to be made and the 
fear of losing out have all attracted a range of imitative cable 
shopping serV1ces (Table 7.2). 
In additition to the examples given, interest has been shown by 
other retailers and media companies (Paul Kagan Associates, 1986). 
In February 1987 J.C. Penney announced plans to develop Telaction, 
1n conjunction with Cableshare Inc, an Ontario based electronics 
company (New York Times, 17/02/87 p19). The Direct Shopping Network 
is a joint venture between Direct Response Broadcasting Network and 
the Silo division of the Cyclops Corporation, which itself was 
bought out by the British retailer Dixons In February 1987 
(Guardian, 18/02/87 p.29). 
The cable channels 1D the United States are heavily dominated by 
media interests, (mainly broadcasting, newspapers, publishers and 
film makers) with telecommunications capital occupying a secondary 
role. The advantage of vertical integration in this sector ensures 
that the routes to the end market are kept open for the owner of the 
cable system. In certain cases this advantage has been extended so 
that other media interests are refused entry to the market, because 
their products are 1n competition with the parent's products 
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(Hollins, 1984). 
Two trends are challenging the dominance of the media companies ill 
cable ~ The tendency towards saturation ill cable markets means that 
the prospects for accumulation have become dim. It also means that 
few of the plumb franchises are still on offer. The second trend is 
that more recent cabling bids have offered a higher technical 
Table 7.2 Cable Shopping 1n the United States 
Service 
a) 24 hour channels 
Audience 
(millions) 
Home Shopping Network 15.0(cable) 
(HSN) 
Cable Value Network 9.0(cable) 
(CVN) 
QVC Network 7.6(cable) 
Shop Television 5.0(cable) 
Network 
Sky Merchant 0.8(cable) 



































COMBl. and 16 major 
cable operators 
Public Company 
(cable operators and 
Sears have interests) 




Pub lic Company 
Horn & Hordat, 
Lorimar Telepictures, 
and Fox TV 
Private Company 




(Source: Business Week 15/12/86 p.60) 
Notes 1 COMB is a Minneapolis based discount retailer. In January 1987 
it was subject to a takeover bid by HSN (New York Times 22/01/87 
p.45) . 
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specification than the standard co-axial tree and branch technology. 
This has raised the capital investment required, increased the 
period of amortization and made the whole venture more risky. As 
with the cabling in the United Kingdom, the response has been 
towards more bids by consortia rather than individual corporations 
for franchises, which weakens the dominance of the media 
The attractiveness of cable shopping was underlined for the media 
companies by the generally flat state of the cable television trade. 
As it has reached saturation there is now a shake-out taking place, 
which is seen in futher concentration as waves of mergers take place 
between media and high technology compan1es. 
Certainly, the 10.6% net profits being earned by cable shopping 
compan1es (Business Week, 15/12/86 p.59) are being looked at with 
some covetousness by cable operators. Nevertheless, the rapid 
migration of capital into cable shopping is thought to be a prelude 
to further shake-outs, as a result of realisation problems due to 
over-investment. For instance QYC was launched in November 1986 with 
a market valuation of $144 million. 
It 1S interesting to note the way that the teleshopping has in fact 
introduced new capital groupings into the home shopp~ trade. In 
the first place the original impetus did not come from established 
capital, let alone established retailers. These companies are able 
to move in later, by setting up joint ventures or associating with 
serV1ces which are finding it more difficult to obtain the bankrupt 
stock with which they introduced the idea. As this has happened, on 
the other end of the supply chain there 1S increased competition for 
access to the limited cable channels available. So that, either 
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cable operators 





ll1 the case of 
actually securing 
contacts with cable shopping 
Home Shopping Network, they 
its outlets by buying-up cable 
The same problems that have beset British videotex and teleshopping 
are found in the United States, in spite of there being no hegemonic 
telescornmunications capital. The role which Prestel plays in the 
United Kingdom has been taken up by the types of compan1.es which 
might operate an umbrella group in the United Kingdom, particularly 
capitals which specialise 111 the prOV1.S1.on of special interest 
services, such as Compuserye and DIDl Jones. This backward 
integration leads to a different division of labour, but does not 
dispense with the problems of realising at least the average rate of 
profit. 





of the corporation that owns the system. 




traditional sector boundaries. This creates great strains for 
videotex operators, as it involves them 1.n all sorts of unfamiliar 
and unlooked for activities, which again 1.S a problem encountered in 
the United Kingdom. 
To meet these boundary definitional problems, there has been a' 
consc1.OUS attempt to build packages which provide a comprehensive 
range of serv1.ces. Thus teleshopping has been on the agenda for the 
videotex operators, and as in the United Kingdom these operators 
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have found it hard to attract retailers on to their networks: 
_retailers who are involved are the mail order companies. 
the 
Other retailers, as ~ the United Kingdom, cannot see precisely how 
tele-retailing can increase either their market size or their rate 
of profit. The solution to the tele-retailing problem becomes more 
clear when the sorts of entertainment led cable shopping services 
are considered. Here the service can be introduced as an additional 
part of the overall cable operation, without the problems of 
building a consumer base of its own. 
Involvement in tele-retailing also requ1res considerable changes 1n 
the mode of competition of retailing. There is the greater 
involvement by third parties in the retail transaction. This 1S 
true not only in the marketing, and transactional processes but also 
~ that the goods have to be delivered. There is the need for new 
skills in the maintenance of databases and client information lists. 
There is the change in the way that the image of the store 1S 
projected. These problems are less severe for experienced mail 
order companies such as Sears and JC Penney. The issue that the 
market which can be tapped through videotex is inappropriate and too 
small is circumvented by the cable shopping solution. But it raises 
problems of its own which is that, companies the size of Sears and 
Roebuck cannot afford to lean too heavily on a form of shopping 
which may turn out to be a fad. 
The United States, with its deregulatory approach to the econom1C 
crisis of the 1970s and 1980s has been the scene of the most 
profitable teleshopping experiments so far seen anywhere. The 
' __ rapidity with which capital has moved into this arena has been 
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startling. Also, maJor mail order retailers have recently lumbered 
onto the scene. The nature of home shopping through these services 
1S clearly uneven and frivolous. It remains to be seen whether the 
business will be stable, or will suffer the sudden demise that 
befell video games. 
The failure of localised videotex 1n the United States, and the 
success of nationally networked cable shopping indicates that there 
1S still a barrier to the provision of general needs retailing such 
as grocery retailing, clothing and so on. Clearly, these 
commodities are not compatible with game-show hype. Cable shopping 
is just not flexible enough to handle orders which are made up of a 
large number of goods such as a weekly grocery order. On the other 
hand, the successful United States videotex serV1ces are too 
dispersed to allow such serV1ces to operate. Mail order style 
teleshopping remains the only option. 
The number of true tele-retailers 1n either of these countries 1S 
very small. The rapid expansion of Home Shopping Network indicates 
the ultimate reality of capitalist social development. Until a clear 
indication of surplus profits is perceived no established capital 
can afford to go near tele-retailing 
In the end, no matter what state policy 1S adopted, tele-retail 
capital will only emerge if it can be demonstrated that it is 
possible to realise surplus-value more efficiently than traditional 
forms of retail capital. Cable home shopping has ,been able to do 
this firstly because it has been selling surplus and bankrupt stock, 
and secondly, because it is using transmission media which are 
already 1TI place. Tele-retailers using videotex can only do so if 
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their style of merchandising is suitable for a dispersed market and 
if subscribers have a strong reason other than teleshopping for 
signing up to the serVlce. At the moment even the densest 
distribution of videotex subscribers is insufficient to support a 
localised tele-retailer. It is here that the action of a state 
controlled telecommunications agency, and perhaps the French 
policy of MinitelisatioD (Bright, 1982; Reynolds, 1986) may be 
crucial to local tele-retailing on videotex. The alternative route, 
interactive cable, may be possible, but serious doubts must be 
voiced about capability of the patchwerk of cable television 
franchises 10 the United Kingdom and the United States of ever being 




TELE-RETAILING AND RETAIL CHANGE 
This thesis has sought 
teleshopping as an 
to develop a theoretical perspective on 
innovation within retailing. A marxist 
perspective was adopted because it offered theoretical insights 
which cannot be gained from following a conventional style of retail 
research. 
The absence of a developed marxist appreciation of retailing 
provided an initial barrier to the objective of the thesis. An 
additional task was therefore to construct an understanding of 
retail capitalism from the basic principles of value theory. 
Given that the theoretical development has taken place Ln 
conjunction with an empirical investigation of teleshopping this 
thesis does not claim to offer more than a first-cut at a marxist 
theory of retailing. It 1S contended, however, that the framework 
used here gives additional power to the interpretation of 
teleshopping as a form of retail change. 
8.1 TeleshoQPing as a mode of horizontal and vertical competition 
The key points which must be noted from the theoretical development 
are that retail capital has specificity as a result of its position 
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In the overall circuits of capital. Furthermore, its function as a 
commercial capital gives it a logic which is to accumulate without 
creating value. This has two primary significances for an 
understanding of teleshopping. First, the retail capitalist is ~ 
horizontal competition with other retail capitalists, which means 
that teleshopping will only be established if it offers a 
competitive advantage for the tele-retailer. Second, the retail 
capitalist competes vertically with other levels of capital. The 
importance of teleshopping here is that it introduces a new set of 
criteria with which a retailer must cope. 
The prospect of teleshopping as a new dominant mode of horizontal 
competition for retail capital was investigated with respect to the 
grocery and mail order trades. In these sectors the prevailing 
dominant mode of competition is at, or is approaching, saturation. 
The exigencies of the law of accumulation mean that some new means 
of accumulation must be found by the capitals ~ each of these 
sectors. 
In th~case of the grocery trade the centralisation of the use-value 
market 1S such that substantial further concentration by the 
capitals concerned is unlikely. They are now looking further afield 
for future growth. For them, teleshopping does not offer sufficient 
prospects for future expansion. At the moment it also does not 
offer an increase in the rate of profit. This 1S because their 
present mode of competition, the self-service store, has allowed 
them to successfully lower their organic composition by making the 
consumer undertake more of the work of consumption. Teleshopping, 
with its delivery service, is at a competitive disadvantage, as a 
result of its higher organic composition. 
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It is The mail order trade 1S 1n quite a different position. 
premised on the attempt to centralise as much of its labour process 
as possible. Also, it had already met the saturation of its mode of 
competition, and was taking steps to lilcrease both its growth 
potential and its rate of profit, which coincided closely with the 
demands of teleshopping. 
The nature of the new vertical competition which a retailer 
encounters when adopting teleshopping, 1S related to the 
technological 
In Britain 
core of teleshoppingj its telecommunications system. 
British Telecom occupies a hegemonic role In the 
provision of teleshopping infrastructure. Having a large capital in 
such a dominant position is a deterrent to entry for any potential 
tele-retailer seeking to make monopoly profits, as they would be 
hard to protect from immediate equalisation. 
The absence of a dominant central capital like British Telecom, as 
was seen In the United States, does not eliminate the problems that 
adopting tele-retailing involves the acquisition of new skills, and 
enmeshes the retailer In a complex set of distribution linkages. 
The basic problem in establishing teleshopping serV1ces 1S that 
there are more agencies in competition for a share of the surplus-
value to be realised from the commodities sold,. Yet the value added 
to a commodity by selling it via teleshopping is intangible, as it 
does not change the material properties of the product, and 1S 
therefore hard to realise. For teleshopping to be established, 
either a new norm of working class consumption which makes room for 
the realisation of such intangible value must be also established, 
or the complex linkages of teleshopping must be streamlined, and. so 
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reduce the costs of circulation. In either case teleshopping must 
demonstrate that it can become an effectl've t' . compe It 1 ve weapon In 
both the horizontal and the vertical senses. 
8.2 Teleshopping and Neo-FOrdism 
The situations under which a new norm of working class consumption 
would be established can only be speculated upon. If it can be 
established and, indeed, if it includes teleshopping, it will have 
to solve the structural crisis which capitalism has been weathering 
since the early 1970s. 
As indicated in Chapter Five (Section 5.3.2), it would be reasonable 
to expect that any solution to the present crisis will involve the 
use of more disaggregated and flexible production techniques through 
the use of information technology. Specifically, the automation and 
robotization of production will allow more flexibility In the 
production of commodities. So that, guarantees of long production 
runs of standardised commodities are no longer pre-conditions for 
profitable capitalist production. Automatic production control can 
allow considerably more customisation of commodities than has been 
the case hitherto. 
At the same time a lot of governmental effort IS going into 
dismantling the welfare structures which underwrote the regime of 
accumulation under Fordism. The criterion of success for these 
policies is a fall in the real social wage. 
It is not suprising therefore that there has been "an enormous 
growth in temporary work, a substantial growth in self-employment, 
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and significant growth 1I1 part-time work since 1981" (Hakim, 1887 
p.93). Recent Labour Force Survey results show part-time workers 
increased from 19.7% to 21.7% of employees (1981-85); self-
employment grew from 9.2% to 11.2% (1981-84); and the number of 
temporary workers, excluding government schemes, grew by 683,000 
(1981-85). The decline 1I1 the 'permanent' workforce from 1981-85 
was from 70% to 66%. 
The significance of flexible labour relations, or the Neo-Fordism of 
which it lS a part, in the present context is that the new labour 
process lS leading to a decentralisation of production, which will 
have implications for the mode of comeptition in retailing. 
The first effect is likely to be the direct effect that mass 
centralised modes of retailing will no longer be complementary to 
the labour process. Superstores and catalogue sales rely on a 
highly predicatable flow of mass manufactured items. One of the 
factors in favour of teleshopping cited in Chapter Three was that 
the range of items now produced was far too great to stock in any 
retail store, in the same vein the lead times in catalogues are too 
great for the Neo-Fordist production systems (Table 3.2). 
The second effect is that the new flexible labour relations which 
capitalism lS trying to establish are immediately competitive for 
their labour-force with retail capital. That lS, the flexible-
temporary-part-time worker lS highly likely to be female (Labour 
Research, 1985). 
The nature of the threat which part-time work and and homework 













retailers on cheap part-time female labour. A fundamental change In 
social organisation which came about th' t . In e ~ enSlve regime of 
accumulation was the increasing involvement of women In the 
workforce. 
A substantial alteration of gender involvement in the labour force 
is likely to flow from Neo-Fordism, which exploits the flexibilty of 
the labour force. The most 'flexible' workers have been the workers 
within retail~, which represent a high proportion of the total 
number of women emploYed. At the moment retail distribution employs 
14% of all female workers and 20% of part-time female workers 
(Employment Gazette, 1987). In an upswing, the rolls of the labour 
reserve army will fall. Whereas in the 1950s the 'labour scarcity' 
of the upswing forced retailers to employ women, in the Neo-Fordist 
upswing the retailers may find themselves having to compete for this 
segment of the labour market. 
The availability of consumer durables under Fordism was a key factor 
in condensing the work of consumption, so that females were able to 
enter the workforce (without a substantial threat to the 
paternalistic household). It may be expected that the new products 
on which Neo-Fordism is built may be used to integrate the 
household and production. Traditional homeworking, IS more 
'Post-appropriate to the days of 'Freely Competitive' than 
Modernist' capi talism, and ought to be substituted by a labour 
process which is rooted Ln computerised production and stock control 
which form the foundations of Neo-Fordism. 
The logic of using telecommunications as a means of disaggregating a 


















1983; Salomon, 1984). The evidence. for substantial numbers of 
telecommuters lS thin. There is thought to be scope for up to 42% 
of workers to be home-based (Glover, 1974). Yet, although the 
actual number lS not known the total impact of telecommuting is 
known to be small (Huws, 1984). 
A study of the emergence of telecommut~ for the Low Pay Unit 
(Huws, 1984) showed that computerised homeworking has clear 
advantages for employers (along the lines of the general tendencies 
of 'flexible' labour relations). Probably the most important 
finding from this study, for the establishment of a new norm of 
working class consumption, lS that teleworking is seen as a means by 
which women can conform to the traditional gender division of labour 
in the household, particularly child care, while continuing to earn 
money and maintaining their career. 
In practice telecommuting will have a small impact upon the labour 
process for a long time to come. As with teleshopp~ technologies, 
the technological systems are not really in place yet, nor are the 
skills required to operate such labour widely disseminated, either 
to management or to staff. Furthermore, many production and 
circulation tasks have to be done in central locations. 
The implications of a maJor increase ~ teleworking would certainly 
be dramatic for traditional retailers and tele-retailers. Even if 
teleworking ~s developed along the relatively restrained lines of 
surburbanising the female clerical labour force into neighborhood 
work centres, or 'back offices,,' (Nelson, 1986), a growing 
familiarity with computer technology ~s liable to breakdown any 
technofear which might detract from teleshopping. 
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The changing spatial configuration of labour may also affect the 
progress of teleshopping. If one can expect the base technologies of 
one period of capitalism to underlie the emergent mode of retailing, 
then one would expect the car dependent superstore mode to give way 
to other forms of retailing. If computer technology is to be the 
technological basis of the "fifth kondratieff wave" then it might be 
reasonable to expect teleshopping to take a prominent place within 
retailing. 
There are also many historical effects which will influence the 
progress of teleshoppiQg. For instance, demographic changes will 
run their course with a steadily rising proportion of the population 
in the 65+ age group (rising from 17% In 1971, to 20% In 2001; 
Employment Gazette 1987). More older people in the population may 
not immediately mean more 'Gateshead Shopping and Information 
Services', but the alternative seems to be more elderly people who 
will need to continue to drive merely to function within society. 
It is worthy of note that the main items which have arisen In this 
section are those that appeared as the speculative pros and cons of 
teleshopping in Chapter Three. In this case however, the discussion 
1S theoretically informed. If teleshopping is to be a dominant mode 
of . it 
of competition for any sector(retail capital it w1ll be because 
provides that capital with an avenue towards accumulation and an 
above average rate of profit. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TECHNOLOGIES 
FOR TEI,EI,ESHOPPING 
This Appendix provides supporting material for the discussion in 
Chapter Six of the technological background to teleshopping. 
Attention is focused on the the developmental circumstances, In the 
United Kingdom, of each the two technologies in turn. Prestel the 
British Telecom version of videotex is taken first. Second, the 
nature of broadband cable television is discussed. Both of these 
technologies were promulgated as policy instruments to improve the 
competitive position of the United Kingdom In the information 
technology industry. To make clear what the competitive conditions 
are which would prompt this action the background to the 
globalisation of the information technology sector is given in the 
third part of the Appendix. 
1 Videotex 
Videotex was developed by the Post Office at the same time as an 
ostentiably similar technology called teletext, was being worked on 
by the BBC. Teletext is a one-way only technique by which some 
marginal extra information can be broadcast along with the standard 
signal. Videotex is interactive, but was also an attempt to gain 
some marginal extra use out of an already existing system. The Post 
Office had the idea that Prestel, their version of videotex, would 
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be mainly used by domestic consumers, and would Increase the rate of 
use of the telephone system at off-peak times. 
The BBC and the Post Office, being state agencies, were concerned to 
develop these technologies in such a way as to improve the terms of 
trade for the United Kingdom television industry. So, despi te the 
limitations of teletext's rigid frame-based data storage system, the 
slight development lead that teletext had over Prestel encouraged 
the Post Office to adopt the teletext display standard for Prestel. 
Thus, "avoiding a proliferation of standards and making it easy for 
the TV industry to produce the new sets." (Fedida and Malik, 1979 
p. 21). 
Prestel was slower and more expensive to develop than teletext 
because it 1S more technically and organisationally complex. 
Videotex requ1res more sophisticated database software so that 
subscribers can interrogate its files. By the time Prestel came to 
market 1n 1979 the Post Office's investment was £5 million 
(Economist, 25/03/78 pp.70-71) compared to the £250,000 that the BBC 
spent on the development of Ceefax (McIntyre, 1983). 
1.1 The cOmmon Carrler policy and gateways 
Prestel 1S also much more complex than Ceefax because the Post 
Office wished to limit its role to the provision of "the computing, 
network and line facilities and the operational software to run the 
system." (Fedida and Malik, 1979 p.24). Whereas the BBC 1S 
comfortable In an editorial role, the Post Office thought that for 
them to provide and control all the information on the database 
. "t The·· l·dea was that Prestel would would be beyond the1r rem1 . 
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.. 
emulate the rest of the telephone service In being a passive media 
for the transmission of information. ThI" s is known as a COmmon 
carrier policy. 
Being a common carrier Prestel was able to charge subscribers for 
using the service and the thO d t" Ir par Ies who were providing 
information for Prestel. These Information Providers (IPs) were 
charged for each frame stored. The Post Office supposed that the 
IPs could make money by charging end users a fee each time they 
called a particular page m the database. Such page charges are 
collected by Prestel and passed on to the IP after the deduction of 
a small commission. 
The common carrier policy has not been an unequivocal success. 
Prestel has been beset with problems m keeping its house in order. 
Each IP can put up any information as long as it complies with the 
standard laws concerning obscenity and libel. Consequently, Prestel 
has been repeatedly accused of being unwieldy conglomeration of 
servIces with no guarantee of either the quality or the completeness 
of its contents. There was also a feeling that the IP's 
contribution was 'unenthusiastic ... ,and unimaginative' (The 
Economist, 11/08/79 p.93). 
Over the years Prestel has tackled this problem by actively 
encouraging some IPs whilst nudging others into the sidelines, or 
caj oling them into better housekeeping. This was particularly 
apparent ill 1981/1982, as BT was limbering up for its public 
flotation. Prestel's facilities and funding were drastically cut 
back, and re-orientated away from the residential market towards the 
more profitable business sector. The residential serVIces were 
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streamlined to focus upon use-value already showing some promise, In 
particular the computer hobbyist market. 
When the Post Office designed Prestel it sought consciously to keep 
the storage of the information in-house. This allowed it to protect 
the software that it had developed and increased the chances that 
the users would have a reliably run system at their disposal; at the 
time computer skills were not as common as they are now even amongst 
large firms. However, by holding all the information on a central 
computer the interactivity, which 1S videotex's great relative 
advantage over teletex, was degraded. IPs could not be communicated 
with directly, and the information on the database was static. The 
result was that services which requ1re full interactivity, such as 
telebanking and teleshopping, could not be effective until Prestel 
implemented a gateway to the retailer's or banker's computer. Even 
when, lTI March 1982, gateways to allow users direct access the 
information providers' computers, the format was constrained by 
Prestel's cumbersome frame storage protocols. 
1.2 Closed user groups and private videotex 
The more focused approach Prestel adopted from 1982 made a 
significant use of the closed user group (CUG). In Prestel's case a 
CUG could be limited to a business firm which uses the system to 
communicate information with branch offices or sales 
The costs to t he firm of operating have been quite representatives. 
stiff. In 1980 it was estimated that a Prestel facility of 15000 
frames would cost £75000 to support over 3 years. Conversely, a 
private videotex system based on a Packet Switch System leased from 
BT and of the same size would require the more acceptable sum of 
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£40620 (Haimes, 1980). Such calculations have fueled the growth of a 
'private videotex market based on the long distance communications 
services that BT, and more recently Mercury, have been installing. 
In 1984 there was thought to be about 400 private videotex systems 
~ the United Kingdom, although a survey by Yates-Mercer (1985) 
could only locate 242 companies admitting to having experimented 
with the technology. There is also a substantial penetration of 
bureaux which offer private videotex to third parties. The 
companles involved include subsidiaries of British Leyland (Istel), 
Datasol ve (Thorn-EMI) and Scicon (BP), as well as companies with 
more obviously related intersets (GEe, IBM, and IeL). Other groups 
are large enough to have networks of their own which offer almost 
nationwide local call access, for instance the Midland Bank Group 
(Fastrak) and Thompsons Travel. 
A small industry of at least 25 companies has grown up to provide 
software to service private and public videotex, including: Jasmin 
Electronics; Metrotel; Langton Electronic Publishing. Also involved 
is a clutch of computer industry companles IeL, IBM, Torch, RDOC, 
Sperry and GEC, the supplier of computers to Prestel (Yates-Mercer, 
1985). Industry sources indicate that the most successful videotex 
f Ar g Computex, DISC International (an ex-packages come rom eon, 
subsidiary of Debenhams), and Langton, all of them specialist 
companies (INTERVIEW). 
Closed user group s also provide a relatively secure means of 
creating special interest clubs within the Prestel subscriber base. 
In the past Closed user group's have been used as the basis of 





for the maJor private viewdata networks to expand their closed user 
·groups· to include the residential market. Indeed this 1S already 
happening with the Clydesdale Bank . lntroducing a remote banking 
service, Telebank on Fastrak, in November 1986. 
1.3 The growing pains of Prestel 
Whilst teletext quite quickly became a commonplace optional extra to 
more expensive televisions the television industry seemed unable and 
unwilling to respond to the Post Office's challenge. Unable because 
Prestel did not immediately penetrate a mass market as did the BBC's 
broadcast teletext. Mass production of the relevant chips was 
deferred until the television manufacturer's could be sure of a 
large demand. A survey in May 1979 indicated that out of 2,350 tv-
rental showrooms 10 the country 60% were stocking teletext sets 
whilst less than 2% had any Prestel sets on display (Petty, 1979). 
The television set makers were also unwilling to make Prestel sets 
cheaply because they were hoping for a re-run of the technological 
rents that were accrued during the early days of colour television, 
so they kept the prices high. In 1979, when Prestel went public an 
adapted set cost more than double the equivalent teletext receiver, 
and the rental fee was initially £6 per month greater (Table AI). 
This prern1um rose to £12 per month by the middle of 1980 whilst the 
extra cost of a teletext set 'over an ordinary colour television fell 
t . t £50 W1'th such h;dh unit costs it 1S not suprising that the o JUS. ~ 
revival in demand for consumer electronics 10 the early Eighties did 
not spill-over into the sale of Prestel sets. The benefits of this 
boom were safely gathered in by the manufacturers of both teletext 
sets and video cassette recorders (Economist, 15/03/80 p.63). 
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Until late 1980 the Post Office continued to look "askance at 
requests for black boxes to be approved for connection with its 
telephone network - fearing that they would undercut the special 
Prestel sets that television set-makers had been persuaded, with 
difficulty, to manufacture" (Economist, 25/10/80 p.83). Even when 
the Post Office grudgingly approved four "black boxes" they 
predicted a "short happy life" for the adaptors and the generally 
small companies that made them (ibid. p.83). The assumption was 
still that the major television set manufacturers, would soon take 
over the production of these services. 
In the event Prestel enjoyed most success in business information 
transmission, particularly in the travel trade. Even so, Prestel 
fell far short of the Post Office's expectations, and today it 1S 
still a minority interest, with very little consumer awareness of 
its potential or even its existence (Table A2). 
1.4 The current situation 
In 1987 Prestel 1S still highly dependent upon the travel trade for 
the core of its business. This aspect is highly lucrative and a 
portion of it has been seduced away by other private videotex 
providers, such as Istel (British Leyland). In other cases, travel 
companies have set up their own private videotex networks: Thomas 
Cook's Fastrak (part of the Midland Group) and Thompsons are two 
systems with a very wide coverage. 
In the light of this, it is interesting to reflect that a large 
proportion of the travel trade is still dependent for its 
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terminals 
on small specialist companies such as Tandata, and Bishopsgate. 
·Although the lion's share (40%) of the market goes to Sony 
(Guardian, 19/09/87 p. 15). Indeed, Sony is thought to account for 
29% of the entire United Kingdom videotex terminal market (Guardian, 
29/01/87 p.28). A lot of subscribers, of course use computers, with 
an alternative 'black box' to convert the analogue signals of the 
telephone network into the digital signals used by computers. Even 
this market is largely inhabited by small companies, such as Pace 
and Miracle. 
Table Al Domestic Equipment Costs (historic prices) 
Adaptor Adapted Colour Television 26" 
purchase price rental per month 
£ £ £ 
Teletext 
1977 200 750 5 
1979 n/k 700 2 
Videotex 8 1979 n/a 1500 
1980 500 1200 14 
Key: n/k - no figures availabe 
1 · ed for use with Prestel until 1980. n/a - no adaptors were lcenc 
(Sources: The Times and The Economist) 
Table A2 Prestel's progress 
Year No. of frames No. of IPs No. of subscribers 
1980 150,000 200 
2,500 
March 500 10,000 March 1981 200,000 900 14,400 Harch 1982 275,000 1,060 25,000 Harch 1883 300,000 n/g 38,000 March 1984 n/g 
nlg nlg Harch 1985 nlg nlg 63,000 Dec 1886 315,000 
Key: n/g -not given 
(Source: British Telecom Annual Report) 
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·As an attempt to succour 
the ailing United Kingsom television 
industry Prestel was a failure. Its demise was final with the 
recent sale of Ferguson to the French 
owned Thomson Grand Public 
(Guardian, 10/07/87 p. 23) M ttl . 
. os e eV1.sions made in Britain come 
now from branch plants, owned by multinationals such as Sony or 
created from J' , t 
OlD ventures set up in the late 1970s by companies 
such as Rank and Toshiba or BEC and H1.·tach1.· (Daily Telegraph, 
23/02/79) . 
2 The development of broadband cable 
Although cable television systems have been a feature of 
broadcasting since its earliest days, most of the systems which are 
installed are simple relay stations, perhaps servicing a block of 
flats, or a local area where tv antennas have been deemed unsightly 
(Hollins, 1984). These cable networks are usually only capable of 4 
to 6 channels. 
The cable systems which are useable for teleshopping are the new 
build broadband systems cable capable of up to 30 channels. Using 
the extra capacity and improved signal switching techniques, 
interactive videos of product information combined with an ordering 
facility become possible. A user might call up instructions on how 
to construct a flat-pack wardrobe, or might screen a fashion show. 
It would even be possible to place an order for the goods seen 
without interrupting the screening. On cable, such quas1.-
entertainment serV1.ces would almost certainly be freed from connect-





cable has been installed in the United States Slnce the 
Its development in the United Kingdom was effectively 
by the highly regulated nature of the United Kingdom 
television transmission l"ndustry. T 1 e evision has traditionally been 
a highly regulated industry, with the BBC and IBA companies having 
hegemony over the supply of broadcast services. Therefore, cable 
systems have always been subject to the rule that they must carry 
the broadcast services available to non-cable viewers m any 
locality. 
This situation is changing for two main reasons. Satellite serVlces 
which beam across regional and national boundaries are now coming on 
stream, both from low power communications satellites and the direct 
broadcast satellites which households can receive by using a small 
satellite receiving dish. 
The second reason is that the United Kingdom cable industry formed a 
powerful lobby to argue that broadband cable was the key to the 
future economic prosperity of the nation. The Information 
Technology Advisory Panel was set up to report directly to Prime 
Minister Thatcher. This panel included the managing director of 
Rediffusion Computers (now ROCe), the managing director of Mullard, 
and the chief executive of the computer services division of British 
Oxygen. Given the strong support for an immediate and substantial 
programme of cabling which ITAP recommended (ITAP, 1982) it is not 
suprising to reflect that at the time Rediffusion, Mullard's sister 
company Visionhire and its parent Philips, had the largest number of 
\ 
cable television subscribers in the country (Table A3). Also on the 
day that ITAP's report was published BOC announced the sale of the 
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majority of their Computer Services Division to Thorn-EMI (Hughes et 
. aI, 1882). 
2.1 The types of broadband cable 
New build cable networks, legalised under the Cable and Broadcasting 
Act (1984), represent a new generation in cable systems in Britain. 
There are two types of switch which are candidates for inclusion in 
new build cable: tree and branch and switched star. Tree and branch 
cable 1S a method of cabling that has been tried and proven in the 
United States. The cables are arranged as a tree, with a trunk 
cable from which branch cables are hived off at intervals to feed 
local areas within the network. This method invo 1 ves the 
transmission of all the channels to all of the homes on the network. 
A decoder In the subscriber's television set unscrambles the 
channels to which the household has access. Interactivity 1n tree 
and branch networks 1S provided through the allocation of one 
channel as a response path. The technique requ1res that all 
communication 1S V1a the central transmission station. If the 
response channel was used heavily, the branching organisation of the 
switches would lead to congestion. 





















The proven status of tree and branch technology means that it 1S 
cheaper and has a track record of reliablility when compared to 
which is the other new build cable standard. As its switched star, 
name suggests, switched stat is distinctive in the way that the 
signal is marshalled around the system by the switches. The signal 
received m the home is limited to around four channels at anyone 
time. The four channe Is which are rece i ved can be changed by 
entering numbers on a keypad. The instruction is sent to a switching 
hub which serves between 50 and 100 homes and which responds to 
subscribers individually. With switched star there is no need to 
scramble the message. The switch will be able restrict access to 
channels to authorised users only. Because there 1S no scrambling 
of the signal, the picture quality can be improved and there no risk 
of subscibers tampering with the equipment. 
Switched star costs more to install, as a switch has to be installed 
for every 50-100 households whether or not they eventually become 
subscribers. The switching capacity however allows a greater volume 
of upstream flow as it maximises the use of the return path, and 
offers the opportunity for subscriber to subscriber communication. 
2.2 Cable franchises 
In assenting to the development of broadband cable the British 
Government set a system under which franchises would be awarded for 
areas of 100,000 homes. The new industry was to be regulated with a 
light touch by a central Cable Authority. 
Since the or iginal franchises were awarded., 
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there has been a shift 
In the balance of ownership of cable companies. The persistence of 
·the "must carry rule" did not improve the prospects for the old 6 
channel cable systems and the 1 ack of SUccess amongst the 
traditional cable operators 
In obtain~ new build franchises has 
led to the withdrawal of both Visionhire and Rediffusion from the 
cable television arena. This . t lS In erest~ as two of the chief 
architects of the ITAP report were associated with these companies. 
To fill the vaccuum the main entrant has been R obert Maxwell's BPOC, 
which bought out the Rediffusion cable networks, as well as 
invest~ in satellites and terrestrial broadcasting, electronic 
databases and local radio. 
Other large scale media companies such as Granada, Thorn-EMI, and 
the ubiquitous News In terna t ional have also been, taking an 
increasing role in cable television, direct broadcast by satelitte 
and electronic publishing. 
3 The globalisation of the information technology sector 
The internationalisation of television manufacture lS merely a 
symptom of a general globalisation of the industries upon which 
teleshopping lS technologically dependent. The centralisation 
process lS currently running like wildfire because traditional 
market boundaries are being undermined by the convergence of 
technological disciplines into a single information technology 
industry. Clear evidence that this lS taking place lS In the 
integration of previously separate telecommunications and computer 
divisions of maJor high technology companles such as Siemens, 
Philips and Nixdorf. Other companies have found suitable partners 
to strengthen their strategic position, as lS seen in STC's 1984 
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acguisition of reL AT&T t 
, aking a 25% stake m Olivetti, IBM's 
absorption of R 1m 
15/08/87 p 15). 
o , and Ericsson's buyout of Datasaab (Guardian, 
The centralisation of the telecommunications industries has long 
been contributed t b th 
o y e monopoly status of most telephone 
operators (PTTs),n t ~l wes ern countries. The attempt by the Post 
Office to promote home grown industrial interests with Prestel was 
clearly just part of a general policy in the maintenance of the 
national technology manufacture. This policy, together with the 
long life expectancy of the simple electro-mechanical switching 
equipment required for voice communications led to the build up of 
close relations between the national telephone operator and a small 
group of manufacturers willing to supply equipment which was 
compatible to the network. 
With the emergence of information technology more complex switching 
techniques were required. ITT, Ericsson and Siemens were particular 
adept at being on hand when PTTs decided to modernise their networks 
(Dang Nguyen, 1985). In particUlar, they actively sought to appear 
to be a home producer by establishing or acquiring local 
subsidiaries. 
The leading companies m telecommunications field are given m Table 
A4. Until recently, Western Electric, a subsidiary of AT&T, has not 
been able to compete outside of the United States because of United 
States trust regulations. The United Kingdom has seen a declining 
share of trade in the period 1960 to 1980. The United Kingdom maj or 
companles involved are GEe, Plessey, Cable and Wireless (now 
privatised), STC (partly owned by r'IT), Racal, and Ferranti. 
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GEC, STC and Plessey were the maJor participants In the belated 
attempt to make a future for 8ritish switching technology with 
System X, again at the behest of the Post Office (HMSO, 1877). This 
joint operation has been subject to constant dispute, mainly over 
the division of labour within the project. The industrial 
contributors were not keen to interrupt the flow of profits which 
they had received from the supply of electro-mechanical equipment 
during the 1870s. In the event STC pulled out in 1882. A bid by 
GEC for Plessey was barred by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
in 1986, mainly because of opposition to the power bloc the merged 
company would form In the supply of equipment to the Ministry of 
Defence. Eventually, lTI October 1887 GEC and Plessey announced the 
merging of their telecommunications divisions, 
production of System X could be rationalised. 
Table A4 The World's twelve largest telecommunications 
manufacturers (1982) 
Market Share (%) 
1973 1982 
Western Electric (US) 40 33 
17 15 ITT (US) 11 12 Siemens (FRG) 
7 8 Ericsson (Sweden) 3 7 Alcatel-Thomson (France) 
6 6 GTE (US) 4 6 Northern Telecom (Canada) 4 / 4 Philips (Holland) 5 4 NEC (Japan) 2 2 Plessey (UK) 2 2 GEC (UK) 3 2 Italtel (Italy) 
so that the 
(Source: Da.n.g Nguyen, 1885) 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE FIELDWORK PROCEDURE 
1 Selection of candidates for interview 
1.1 The,part~cipating f,irms were selected by trawl;n 
to ldentlfy the prlncipal f' , ~ g the trade literature 
t 1 h ' lrms operatlng at each point in the 
e es 0pplng supply chain (section 6.2.2). 




i) the small number of act;ve ~ tele-retailing firms (sections 5.2.3 and 
7 • 1) . 
ii) the concentrated nature of the retail grocery and mail order sectors. 
With such a limited field of d'd t can l a es a policy of talking to as many 
of the largest five firms in h t eac sec or was adopted. Additionally 
two convenience-store chains were approached. 
T~e network operators had to include Prestel as the only significant 
Vlew data network provider in the UK. Two cable companies, representing 
a tree and branch and a switched star system operator, were also 
approached (see Appendix 1). In the US the operators of the main 
viewdata trials were also solicited (section 7.1) 
Interviews were also sought with one company involved in the 
provision of viewdata software and two companies selling viewdata 
hardware (Tandata and Pace) . 
1.5 Three of the larger general information providers on Prestel were 
also interviewed, as were two banking groups involved in the cashless 
banking trials. 
1.6 Individuals within the firms were selected, again by a trawl through the 
trade press. Key figures within each firm were sought on the 
likelihood that they could: give a strategic overview of their firm's 
position; and that they were in daily contact with the operational 
issues which face retail capital. In general this meant the 
managing director of small companies and the marketing or trading 
director of larger companies. 
2 The interview 
2.1 It was not practicable to devise a questionnaire which could be 
used for all the interviews. In interviewing such a range of firms. 
the critical issues involved varied markedly. There was, however, 
overlap between the questions within groups of firms, particularly: 
the grocery retailers; the mail order retailers; and the teleshoppin~ 
pioneers. The questions which formed the basis of each of these differel 
types of interview were centred around the specific forms which the 
horizontal and vertical competition is taking in their current 
mode of retailing and the form which they would take with teleshopping. 
The other main points' . 
. were: ~nvestment pract~ces and targets· ma~n competitive t t . ' . 
. s ra eg~es; research and development strateg~es; and 
the ~aJor.obstacles to the introduction of teleshopping given present 
trad~ng c~rcumstances. 
2.2 Each interview was conducted on the firm1s premises, it was recorded 
using a cassette tape recorder and lasted between one and two hours. 
3 Analysis 
3.1 A full transcript was made of each tape. 
3.2 The transcripts were then edited, so that only the salient points 
(with respect to the issues .in section 2.1 above) remained. 
3.3 The edited transcripts were returned to the interviewees for comment 
and correction. In most c~ses the interviewees were quite happy 
to be quoted by not attributed. Under the terms of the interview this 
has prevented the citation of individual names and companies in the 
thesis, except in specific instances. Thus the list of companies 
interviewed is also not cited. 
3.4 The transcripts were then reviewed and analysed with respect to the 
nature of vertical and horizontal competition which was revealed. 
The comments relevant to each main theme identified (e.g. conflicts 
with current mode of retailing) from all the interviews were then 
pulled together for use in the illustrative passages in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven. 
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